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1. Introduction 
 
Online sports betting markets have experienced considerable growth during the last 
decade, not least due to widespread access to broadband, liberalized regulation of internet 
gambling, as well as the emergence of online betting channels and product innovations (see, 
e.g., Gainsbury, 2012; Williams et al., 2012). Anyone can these days bet on a huge variety of 
sporting events and different outcomes within them, both before and during the events. Sports 
betting is rapidly turning from being a monopoly-based governmental affair into a 
competitive global industry with an ever-increasing number of participants, both bookmakers 
and betting exchange platforms, providing attractive prices to consumers who place their bets 
rather online than over the counter in a high street shop. Despite these changes, the 
fundamental difference between sports betting and other forms of gambling still remains: as 
there are no pure objective probabilities in sports betting, it is possible to earn abnormal 
returns by deriving the outcome probabilities more sharply than the rest of the market. 
At the same time, different betting markets have received lots of attention in the 
academic literature due to their similarities with financial markets (see, e.g., Pankoff, 1968; 
Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Sauer, 1998; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Durham et al., 2005). 
Most importantly, it is argued that betting markets are better suited to efficiency tests than 
traditional financial markets because they encompass several advantages as an empirical 
setting, while also having commonalities that provide insights into traditional markets. 
Because payoffs of bets are contingent on the occurrence of uncertain sporting events, sports 
betting markets generate information about the likelihood of these events in the same way that 
financial markets aggregate information about uncertain future asset payoffs. Moreover, 
researchers in finance have been interested in the behavioral motives that make people 
participate in gambling-related unprofitable investments at the same time that they buy 
insurance. As theories of decision making try to explain how individuals behave under risk 
and uncertainty, basing the analysis on probabilities and outcomes, decisions about betting 
can actually be seen as simplified versions of any decisions. 
Similar to conventional financial markets, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) with 
its three different forms applies also to sports betting markets. Given an information subset 
specified by the EMH, enquiries of market efficiency in the context of sports betting can be 
carried out through two different lenses: statistical and economic (see, e.g., Dowie, 1976; 
Gandar et al., 1988; Gray and Gray, 1997). The statistical lens inspects whether betting odds, 
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which represent subjective probabilities assigned by market participants for different 
outcomes, are unbiased estimators of outcomes of sporting events. The economic lens 
examines the existence of profitable betting strategies. Because of the bookmaker margin, i.e. 
transaction costs included in betting odds, statistical efficiency does not necessarily translate 
into profits and is therefore mostly of academic interest. Economic efficiency, on the other 
hand, is full also of practical relevance and is often considered as the stricter and definite test 
of efficiency; the question whether a (statistical) bias is (economically) exploitable lies at the 
heart of the definition of betting market efficiency (Pope and Peel, 1989). 
 
1.1. Purpose and contribution 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate weak form market efficiency of online 
sports betting in European soccer from both the statistical and economic perspective. In sports 
betting, weak form efficiency implies from the statistical perspective that betting odds are 
unbiased estimators of different outcomes when using only historical betting odds 
information. From the economic perspective, weak form efficiency means that a bettor cannot 
earn profits by using the same information. Using both the highest and average odds quoted in 
the online betting market for 95,789 soccer matches in 74 divisions in 45 European countries 
between 2009 and 2014, I examine the efficiency of the popular 1X2 betting with three 
possible match outcomes: a home win, a draw, and an away win. 
The statistical efficiency part of the study performs three different tests. First, the 
relation between subjective (market consensus) and objective (actual historical) probabilities 
of home wins, draws, and away wins is modeled with linear regression. Second, the same 
relation is modeled with both binary and multinomial logit regression. Third, I will move 
from inspecting statistical efficiency on the aggregate level to investigating it on the 
individual odds level, grouping the average betting odds and testing the probabilities implied 
by these odds against the groups’ empirical probabilities based on historical match results. 
The economic efficiency part, employing the highest odds available in the market 
instead of the average odds used in the statistical part, is comprised of four sections. First, on 
the aggregate level, net returns of unit bets are regressed on the corresponding odds applying 
tobit regression, inspecting whether these returns are non-positive across all odds levels. 
Second, odds are grouped on the basis of odds level and rates of return of each group are 
tested against the profitability threshold. Third and fourth, profitability of some naïve and 
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sophisticated value betting strategies is explored with the sample, respectively. The idea with 
the sophisticated strategies is that economic inefficiencies might stem from two alternative 
sources, either from statistical inefficiencies or from taking advantage of outlier odds even 
when the market is statistically efficient on aggregate.1 
The study advances the literature that examines weak form betting market efficiency 
in three directions. First, to the best of my knowledge, the thesis uses a data set more 
comprehensive than in any relevant previous soccer study, both in terms of the number of 
matches considered and the number of bookmakers whose odds are taken into account when 
determining the average and highest odds for each outcome. When testing betting market 
efficiency, a large sample size is important for a number of reasons. If a betting market is only 
marginally inefficient, the sample size must be very large before the tests have reasonable 
power (see, e.g., Gandar et al., 1988; Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Gray and Gray, 1997; 
Nyberg, 2014). A larger amount of data also allows us to perform more accurate tests on any 
given odds level. Even though the aggregate tests of efficiency might show a betting market 
to be inefficient, the deviations from efficiency often occur at some specific parts of the odds 
spectrum, which can be revealed only by the odds level analysis. Moreover, when building 
potentially profitable betting strategies, a greater number of bets with a positive expected 
value enables more precise specifications as well as more consistency in returns. Finally, 
when here covering an outstanding variety of European soccer divisions, we can draw 
conclusions that hold in the whole 1X2 betting market in European soccer. 
As the second empirical contribution, the study comprises one of the first extensive 
examinations of 1X2 soccer betting during the online betting era, which is characterized by a 
greater number of bookmakers and other market participants, lower bookmaker margins, and 
intensive competition (Gainsbury, 2012; Williams et al., 2012). This contrasts starkly to the 
contexts in the majority of earlier studies of betting market efficiency, in which statistical 
biases, if found, have usually not resulted in economic inefficiency because of higher 
bookmaker margins (see, e.g., Pope and Peel, 1989; Cain et al., 2000; Deschamps and 
Gergaud, 2007). Third, as the study separates the statistical and economic tests of efficiency, 
it is able to search for value bets, i.e. sources of economic inefficiency, both from potential 
                                                 
1 The latter scenario is actually behind the provocative title of this thesis. If the difference between the outlier 
odds and the (statistically efficient) market consensus is large enough, it might be possible to earn an abnormal 
(economic) return in an (statistically) efficient market. 
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statistical inefficiencies and quasi-arbitrage2 opportunities. In this respect, the study differs 
from the majority of earlier literature that focus either on the statistical or economic 
dimension of betting market efficiency. 
 
1.2. Motivation 
 
The motivation for this study is also threefold. The first motive stems from the widely 
accepted fundamental view that sports betting markets resemble simple financial markets that 
provide ample opportunities for economic analysis not available in other financial markets 
(see, e.g., Pankoff, 1968; Dowie, 1976; Gandar et al., 1988; Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Gray 
and Gray, 1997; Sauer, 1998; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Durham et al., 2005; Stekler et al., 
2010). Investments in sports betting markets have always a well defined start and end point to 
study as well as quick processing of returns, which allows for the examination of the efficient 
market hypothesis in an uncomplicated environment. Moreover, due to the large amount of 
data readily available, it is possible to obtain robust tests of various hypotheses. While a vast 
amount of studies explore efficiency for instance in stock markets—whether share prices 
represent unbiased views of true values of companies—the true value of a particular 
investment is never revealed because these markets are constantly forming expectations of 
future cash flows. Sports betting markets represent an appealing empirical laboratory to fill 
this gap and shed light on pure market efficiency. 
The second source of motivation relates to the recent developments in online sports 
betting markets in relation to the results in the earlier betting market literature, which make 
these markets an even more relevant arena for testing market efficiency from both the 
statistical and economic perspective. While most of the academic research has focused on 
single betting markets and on a limited number of traditional bookmakers, it is interesting to 
perform similar studies in the online betting era, under very different circumstances than 
during the publication of the first betting market studies in the latter half of the 20th century 
(Vlastakis et al., 2009; Oikonomidis and Johnson, 2011, 204). Online betting comprises now 
a highly competitive market based on sophisticated technology and increasingly informed and 
demanding customers, having a substantial impact on society (Gainsbury, 2012, 1). Even 
more importantly, as bookmaker margins get smaller, systematic biases in odds, if they still 
                                                 
2 Originally defined by Vaughan Williams (2001), quasi-arbitrage refers to situations in which a bettor can bet at 
odds better than implied by objective probabilities, assuming that the average market odds stand for a good 
approximation of the objective probabilities. 
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exist, might now be more easily economically exploited (Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; 
Graham and Stott, 2008). In addition, at present bookmakers accept also single bets, i.e. bets 
regarding only one outcome, which gives a mathematical advantage to the bettor compared to 
combination bets that were the norm previously (Buchdal, 2003, 24; Goddard and 
Asimakopoulos, 2004; Forrest et al., 2005). All these changes make sports betting more 
attractive from the bettor point of view. 
Regarding weak form efficiency in 1X2 soccer betting, a notable part of the previous 
literature rejects statistical efficiency in some form, often in the shape of a favorite-longshot 
bias, without being able to reject economic efficiency due to higher bookmaker margins (Pope 
and Peel, 1989; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Cain et al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and 
Gergaud, 2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009). On the other hand, some more recent studies detect 
statistical inefficiency but do not investigate economic efficiency at all (Strumbelj and 
Sikonja, 2010; Koning, 2012; Nyberg, 2014). This study aims at filling these gaps in the 
literature. With respect to the studies that reject statistical but not economic efficiency, this 
study introduces fresh and extensive data in the online betting era, employing substantially 
more competitive odds. If statistical inefficiency still exists, I will examine whether this 
inefficiency could now also lead to economic inefficiency. If statistical inefficiency does not 
any longer exist, quasi-arbitrage might still result in economic inefficiency. With respect to 
the studies that reject statistical efficiency but do not investigate economic efficiency, this 
study extends the literature by performing also various tests of economic efficiency. 
The third and final motive for the study concerns weak form betting market efficiency 
as the choice of study, instead of the semi-strong and strong forms in which the information 
subset under consideration is widened to publicly available information and all potential 
(even private) information, respectively. With connection to semi-strong form efficiency, 
various models for predicting soccer match outcomes have already existed for a long time 
both within the academia and in commercial markets, with an abundance of computer 
programs and expert knowledge (Rue and Salvesen, 2000). Earlier studies show that the 
forecasting performance of bookmakers has improved towards the online betting era with 
intensified competition and higher financial stakes, which might make the discovery of 
forecasts that would consistently beat the consensus estimates highly unlikely (see, e.g., Rue 
and Salvesen, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Forrest et al., 2005). 
Strong form efficiency, on the other hand, has become a less interesting theme for 
research due to the unanimous evidence of the low capacity of insiders to provide any 
significant added value to outcome predictions, as well as of the absence of any considerable 
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insider trading in the main betting markets (see, e.g., Pope and Peel, 1989; Avery and 
Chevalier, 1999; Forrest and Simmons, 2000; Cain et al., 2003; Song et al., 2007). Thus, it is 
more captivating to take the weak form efficiency point of view and explore on the one hand 
whether the market as a whole can build unbiased estimates of match outcomes and on the 
other hand whether some relatively simple betting strategies can lead to profits when using 
the highest odds available in the market. 
In addition to the above sources of motivation, I find this study highly relevant also 
personally. As a student of finance, I have always been interested in financial markets in 
general and market efficiency in particular. On the other hand, as a professional athlete, I have 
been fascinated by various phenomena around sports, definitely not least by sports betting. 
Hence, this study gives me a brilliant opportunity to combine these interests around finance 
and sports. I would be more than glad to contribute both to the academia, by giving new 
insights into market efficiency, and to the practice of making money, by showing how betting 
market inefficiencies can be profitably exploited. 
 
1.3. Main findings 
 
The statistical tests find clear evidence of statistical weak form betting market 
inefficiency through a favorite-longshot bias (FLB), a systematic tendency of the betting 
public to overbet longshots and underbet favorites. The discovery of the FLB is in line with 
several studies in soccer (Pope and Peel, 1989; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Cain et 
al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009; Koning, 2012; Direr, 
2013; Nyberg, 2014) but also in other sports (see, e.g., Griffith, 1949; Dowie, 1976; Ali, 
1977; Snyder, 1978; Asch et al., 1982, 1984; Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1997; Cain et al., 
2003; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). On the aggregate level, both the linear and logit 
regression models reveal that subjective probability indicated by average market odds is not 
an unbiased estimator of objective outcome probability. As the subjective probability of an 
outcome increases, the objective probability increases more than implied by efficiency. On 
the individual odds level, the method that sorts odds into groups discovers that the deviations 
between subjective and objective probability occur on both perimeters of the odds spectrum, 
not in the middle of it. Thus, in a statistical sense, the betting market seems to be weak form 
inefficient at high respective low probabilities and efficient in between. 
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The economic tests give a more ambiguous view on weak form efficiency. When 
employing all the matches in the sample, neither the tobit regression model nor any of the 
naïve strategies reveal profitable betting opportunities, but some of the odds groups with 
highest subjective probability yield moderately positive returns. When only including bets 
with a positive expected value and simulating the associated returns, the sophisticated strategy 
based on quasi-arbitrage generates no profits, but the sophisticated strategy that takes into 
account the FLB generates consistent profits. For the whole sample period, a strategy 
specification that involves conservative staking and places bets only on strong favorites yields 
an annual return of 8%. Therefore, contrary to the majority of the literature that reveals 
statistical but not economic weak form inefficiency in 1X2 soccer betting (Pope and Peel, 
1989; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Cain et al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and Gergaud, 
2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009), this study suggests that the current betting market is inefficient 
also in an economic sense. With relation to the more recent soccer literature that traces 
statistical inefficiency but does not investigate economic efficiency at all (Strumbelj and 
Sikonja, 2010; Koning, 2012; Nyberg, 2014), this study finds similar biases but also shows 
that these biases lead also to economic inefficiency. 
Altogether, the study concludes that the European online sports betting market in 
soccer is weak form inefficient. The observed statistical biases appear to be persistent and 
similar to those discovered before the online betting era. Due to the lower bookmaker margins 
in the present-day online betting market, however, the distinction to the previous academic 
work is that these biases can now be economically exploited, providing attractive investment 
opportunities for sharp bettors. The study provides two intertwining streams of explanations 
for the peculiarity of why sharp bettors do not seem to exploit the irrationality similarly to 
what sharp investors and arbitrageurs would do in financial markets to eliminate mispricing. 
First, institutional arrangements might prevent sharp bettors from exploiting the value bets 
available in the market. Second, market immaturity highlights the presumption that a 
significant part of the bettor population may have less financial motives as well as smaller 
stakes than investors in financial markets, which might lead to suboptimal betting decisions 
that are taken into account in odds set by profit maximizing bookmakers. All things 
considered, the focal implication of this study for finance is to demonstrate how even a 
competitive market, characterized by an ocean of market participants, considerable volumes, 
and low transaction costs, can be weak form inefficient under some specific conditions. 
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1.4. Limitations 
 
There are two main limitations to the study, relating to distribution of the bookmaker 
margin and prevalence of bookmaker stake limits, respectively. First, fully consistent with the 
practice of the discipline, the study assumes that the bookmaker margin is spread 
proportionally across each possible outcome of any match in the sample. This is a necessary 
condition for being able to calculate the subjective probabilities assigned by the market. If, 
however, the margin would not be dispersed in the hypothetical way, assessments of 
statistical betting market efficiency would become invalid because we could not determine the 
subjective probabilities accurately. In the context of this study, however, this limitation is less 
significant because bookmaker margins in the current online betting market are smaller than 
before, reducing their overall effect in probability calculations. Furthermore, the presumption 
that the subjective probabilities are correct is supported by the economic tests of efficiency 
that detect a similar bias (FLB) without needing to convert odds to probabilities in any way. 
Second, when executing the economic tests of efficiency, it is assumed that the bettor 
is able to bet any given sum at the highest odds quoted in the market. As some bookmakers 
are known (and always allowed) to limit the stakes of sharp bettors, it might be that the given 
strategies could not be consistently implemented. In any case, this limitation is probably 
diminished due to three factors. On the one hand, the current online betting market includes 
various bookmakers who publically accept sharp bettors. On the other hand, sharp bettors can 
also use some specific techniques that make them look less sharp from the bookmaker point 
of view. Moreover, compared to arbitrage betting, the risk of becoming limited is less 
significant in value betting, which is the foundation of this study. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. The subsequent two chapters provide the necessary 
introduction to online sports betting and testing efficiency within them, while Chapter 4 
sieves through the relevant literature on weak form betting market efficiency. Chapters 5, 6, 7, 
and 8 include the hypotheses, data, methodology, and assumptions employed in the study, 
respectively. The results of the statistical and economic tests of efficiency are presented in 
Chapter 9 and discussed in Chapter 10. Finally, Chapter 11 concludes and Chapter 12 shortly 
highlights ideas on future research. 
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2. Fundamentals of online sports betting 
 
Gambling refers to wagering a stake with monetary value in games in which the 
outcome is determined at least partly by chance. The main categories of gambling products 
are sports betting, casino games, poker, bingo, skill games, and lotteries. Sports betting, the 
focus of this study, can be described as speculative scenarios about sporting events regarding 
which participants exchange assets, known as bets or wagers, concerning a specific outcome 
(Alberola and Garcia-Fornes, 2013).3 Sports betting distinguishes itself from other gambling 
products in one fundamental respect. Whereas in other gambling products probabilities of 
winning are known with certainty and the law of large numbers dictates profits for the 
organizers because odds are stacked in favor of them, market participants in sports betting can 
deduce only their subjective probabilities (Levitt, 2004). In other words, while other gambling 
products involve risk but no uncertainty, sports betting contains both risk and uncertainty 
(Figlewski, 1979). Consequently, in sports betting, bettors have a chance to be profitable (and 
organizers of betting unprofitable) in the long run if they are able to determine probabilities of 
sporting events more accurately than the other market participants. 
 
2.1. Why do people participate in sports betting? 
 
The question of why people gamble—irrespective of the negative expected return 
characteristic to gambling products—has been generally given two different explanations: the 
wealth maximizing explanation and the pleasure seeking explanation. The former views 
gamblers as economic agents who invest money in gambling purely aiming at maximizing 
wealth. Here, these agents are assumed to make decisions under risk and uncertainty within 
the expected utility theory (EUT) framework, originally proposed by Bernoulli (1738). After 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed the EUT, the wealth maximizing explanation 
for sports betting has dominated the research agenda. In horse racing, for example, betting 
behaviors are modelled and explained using the EUT already by Griffith (1949), McGlothlin 
(1956), Rosett (1965), Weitzman (1965), Harville (1973), Ali (1977; 1979), Snyder (1978), 
                                                 
3 Here, sports betting is assumed to include horse racing as well as the rapidly expanding variety of other events 
on which bets are nowadays available. As an example of the blurring continuum between traditional gambling 
and speculation in financial markets, some well established betting companies have even financial indices 
betting (concerning stock markets, currencies, commodities, etc.) in their repertoire. 
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Losey and Talbott (1980), Hausch et al. (1981), and Asch et al. (1982, 1984). These studies 
consider bettors risk seekers with a convex utility function. 
However, under the EUT, the assumption of homogeneity of bettors fails to account 
for the heterogeneity of motivations that might be present among them (see, e.g., Thaler and 
Ziemba, 1988). The latter explanation, which is often ignored in the economic literature, 
argues that betting is at least partly motivated by its pleasure of participation instead of being 
purely wealth oriented. Given that betting is a negative sum game, Busche and Hall (1988) 
ponder whether risk preferers anyway are the only people willing to bet and whether bettors 
are homogeneous with respect to risk attitudes. They suggest that betting could be considered 
as a hobby for a representative consumer, just like going to the opera or owning a boat. In this 
case, pleasure of participation would enter the utility function directly; even though it would 
still be possible that the utility function is convex in wealth, it is not any more a requirement 
for such rational bettors. 
Conlisk (1993) also discovers that when resisting the hypothesis that betting confers 
utility from pleasure of participation, standard economic theory is left without a good 
explanation for betting. He argues that because risk aversion is at the heart of explanations for 
common economic behavior such as insurance purchase and portfolio diversification—
whereas strict risk aversion rules out betting completely—it is difficult to explain why people 
simultaneously pay to decrease risk (insurance) and pay to increase risk (betting).4 Conlisk 
claims that as economists do not model food preferences purely in terms of nutritional 
consequences for health, they should similarly not model betting solely in terms of 
consequences for wealth. Through appending a tiny utility of betting to the expected utility 
model for a risk averse individual, he is able to explain both small payoff gambles and large 
price lotteries, as well as many patterns of risk seeking in the experimental evidence that is 
puzzling from the standard theory point of view. Thus, when viewing betting as entertainment 
or consumption, its negative expected value can be seen as a fee for the pleasure it brings.5 
                                                 
4 In their landmark paper, Friedman and Savage (1948) explain simultaneous purchase of insurance and lottery 
within the expected utility theory by supposing a special shape for an individual’s utility-of-wealth function that 
is risk averting over high and low wealth ranges and risk seeking in between. Markowitz (1952) then modifies 
this theory by assuming that utility is a function of change in wealth rather than level of wealth and presumes a 
special shape for this function. The Markowitz hypothesis has also been basic to psychologists who study risky 
choice, like Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In any case, Conlisk (1993) emphasizes that all these approaches 
that view betting solely as a means to increase wealth include fundamental difficulties and can explain only very 
limited patterns of simultaneous purchase of insurance and bets. 
5 Some studies show how the demand for betting can be treated as an economic good, being subject to a variety 
determinants consistent with the standard consumer preference theory. Gruen (1976) and Ali and Thalheimer 
(1997), for example, show that betting in horse racing has a downward sloping demand curve and that these 
bettors behave in a rational, price elastic, and utility maximizing fashion, similar to other commodities. 
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Individual motivations underlying betting behavior have also been portrayed in other 
social sciences. Bruce and Johnson (1992) examine two groups of bettors: sophisticated and 
unsophisticated. They argue that sophisticated bettors place bets to increase their wealth but 
also because betting provides an intellectual challenge. This approach views betting as 
professional, following strict guidelines and systematic rules with the intention of maximizing 
financial gains. Unsophisticated bettors, in turn, strive for excitement and social interaction, 
sharing a common enthusiasm regarding the build-up to the betting events as well as the 
drama of the events themselves. As a result, these bettors enjoy the social aspects around the 
successes and losses of their bets, without putting too much emphasis on financial gains. 
Combining the above two perspectives to discover why people participate in sports 
betting, we can say that incorporating the utility of gambling into the framework of expected 
utility theory is necessary, but that the magnitude of this utility might vary significantly 
between different individuals. For some, increasing wealth is the sole motivation for betting; 
for others, betting itself has its utility. In any case, this thesis views sports betting as a means 
to maximize wealth and explores the topic from the sophisticated bettor point of view. 
However, the study does not ignore the existence of unsophisticated bettors either. The 
proportion of “incompetent” betting volume generated by unsophisticated bettors has been 
shown to be significant and has a tendency to skew the odds, which, in turn, could possibly be 
exploited by the “competent money” of sophisticated bettors (Gandar et al., 1988; Paul and 
Weinbach, 2005b; Kotlyar and Smyrnova, 2012). 
 
2.2. Characteristics of online sports betting markets 
 
Online gambling refers to gambling that occurs for example via internet or mobile 
phone. Since its inception in 1995, online gambling has burgeoned; all forms of gambling are 
now widely available online 24 hours a day, seven days a week, from almost any location.6 
During the recent decade, the number of online gambling sites has fluctuated between 2,000 
and 2,500. Online sports betting, in turn, has become the dominant sector in the online 
gambling industry, accounting for roughly a half of the industry revenue. It also represents the 
leading gambling product in terms of gross gambling yield7. The popularity of sports betting 
                                                 
6 See Gainsbury (2012, 3) for an exhaustive list of the key trends that drive the online gambling industry. 
7 Gross gambling yield (GGY) equals the total amount gambled less prizes paid to customers. Without other 
income streams than gambling, GGY equals an operator’s gross profit. Thus, GGY represents the real economic 
value of the gambling industry when compared to the rest of the economy. (Gainsbury, 2012, 7) 
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is mainly due to its obvious and close connections to sports as well as to the fact that betting 
on sports constantly challenges bettors’ opinions against odds. Moreover, sports betting is 
regarded as more acceptable by governments than many other forms of gambling, thereby 
being more permitted in certain markets. (Williams et al., 2012) 
 Along with the expansion and intensified competition in online betting markets, 
operators have been forced to offer their products in more attractive terms, corresponding to 
low margins and higher odds. Even though statistical efficiency of online sports betting 
markets is interesting to investigate also in the context of higher margins, examinations of 
economic efficiency become more alluring the lower the margins are. To generate profits by 
exploiting statistical biases, odds in the current online betting markets have to deviate less 
from true probabilities (Graham and Stott, 2008; Malarić et al., 2008). As margins decrease, it 
becomes more likely that some betting strategies generate positive returns, which contrasts 
strongly with margins that were greater than 10% until the early 2000s (see, e.g., Pope and 
Peel, 1989; Kuypers, 2000; Dixon and Pope, 2004; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007). 
 
2.2.1. Organization of markets 
 
Sports betting markets are organized in three distinct ways. The traditional forms of 
betting existing both online and offline include the bookmaker system, which is the focus of 
this thesis, and the pari-mutuel system. Alongside these two traditional settings, exchange 
betting has emerged as a new market mechanism during the last decade. Next, I will give an 
overview on these systems. 
 
The bookmaker system 
 
The bookmaker system is the most popular form of organizing sports betting markets. 
In this system, fixed betting odds are unilaterally determined by bookmakers, i.e. gaming 
companies employing odds compilers who have special knowledge of specific sports to 
estimate true probabilities of events. Bookmakers usually publish their odds a few days before 
the start of an event. Bettors can then choose their bets at these odds, while bookmakers act as 
market makers and automatically take the opposite position, thereby carrying counterparty 
risk. Theoretically, bookmakers might accept unlimited betting volume at the odds they 
publish, but in practice some of them deploy limits for stakes and/or maximum winnings in 
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their terms and conditions as well as in their regular customer analytics processes. In addition, 
even though bookmakers have the right to adjust their odds after a market has opened, they 
rarely adjust them significantly. Either way, the size of a bettor’s claim is always tied to the 
initially chosen odds so the size of conceivable cash flows is known at the time of placing the 
bet. (Dixon and Pope, 2004; Forrest et al., 2005; Vlastakis et al., 2009; Franck et al., 2013) 
Bookmakers’ business model rests on managing betting probabilities, including a 
margin in their odds. Through slightly reducing the odds for each outcome in the book, the 
bookmaker will make a profit as long as the probabilities are managed correctly and/or the 
book is balanced. In this context, the purpose of academic studies has been to analyze the 
accuracy of these bookmaker probabilities and to explore profitable betting strategies, thereby 
drawing conclusions on market efficiency.8 (Buchdal, 2003, 12) 
 
The pari-mutuel system 
 
In the pari-mutuel system, betting volumes on all possible outcomes of a sporting 
event are aggregated and then distributed to the winners according to their relative stakes. The 
odds fluctuate freely and the claim of an individual bettor is not fixed ex-ante but depends on 
all the incoming betting volumes until the market is closed before the start of the event. Thus, 
compared to the bookmaker system, conceivable cash flows of a bet are not yet determined at 
the time of placing the bet. In addition, as bettors are effectively competing against each other 
and the organizer of pari-mutuel betting takes a margin out of the win pool before delivering 
payouts to winners, the system is risk-free for the operator, whereas this is not necessarily the 
case in bookmaker betting. Even though the pari-mutuel system for betting is still common in 
horse racing, it is becoming a less important mechanism compared to the bookmaker and 
betting exchange systems. In any case, a significant part of earlier academic research on 
efficiency of betting markets has focused on pari-mutuel betting.9 (Franck et al., 2013) 
  
                                                 
8 Studies that investigate the bookmaker system include, for instance, Gandar et al. (1988), Pope and Peel 
(1989), Golec and Tamarkin (1991; 1995), Brown and Sauer (1993), Woodland and Woodland (1994; 2001; 
2003), Gray and Gray (1997), Avery and Chevalier (1999), Cain et al. (2000), Kuypers (2000), Dixon and Pope 
(2004), Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), Schnytzer and Weinberg (2004; 2008), Durham et al. (2005), 
Forrest et al. (2005), Paul and Weinbach (2005a; 2005b), Deschamps and Gergaud (2007), Vlastakis et al. 
(2009), Koning (2012), Constantinou and Fenton (2013), Direr (2013), Krieger et al. (2013), and Nyberg (2014). 
9 These studies include, for example, Rosett (1965), Weitzman (1965), Ali (1977; 1979), Snyder (1978), 
Figlewski (1979), Losey and Talbott (1980), Hausch et al. (1981), Asch et al. (1982; 1984), Quandt (1986), Asch 
and Quandt (1987), Thaler and Ziemba (1988), Gabriel and Marsden (1990), Hausch and Ziemba (1990), 
Swidler and Shaw (1995), Terrell and Farmer (1996), Golec and Tamarkin (1998), and Edelman and O’Brian 
(2004). 
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The exchange betting system 
 
Exchange betting has recently emerged as a novel betting market system. Originally 
inspired by electronic financial exchanges, developments in ICT, and the arrival of online 
betting, betting exchanges have marked a revolution in the industry. These exchanges are 
order-driven markets for fixed odds betting where odds are determined in a continuous double 
auction process that matches demand and supply, allowing bettors to bet directly with each 
other and thereby disintermediating bookmakers. Whereas in the two traditional betting 
market settings bettors can only buy bets (i.e. bet on a given outcome to occur), in the 
exchange setting they can also sell bets (i.e. bet against a given outcome to occur). Betting 
exchanges themselves do not carry any counterparty risk; they act only as middle men and 
charge a small commission. Exchange betting has been naturally considered as an attractive 
area of research during the recent years.10 Out of all betting exchanges in the world, Betfair is 
by far the largest one, nowadays processing around seven million trades per day.11 (Laffey, 
2005; Franck et al., 2013; Croxson and Reade, 2014) 
 
2.2.2. Other key characteristics 
 
 The other essential features of online sports betting markets concern types of bets 
offered, sports available for betting, timing of betting (in relation to the start of an event), and 
types of odds applied. First, in contemporary betting, there are many types of bets, both more 
and less exotic, most of them being suited to the full range of sports. In soccer, the most 
popular and common type is 1X2 betting, which will be investigated also in this study. In 1X2 
betting, odds are determined for three conceivable outcomes: a home win (1), a draw (X), and 
an away win (2). Besides 1X2 betting, other popular types of soccer bets include handicap 
betting and total goals betting. A distinction should also be made between making a single bet 
and making a multiple bet. In the former, only the chosen outcome must take place for the bet 
to win; in the latter, all the selections must be successful for the bet to win. However, the 
larger the number of selections in a multiple bet is, the larger will also be the bookmaker’s 
                                                 
10 Empirical studies on exchange betting have been performed for example by Smith et al. (2006; 2009), Gil and 
Levitt (2007), Franck et al. (2010; 2013), as well as by Croxson and Reade (2014). 
11 Croxson and Reade (2014) highlight that this number of trades is greater than the number of daily trades on all 
the European stock exchanges combined. Moreover, they mention that during the last years the search term 
“betfair” has overtaken “FTSE” in popularity on Google. 
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expected profit margin. Thus, a sophisticated bettor would always prefer single bets, which is 
the focus of this study.12 (Buchdal, 2003, 18–25; Gainsbury, 2012, 20) 
 Second, bets are nowadays offered for all kinds of sports, on several levels, and for 
both domestic and international events. This study focuses on soccer, which is the most 
popular sport in the world (Guttman, 1993, 129; Dunning, 1999, 103). Given the enormous 
popularity of the sport, combined with the increasing interest in online betting, it is no 
surprise that the online soccer betting market has also expanded. In most countries, soccer is 
by far the biggest sport in terms of turnover at online bookmakers (Finnigan and Nordsted, 
2010; Oikonomidis and Johnson, 2011, 204) and constitutes the fastest growing gambling 
market (Constantinou and Fenton, 2013). The current soccer betting market is very large and 
competitive, companies operating with low margins, making it interesting to explore how 
odds-based information can be used to increase betting returns (Oikonomidis and Johnson, 
2011, 208). Furthermore, European soccer constitutes one of the most liquid and focal betting 
markets (Vlastakis et al., 2009). 
 Third, online sports betting involves placing bets both before the start of an event (pre-
match betting) and during the event (live betting). After publishing their pre-match odds, 
bookmakers have the option to change their odds if they need to react to new information 
concerning the event or to manage their projected liabilities around the event. This study 
focuses on pre-match betting, employing closing odds, i.e. odds quoted in the market just 
before the start of an event. Live betting has also grown in popularity during the recent years, 
now accounting for the major part of bookmakers’ gross margins (Church-Sanders, 2011; 
Croxson and Reade, 2011). Compared to pre-match betting, live betting comprises a more 
fluctuating environment as different conditions in an ongoing event are changing constantly 
and sometimes even dramatically (Kotlyar and Smyrnova, 2012). 
Fourth and finally, there is a difference between fixed odds and variable odds. Fixed 
odds imply that the size of the conceivable cash flows is determined by the odds on which the 
bettor places the bet. Thus, the size of the bettor’s claim is tied to the initially chosen odds, 
not depending on subsequent price changes. Variable odds, in turn, refer to odds that are not 
fixed at the time of placing the bet. Instead, the size of the bettor’s claim is tied to volumes 
placed on each outcome of the particular event at the time of closing the market. Odds 
provided by bookmakers and betting exchanges are fixed odds, whereas odds provided in 
                                                 
12 Before the online betting era, single bets were usually not allowed at all, making bookmaking a lot more 
advantageous to bookmakers. Along with the emergence of online betting and intensified competition, these 
betting rules have been relaxed and the availability of single bets has become the norm. (Buchdal, 2003, 24–25; 
Goddard and Asimakopoulos, 2004; Forrest et al., 2005) 
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pari-mutuel betting markets are variable odds. As this study focuses on the bookmaker 
system, the odds discussed throughout the study are fixed odds.13 (Franck et al., 2013) 
 
2.3. Odds, probabilities, and the bookmaker margin 
 
In the context of sports betting, prices of bets on different outcomes are called odds, 
which represents the amount that the bookmaker will pay out on a winning bet in relation to 
the bettor’s stake (see, e.g., Buchdal, 2003). Odds, in turn, are inversely related to 
probabilities associated with particular outcomes; the higher the odds, the lower the implied 
probability of a certain outcome taking place and vice versa. Depending on the geographical 
area as well as the betting market in question, there are several conventions for quoting odds, 
out of which the most significant include decimal odds (that is commonly used in continental 
Europe), fractional odds, and moneyline odds. These conventions contain the same 
information and can be easily converted to each other. Decimal odds, which are used in this 
study, specify how many times the stake the payout will be if winning the bet. For example, if 
staking one hundred euros on a bet with the odds of 2.50, winning the bet would generate a 
payout of 250 euros and a net profit of 150 euros, whereas losing the bet means that the stake 
of one hundred euros would be lost. 
In the context of decimal odds, probabilities implied by odds are calculated by taking 
the inverse of the odds. For any event, however, probabilities offered by a bookmaker for all 
possible outcomes never sum to one but exceed it, because of the bookmaker margin. This 
margin represents the bookmaker’s brokerage fee and aims at guaranteeing a profit for the 
bookmaker regardless of the outcome, as long as the bets the bookmaker has received are 
distributed evenly across the outcomes. Conversely, from the bettor point of view, the 
bookmaker margin can be considered as a transaction cost for placing a bet. 
Formally, when using decimal odds for a sporting event with 𝑛 mutually exclusive 
outcomes, the offered probability of the 𝑗:th outcome is defined as 
 
𝜃𝑗 =
1
𝛿𝑗
 ,             (1) 
                                                 
13 To be exact, the earlier literature sometimes gives another meaning for the term fixed odds. Pope and Peel 
(1989), for example, view fixed odds as odds that are set a few days before the start of an event, thereafter 
staying unchanged. However, as mentioned by Buchdal (2003, 15), this view is not relevant in the online betting 
era because odds provided by internet bookmakers and betting exchanges are often changing constantly to reflect 
new information as well as to manage projected liabilities. 
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where 𝜃𝑗 is the offered probability and 𝛿𝑗 is the odds quoted for the outcome. The bookmaker 
margin can then be obtained by adding up the offered probabilities of all possible outcomes so 
that 
 
𝑀 = ∑ 𝜃𝑗 − 1
𝑛
𝑗=1 ,          (2) 
 
where 𝑀 is the bookmaker margin. 
Whereas offered probability is used by the bookmaker to define the odds offered to 
bettors, subjective probability expresses the bookmaker’s view on the true probability of an 
outcome occurring. To convert offered probabilities to subjective probabilities, offered 
probabilities must be normalized so that they sum to one, thereby eliminating the bookmaker 
margin. Thus, the subjective probability of the 𝑗:th outcome is defined as 
 
𝜌𝑗 =
𝜃𝑗
1+𝑀
 ,             (3) 
 
where 𝜌𝑗 is the subjective probability.
14 Corresponding to the subjective probabilities, we can 
then calculate the scaled odds, i.e. fair odds that lead to a bookmaker margin of zero, by 
 
𝜗𝑗 = (1 + 𝑀)𝛿𝑗,          (4) 
 
where 𝜗𝑗 refers to the scaled odds for the outcome 𝑗. 
 While subjective probability can be viewed as the probability set by the market for an 
outcome to happen, objective probability, on the other hand, can be defined as the proportion 
of times an outcome takes place when the event is repeated a very large number of times. In 
the context of sports betting, however, objective probability is never revealed in practice, 
making the whole concept highly controversial. Neither classical nor statistical probability 
can be applied in sports betting because each sporting event is unique with its set of factors 
that are stochastic by their very nature. Consequently, sports betting odds represent only 
estimations of expected probabilities, which gives rise to the examinations of betting market 
efficiency in the first place. (Ali, 1977; Kotlyar and Smyrnova, 2012) 
                                                 
14 This kind of standard normalization assumes that the bookmaker margin is distributed equally over the offered 
probabilities and the assumption is applied also in this study. Section 8.4 provides a further discussion.  
18 
 
 
2.4. Making money in online sports betting 
 
Successful betting strategies in bookmaker markets contain two main elements: a 
method that gains an edge over bookmakers and money management that maximizes profits. 
Regarding the former, there are three methods that enable a long term mathematical 
advantage: value betting, sports arbitrage, and matched betting. Regarding the latter, staking 
strategies fall into four broad categories. This section presents these elements. As my focus is 
on legal ways of betting, I exclude match fixing15 and exploitation of bookmakers’ obvious 
errors in odds setting16. 
 
2.4.1. Value betting 
 
Value betting is a sports betting strategy according to which a bettor seeks an edge 
through betting only on outcomes in which her notion of the objective probability exceeds the 
probability implied by the odds, with the bookmaker margin built in (see, e.g., Buchdal, 2003; 
Malarić et al., 2008; Kotlyar and Smyrnova, 2012). In this respect, it is equivalent to the 
search for underpriced securities in financial markets. Buchdal (2003, 42–53) views 
successful betting as a practice of understanding and managing probabilities and describes 
value betting as the only way to overcome bookmakers’ odds, providing an accessible 
measure of a bettor’s expectation to make a profit. If the edge exceeds one, a bet is a value bet 
and potentially profitable, according to the analysis that went into determining it in the first 
place. Put formally, a bet on a given outcome 𝑗 is a value bet if 
 
𝑟𝑗 =
𝜋𝑗
𝜃𝑗
> 1,           (5) 
 
where 𝑟𝑗  is the edge, 𝜋𝑗 is the objective probability, and 𝜃𝑗 is the offered probability of the 
outcome. 
                                                 
15 In match fixing, organizers of fixed matches (match fixers) provide an individual or a group of contestants in a 
sporting event with rewards for reducing or altering their effort contribution to generate a desired outcome that 
the organizers can bet on and thereby earn a profit (see, e.g., Preston and Szymanski, 2003; Caruso, 2009). 
Match fixing is illegal and considered as one of the most significant problems in present-day sports. 
16 Within the betting community, these obvious errors are known as palpable errors or palps. Placing bets at 
these odds may easily lead to bookmakers limiting or closing these customers’ accounts. 
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In the literature, the value betting methodology is often employed when obtaining 
estimates of match outcomes with statistical models, thereafter screening potential value bets 
using Eq. (5) and replacing objective probability with the probability predicted by the given 
model.17 Finally, when a value bet is found, a sharp bettor should always choose the 
bookmaker with the highest odds for the outcome to maximize value. This study rests also on 
value betting, assuming that value bets are now more prevalent both in terms of number and 
magnitude than before the online betting era. 
 
2.4.2. Sports arbitrage 
 
Even though each single bookmaker has a positive profit margin built into its odds, in 
some cases even negative profit margins might be available in the market on aggregate. 
Similar to finance, where arbitrage refers to the practice of making a risk-free profit by taking 
advantage of price differentials between different markets, sports arbitrage refers to carrying 
out sports betting so that a sure profit is guaranteed by combining odds offered by different 
bookmakers. Formally, a bet is an arbitrage bet if 
 
1
∑
1
𝛿𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
− 1 > 0,          (6) 
 
where 𝑛 is the number of outcomes and 𝛿𝑗 is the odds quoted for the 𝑗:th outcome. 
Occurrence of sports arbitrage opportunities depend on two factors: the divergence of 
odds between different bookmakers and the profit margins of these bookmakers. The larger 
the divergence of odds and the lower the profit margins, the more arbitrage opportunities 
there will be. Although arbitrage betting seems to provide risk-free profits at first sight, it 
includes some practical challenges that have to be carefully taken into account.18, 19 
(Constantinou and Fenton, 2013; Franck et al., 2013) 
 
                                                 
17 These studies include, to mention a few, Kuypers (2000), Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), Gray et al. 
(2005), Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005), Deschamps and Gergaud (2007), Malarić et al. (2008), Milliner et 
al. (2009), Vlastakis et al. (2009), Franck et al. (2010), Hvattum and Arntzen (2010), Sessford and White (2010), 
and Constantinou et al. (2012; 2013). 
18 For a more detailed introduction to sports arbitrage, see, for instance, Buchdal (2003, 49–52), Laffey (2005), 
Vlastakis et al. (2009), Banks (2013), Constantinou and Fenton (2013), and Franck et al. (2013). 
19 Earlier empirical studies that deal with sports arbitrage include, for example, Pope and Peel (1989), Dixon and 
Pope (2004), Edelman and O’Brian (2004), Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005), Gil and Levitt (2007), 
Vlastakis et al. (2009), Constantinou and Fenton (2013), Constantinou et al. (2013), and Franck et al. (2013). 
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2.4.3. Matched betting 
 
The third way of making money in online sports betting is about generating profits 
from bonuses and free bets that bookmakers offer to attract new and maintain existing 
customers, known as matched betting. It requires an account at a bookmaker that offers these 
incentives as well as another account at a betting exchange or at another bookmaker. By 
placing a bet on a particular outcome at the bookmaker offering the incentive, at the same 
time placing corresponding bets against these outcomes elsewhere, a profit will be generated 
regardless of the outcome. (Banks, 2013) 
 
2.4.4. Principles of money management 
 
 Besides gaining a mathematical advantage, successful sports betting requires optimal 
staking; a bettor must know how much to invest in each bet with a positive expected value. 
Proper money management involves a predetermined bankroll set aside for betting as well as 
a staking plan, but it should also always maximize returns and reduce bankruptcy risk to 
acceptable levels. The problem is similar though more complex in stock markets; in this 
sense, a bettor can be viewed as an investor looking for excess risk adjusted return. (Buchdal, 
2003, 96; Thorp, 2006, 386) 
There are four categories of staking strategies: fixed staking, variable staking, 
progressive staking, and percentage staking. Fixed staking involves placing bets with the 
same stake regardless of odds. In variable staking, a bettor varies the size of her bets 
according to various criteria. For example, she may choose to standardize the amount she 
wins with every successful bet. Progressive staking refers to either increasing or decreasing 
the stake after each bet, depending on whether it was won or lost. Lastly, percentage staking 
standardizes the size of the stake as a percentage of the current betting bank at the time the bet 
is placed, instead of as a specific proportion of the initial bankroll. Kelly staking is the focal 
percentage staking plan in sports betting and will be applied also in this study, together with 
the basic fixed and variable staking plans. (Buchdal, 2003, 96–98) 
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2.4.5. Kelly staking 
 
Kelly staking, or the Kelly criterion, is a capital growth model that maximizes the 
expected logarithm of wealth on a bet-by-bet basis, originally proposed by Kelly (1956) and 
later extended as well as thoroughly proved by Breiman (1961) and Algoet and Cover (1988). 
In the context of betting, Gramm and Ziemba (2008, 320–321) highlight the three most 
important properties of the model: it maximizes the asymptotic growth rate of capital, it 
asymptotically minimizes the expected time to reach a specific level of wealth, and it almost 
surely outperforms any other essentially different betting strategy in the long term.20 Also in 
the context of financial markets, where investors must decide how much capital to invest after 
identifying a favorable investment opportunity, the methodology is equally important; the 
Kelly investment strategy has been applied in computations of optimal portfolio weights in 
multi asset as well as worldwide asset allocation problems (MacLean and Ziemba, 2006).21 
Buchdal (2003, 155–156) argues that the Kelly staking provides an optimum risk-
reward trade-off, allowing the betting bank to grow at the maximum rate for minimum risk, 
when repeated over a period of time. With Kelly staking, the bettor always bets percentages 
of the bankroll, so a growing bankroll means larger stakes and vice versa. For a particular size 
of the bankroll, stake size is dependent on both the odds and the edge of the given bet. 
Formally, the size of a stake according to the Kelly staking plan for placing a bet on the 
outcome 𝑗, which has been found to be a value bet, is defined as 
 
𝑘𝑗 =
𝑟𝑗−1
𝛿𝑗−1
,           (7) 
 
where 𝑘𝑗 is the size of the Kelly stake as a decimal percentage of the bankroll, 𝑟𝑗 is the edge 
determined by Eq. (5) and 𝛿𝑗 is the odds quoted for the outcome. 
The main disadvantage of the Kelly criterion is that stakes suggested by the model 
may in some cases be very large (and intrinsically undiversified), making it risky in the short 
term, especially if estimations of the betting edge are somehow wrong. Most of the time 
bettors who apply the Kelly methodology will eventually increase their wealth, but it does not 
                                                 
20 For further properties of Kelly staking, see, for example, MacLean et al. (1992; 2010) and Thorp (2006). 
21 More precisely, the Kelly methodology is known to economists and financial theorists as concepts like 
geometric mean maximizing portfolio strategy, maximizing logarithmic utility, the growth-optimal strategy, and 
the capital growth criterion (Thorp, 2006, 386). 
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exclude the possibility of losing one’s wealth in the case of specific unsuccessful bets.22 To 
avoid this pitfall, however, a bettor can apply fractional Kelly staking that compromises long 
term growth maximization but increases security. By first computing the Kelly optimal size of 
a bet and then placing the bet with only a fixed fraction of the computed amount, the bettor is 
able to combine the goals of capital growth and security as she moves the risk aversion away 
from zero to a higher level.23 (MacLean et al., 1992; 2010) 
Formally, the fractional Kelly staking plan for placing a value bet on the outcome 𝑗 is 
given by 
 
𝑓𝑗 = 𝑘𝑗 ∗ 𝑔,           (8) 
 
where 𝑓𝑗 is the size of the fractional Kelly stake as a decimal percentage of the bankroll, 𝑘𝑗 is 
the size of the standard Kelly stake determined in Eq. (7), and 𝑔 is the applied fraction so that 
0 < 𝑔 < 1. One common choice is to apply the half Kelly staking plan, according to which 
𝑔 = 0.5, compromising the optimal growth rate by 25% (Thorp, 2006, 411–412). 
  
                                                 
22 More precisely, these bets are subject to the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion—the reciprocal of current wealth—that 
is small compared to other commonly chosen utility functions (MacLean et al., 2010). 
23 In financial markets, many popular investors have applied Kelly or fractional Kelly strategies. In their 
analyses, MacLean et al. (2010) suggest that Warren Buffett and George Soros seem to act similarly to standard 
Kelly bettors, while John Maynard Keynes resembles an 80% fractional Kelly bettor. 
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3. Testing efficiency in sports betting markets 
 
This chapter is concerned with testing efficiency in sports betting markets. The 
discussion centres par excellence around the efficient market hypothesis and its implications 
in sports betting. The chapter begins with a concise review of the theory of efficient markets 
as sketched for financial markets, then moving on to demonstrating the usefulness of sports 
betting markets as an arena for efficiency tests and discussing the similarities between these 
two markets. The latter part of the section gives the definitions for different forms of betting 
market efficiency as well as generally describes the methods for testing efficiency within 
these forms. The exact methodology applied in this study will be presented later in Chapter 7. 
 
3.1. The efficient market hypothesis revisited 
 
The theory of efficient markets is one of the most important paradigms in economics 
and finance, referring to the process of price formation in financial markets. While the 
emergence of the efficiency literature dates all the way back to the 16th century [see, e.g., 
Sewell (2011) for a chronological review of the notable literature], Bachelier (1900) provides 
the pioneering theoretical contribution and Cowles (1933) performs the first considerable 
empirical research. The modern literature around the topic begins with Samuelson’s (1965) 
proof of price changes that are not forecastable as long as prices fully incorporate the 
expectations and information of all market participants. However, the paradigm gained wide 
popularity after Fama (1970) presented the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), in his seminal 
review of theoretical and empirical studies done in capital markets. In 1978, Jensen (1978, 95) 
declared his view on the EMH so that “there is no other proposition in economics which has 
more solid empirical evidence supporting it”. Later, as originally done by Fama, most 
investigations on efficiency in the real world have focused on conventional financial markets 
in which large databases have been available.24 
The efficient market hypothesis proposes that financial markets are informationally 
efficient, meaning that these markets are perfectly competitive and security prices reflect all 
                                                 
24 Vaughan Williams (2005), among others, provides a comprehensive review of the academic literature 
investigating efficiency in financial markets. Osborne (2001) lists the wide variety of other markets in which the 
EMH has been tested. 
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available information.25 If a discrepancy exists between the market price and the information-
based fundamental value, informed investors would immediately exploit this deviation. As a 
result, under the EMH, market prices of financial assets are equivalent to their “right”, 
fundamental values, i.e. the discounted values of the securities’ future cash flows. Changes in 
market prices are random since they are influenced only by new random information, which 
in turn instantly adjusts the prices to reflect the new situation. Because the flow of 
information is unpredictable in nature, investors cannot make any estimations of the new 
information—otherwise predictions regarding new information would have already caused 
the market prices to change. (Fama, 1970; 1991; 1998; Malkiel, 2003) 
Beyond the assumption of utility maximizing market participants, the efficient market 
hypothesis necessitates that agents have rational expectations on the population level. This 
implies that in the face of new relevant information agents are able to update their 
expectations correctly, though only on average. Consequently, the EMH claims that no one 
can consistently earn above average returns on a risk adjusted basis; neither technical analysis 
(the study of past prices to predict future prices) nor fundamental analysis (the exploration of 
financial information to detect misvalued assets) should generate returns greater than those 
achieved by holding a randomly selected portfolio of assets with comparable risk. Even 
though the EMH allows market pricing to be imperfect in the short term, it believes that the 
true values will win out in the long term. (Malkiel, 2003; Gray et al., 2005) 
 
3.1.1. Three forms of market efficiency 
 
Fama (1970) distinguishes three information subsets—weak, semi-strong, and 
strong—which have become widely accepted forms for appraising and testing market 
efficiency from different perspectives. Weak form tests determine whether past prices alone 
can predict future prices. Semi-strong tests use all publicly available information to predict 
prices. Strong form tests are concerned with demonstrating whether any special group is able 
to achieve a higher than average rate of return due to the group’s monopoly over specific 
information. Thus, the basis for separation of the three information subsets lies in what is 
meant by “all available information”. Each stronger form of efficiency incorporates all 
                                                 
25 Literature recognizes two alternative interpretations of the statement that prices reflect all available 
information. In the strong version, information and trading costs, i.e. costs of getting prices to reflect 
information, are always zero (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In the weaker and perhaps economically more 
sensible version, prices reflect information to the point in which the marginal benefits of acting on the 
information do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen, 1978). 
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weaker forms of efficiency. Formally, a market is said to be efficient with respect to some 
information set if security prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all 
participants (Malkiel, 1992). 
Weak form efficiency claims that abnormal returns are impossible to obtain by 
analyzing prices from the past. Future price movements should be determined entirely by 
information not contained in the price series; asset prices must follow a random walk. If weak 
form efficiency holds, prices are composed of only three components: the last period’s price, 
the expected return of the asset, and a random error term with an expected value of zero. The 
random error corresponds to new unexpected information released during the period 
observed. Weak form efficiency is usually examined through statistical tests of independence 
(such as autocorrelation tests and runs tests) and trading tests (such as filter rule tests). The 
majority of academic research supports weak form efficiency of capital markets.26 (Fama, 
1970; 1991; 1998; Malkiel, 2003) 
Semi-strong form efficiency implies that all publicly available information, such as 
facts about firms’ products, operations, patents, and balance sheets, are reflected in prices of 
relevant financial assets fully, immediately, and in an unbiased fashion. Thus, in addition to 
historical prices, it suggests that excess returns are impossible to generate by basing 
investment decisions on any publicly available information. Consequently, while weak form 
efficiency insists that technical analysis is useless in the search for abnormal returns, semi-
strong form efficiency dismisses also all forms of fundamental analysis. The most common 
forms of semi-strong efficiency tests include event studies as well as different time series 
tests. Academic research shows that financial markets are typically efficient also in the semi-
strong sense but this evidence is more blurred than that of weak form efficiency.27 In any 
case, particularly event studies comprise the most obvious evidence of efficiency, which is 
supportive with only few exceptions. (Fama, 1970; 1991; 1998; Malkiel, 2003) 
Strong form efficiency, the last information subset of the EMH, assumes that all 
available information, both public and private, is reflected in asset prices. In this case, excess 
returns cannot be achieved in the long run even if an investor holds insider information. This 
form of efficiency is naturally the most contested version of the EMH. In a theoretical sense, 
it is the most compelling form of the EMH, while in a practical sense it is the most difficult 
                                                 
26 See Lim and Brooks (2011) for a systematic review of the weak form efficiency literature with an exclusive 
focus on stock markets. 
27 Studies inconsistent with the semi-strong form efficiency consider, for example, dividend payments (Charest, 
1978; Ahrony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983) and earnings announcements (Ball and Brown, 
1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1990). 
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form to confirm. Strong form efficiency is often viewed as a benchmark against which 
deviations from market efficiency in its strictest sense can be judged. Tests of strong form 
efficiency tend to focus on returns of groups of investors with excess information, including 
corporate insiders, institutional money managers, analysts, and exchange specialists. The 
majority of academic evidence refutes strong form efficiency of financial markets.28 (Fama, 
1970; 1991; 1998; Malkiel, 2003) 
Altogether, during the last decades, empirical evidence of the different forms of the 
efficient market hypothesis have raised both support and opposition. After enjoying strong 
support earlier, the EMH has now come under relentless attack especially from the school of 
behavioral finance (Lim and Brooks, 2011). To offer reconciliation between the opposing 
views, Lo (2004) presents the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH), an evolutionary 
alternative to market efficiency, under which the EMH can coexist along with behavioral 
finance in an intellectually consistent manner. According to the AMH, instead of being an all 
or none condition, market efficiency is a characteristic that varies continuously over time and 
across markets. 
 
3.1.2. The joint hypothesis problem: the main obstacle to analyze market efficiency 
 
As explained above, efficient markets are markets in which prices fully reflect 
available information within a given information subset (Fama, 1970). However, Fama (1991) 
later admits that market efficiency in itself is actually not testable because it must be tested 
jointly with some model of equilibrium, i.e. with an asset pricing model. Thus, even if we find 
anomalous evidence of the behavior on some asset returns, it will remain unclear whether 
these anomalies are really due to market inefficiency or, alternatively, an incorrect model of 
market equilibrium. This challenge, called the joint hypothesis problem (or the bad model 
problem), comprises the most significant obstacle to make inferences about market efficiency 
with the EMH, suggesting that regardless of the amount of evidence supporting the EMH it 
can never be perfectly validated. 
This obvious drawback of the efficient market hypothesis has been thereafter widely 
recognized in the literature, allowing many other authors to conclude that the EMH per se is 
not a well defined and empirically refutable hypothesis. The common feature of this critique 
                                                 
28 For example, corporate insiders have been shown to profit from trading on pertinent information (Jaffe, 1974; 
Seyhun, 1986). However, Rozeff and Zaman (1988) argue that even insiders’ abnormal returns are economically 
insignificant and essentially diminish if transaction costs are higher. 
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concerns the fact that the focal phrase of the EMH, that prices fully reflect all available 
information, is a statement about two distinct aspects of prices: the information content and 
the price formation mechanism (see, e.g., Lo and MacKinlay, 1999; Lofthouse, 2001; Sewell, 
2012). In short, despite the vast amount of studies applying the EMH, it does not seem to 
provide waterproof methodology for analyzing efficiency of financial markets. 
 
3.2. Sports betting markets as a setting for efficiency tests 
 
 Due to the challenges in formulating direct tests of efficiency in financial markets, the 
finance literature has looked beyond conventional financial markets to find a setting that 
would be better suited for tangible studies of efficiency. Pankoff (1968) is the first to mention 
that sports betting markets permit an unusually direct test of market efficiency, whereas 
Thaler and Ziemba (1988) are among the first to propose that sports betting markets might be 
even better suited for efficiency tests than the stock market and many other financial markets. 
They emphasize that since a stock is basically infinitely lived, its value today depends both on 
the present value of future cash flows and on the price that will be paid for the security 
tomorrow. In contrast, Thaler and Ziemba argue that each asset in sports betting markets has a 
well defined termination point at which its value becomes certain.29 Thaler and Ziemba also 
suggest that sports betting markets have a better chance of being efficient because their 
conditions, such as quick and repeated feedback, tend to facilitate learning. 
Many other authors have later elaborated these views on the suitability of sports 
betting markets for tests of efficiency and choice under uncertainty, highlighting four distinct 
features (see, e.g., Gray and Gray, 1997; Sauer, 1998; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Kuypers, 
2000; Schnytzer and Weinberg, 2004, 71–72; Durham et al., 2005; Gray et al., 2005; Paul and 
Weinbach, 2005b; Croxson and Reade, 2014). First, in sports betting markets, market 
participants receive an objective signal about the fundamental value of an asset quickly, often 
even within a couple of hours. Efficiency tests do not have to focus on predictability of asset 
returns, which simplifies inferences about the learning behavior of investors. Second, the 
range of possible asset payoffs is simple and often known with certainty in advance. Third, 
tests of efficiency in sports betting markets reduce the scope of the pricing problem and 
                                                 
29 To be exact, as shown by Figlewski (1978), even options and futures markets seem to have a similar objective 
end-of-horizon payoff at first sight. However, as Gandar et al. (1988) remind, the commodities underlying 
options and futures are anyway typically ongoing in nature and their prices at the option or future horizon could 
possess some irrationality that would therefore come over to the derivative securities as well. 
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remove the joint hypothesis problem. Fourth, sports betting markets seem to provide a useful 
middle ground between stock markets and experimental markets. Compared to the former, 
sports betting markets form an idealized laboratory setting; compared to the latter, they offer 
vast volumes of real money on the line over lengthy time series. 
Besides praising the suitability of sports betting markets for efficiency tests, the 
literature also recognizes several similarities between sports betting markets and financial 
markets (see, e.g., Pankoff, 1968; Snyder, 1978; Asch et al., 1982; 1984; Gabriel and 
Marsden, 1990; Terrell and Farmer, 1996; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Levitt, 2004; Durham 
et al., 2005). Sports betting constitutes an economic market in which people buy and sell 
assets at prices that reflect bettors’ judgments about probabilities of different outcomes, 
offering an opportunity to study economic decision making under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. These markets are characterized by a large number of participants with 
heterogeneous beliefs, ease of entry, and extensive market knowledge combined with rapid 
dissemination of information. Moreover, the markets are liquid, encompass large volumes, 
and involve arbitrageurs. Like trading in financial assets, sports betting is a zero-sum game 
with one trader on each side of any transaction, and also the possibility and profitability of 
insider information parallels closely that found in the stock market.30 
 
3.3. Devising the efficient betting market hypothesis 
 
Even though the framework of the efficient market hypothesis with its three different 
forms has been originally developed for financial markets, it applies in a natural way to 
betting markets where asset prices are replaced by betting odds. First proposed by Dowie 
(1976), investigations on betting market efficiency can be considered in three information 
subsets. In his approach, weak form efficiency equates available information with historical 
odds and returns, semi-strong form efficiency adds public information to the set of available 
information, and strong form efficiency allows for the existence of particular market 
participants who may possess monopolistic access to specific information. 
On the other hand, in the context of betting markets, efficiency has been viewed 
through two different lenses: statistical and economic (see, e.g., Snyder, 1978; Losey and 
Talbott, 1980; Asch et al., 1984; Gandar et al., 1988; Thaler and Ziemba, 1988; Woodland 
                                                 
30 Furthermore, similarities between specific financial assets and bets have also been discussed in the literature. 
Ruhm (2003) shows how positions in financial options can be considered as simple bets, while Vecer et al. 
(2006) compare betting contracts with credit derivatives, viewing goals and red cards in soccer as credit events. 
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and Woodland, 1994; Gray and Gray, 1997; Sauer, 1998; Sessford and White, 2010). 
Statistical efficiency implies that betting odds (i.e. probabilities that are determined by the 
information subset at issue) are unbiased predictors of actual results. Economic efficiency 
implies that it is not possible to earn profits following any betting strategy. Thus, contrary to 
financial markets where market efficiency is commonly viewed only through the economic 
lens, betting markets provide an additional, statistical lens to shed light on efficiency.31 
Due to the transaction cost incorporated in the bookmaker margin, statistical betting 
market inefficiency does not necessarily indicate economic inefficiency. While tests of 
statistical efficiency are primarily of academic interest, tests of economic efficiency represent 
the stricter and decisive test of efficiency, being full of practical interest (Asch et al., 1984; 
Gray and Gray, 1997; Schnytzer and Weinberg, 2004, 80). As suggested also by Fama (1991) 
in the context of financial markets, more important than finding market inefficiencies per se is 
to measure the extent of inefficiency. To generate profits, the larger the biases the greater can 
transaction costs be, and vice versa. In the current online betting markets characterized by low 
transaction costs, deviations from statistical efficiency do not have to be large to allow 
profitable betting (Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; Graham and Stott, 2008).32 
 When combining the three information subsets provided by the efficient market 
hypothesis with the two lenses on betting market efficiency suggested by the earlier literature, 
I devise the “efficient betting market hypothesis” and give the following definitions for the 
three forms of betting market efficiency: 
 
 Statistical weak form betting market efficiency: Betting odds capture all historical 
information on odds so that they are unbiased predictors of actual results. 
 Economic weak form betting market efficiency: Using only historical information on 
odds, there is no consistently profitable betting strategy. 
 
 Statistical semi-strong form betting market efficiency: Betting odds capture all 
publicly available information so that they are unbiased predictors of actual results. 
                                                 
31 When using the concepts of statistical and economic efficiency in betting markets, it is important to bear in 
mind that in this context the word statistical refers to probabilities, not to research methodologies. Both 
statistical and economic efficiency are, naturally, investigated with the help of statistical techniques. 
32 Asch et al. (1984) draw an interesting analogy to empirical research in the stock market. While many 
departures from perfect efficiency have come out in different empirical tests, in general these departures are 
often not large enough to devise an active strategy that could consistently beat a passive buy-and-hold strategy. 
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 Economic semi-strong form betting market efficiency: Using all publicly available 
information, there is no consistently profitable betting strategy. 
 
 Statistical strong form betting market efficiency: Betting odds capture all existent 
information so that they are unbiased predictors of actual results. 
 Economic strong form betting market efficiency: Using all existent information, there 
is no consistently profitable betting strategy. 
 
3.4. Methods for testing betting market efficiency 
 
Empirical examination of betting market efficiency has many variations, depending on 
the form and lens through which efficiency is considered. Each form of efficiency can be 
examined with either pure statistical tests or direct economic tests; the former tests look at 
statistical properties of betting markets, while the latter tests attempt to detect unexploited 
profit opportunities (Gandar et al., 1988). This holds also in soccer; odds should constitute 
unbiased estimates of actual match outcomes and if there exist systematic biases in the 
market’s ability to incorporate relevant information into odds, one might be able to formulate 
betting strategies that profitably exploit these biases (Gray et al., 2005). This section briefly 
describes the variety of methods available for statistical and economic tests of efficiency. 
 
3.4.1. Statistical tests of efficiency 
 
Statistical betting market efficiency requires that market probability distributions (i.e. 
odds), conditional on the relevant information subset, are equal to objective probability 
distributions, conditional on the same information set. The exact procedures depend on the 
institutional structure of the betting market associated with a given sport. Formally, statistical 
betting market efficiency implies that 
 
𝐸(𝜋𝑗 − 𝜌𝑗| ∅ ) = 0,          (9) 
 
where 𝜋𝑗 is the objective probability of the outcome 𝑗, 𝜌𝑗 is the subjective probability derived 
from odds for the outcome and ∅ is the subset of information at issue. As the betting market 
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contains no systematic risk, we need to consider only first moments of conditional probability 
distributions. Moreover, a zero expectation of the betting market’s conditional forecast error 
comprises a necessary condition for efficiency. (Gandar et al., 1988; Stekler et al., 2010) 
Statistical tests of betting market efficiency can be divided into regression-based tests, 
grouping tests, and other tests. Regression-based tests use various types of regression 
analysis, both linear and nonlinear, for modeling the relationship between odds and outcomes. 
Standard linear regression has been widely employed but it has been considered weak, 
revealing only whether a betting market is efficient in an aggregate sense (see, e.g., Zuber et 
al., 1985; Gandar et al., 1988; Sauer et al., 1988; Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Gray and Gray, 
1997; Kuypers, 2000; Paul et al., 2004; Sinkey and Logan, 2014). To reduce aggregation, 
however, it can be applied to each level of odds individually (Woodland and Woodland, 
1994). Besides these standard models, the relationship between subjective and objective 
probability has been investigated using linear probability models (LPMs), first introduced by 
Pope and Peel (1989). However, LPMs are subject to two major econometric issues: 
heteroscedasticity and allowance of unreal probabilities. To overcome these issues, probit and 
logit models, both binary and multinomial, have also been implemented (see, e.g., Forrest et 
al., 2005; Franck et al., 2010; Koning, 2012; Nyberg, 2014). 
Grouping tests, originally developed for horse racing by Ali (1977), apply two 
different grouping methods to compare subjective probabilities with objective probabilities. 
The first method categorizes contestants into groups based on their favorite rank in a given 
race, while the second method carries out the categorization based on the level of odds of the 
contestants. Thereafter, in both cases, the groups’ average subjective probabilities are 
calculated and compared to the estimators for the groups’ objective probabilities. Even though 
the grouping tests are applied to a large extent only in pari-mutuel horse and greyhound 
racing, they contain specific features that are applicable also in other contexts. 
The other tests include two approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of betting market 
odds as forecasts: the Brier score and the rank probability score (RPS), both of which are 
proper score functions. These tests are descriptive measures on prediction accuracy over time 
and/or between different bookmakers for mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
outcomes (Franck et al., 2010; Hvattum and Arntzen, 2010). Developed by Brier (1950), the 
Brier score treats each of the outcomes in a betting event as a separate binary event and each 
market odds for these outcomes as an individual forecast. Each score is obtained by 
calculating the squared difference between the subjective probability and the realized 
outcome (zero if the outcome did not take place and one if it did) in a given match. Thus, the 
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lower the score, the closer the odds are to the true probabilities. Formally, for a set of 
forecast-event pairs, the average Brier score is defined as 
 
𝐵 =
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ (𝜌𝑖𝑗 − 𝜑𝑖𝑗)
2𝑂
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,      (10) 
 
where 𝐵 refers to the Brier score, 𝑁 is the number of forecast-event pairs, 𝑂 is the number of 
possible outcomes in an event, 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is the subjective probability of the 𝑗:th outcome to occur in 
the 𝑖:th event, and 𝜑𝑖𝑗 is a binary indicator for the different outcomes so that 𝜑𝑖𝑗 = 1 if the 
outcome 𝑗 took place in the 𝑖:th event and 𝜑𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise. 
First introduced by Epstein (1969), the rank probability score is another descriptive 
measure on odds accuracy, evaluating the forecasts for different outcomes as a multi-category 
forecast. In the context of soccer, Constantinou and Fenton (2012) argue that Brier scores do 
not address the ordinality of match outcomes when scoring the forecasts and suggest that the 
RPS is a more appropriate measure. It is calculated as the sum of differences between the 
cumulative forecast probability and the cumulative outcome probability. The major difference 
to Brier scores is that the score given to a forecast with the RPS is weighted with the number 
of possible outcomes. Hence, the average RPS is formally defined as 
 
𝑅𝑃𝑆 =  
1
𝑁
∑
1
𝑂−1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ∑ (∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=1 − ∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑗
𝑘=1 )
2𝑂
𝑗=1 ,    (11) 
 
where 𝑅𝑃𝑆 refers to the rank probability score. Similar to Brier scores, a lower average RPS 
indicates higher forecast accuracy and vice versa. Brier scores are thereby actually a special 
case of the RPS when the number of categories is two. 
 
3.4.2. Economic tests of efficiency 
 
Economic tests of efficiency explore whether any betting strategy yields consistent 
profits. At the same time, these tests are always incomplete per se because the number of 
different betting rules and strategies is in practice unlimited. Formally, economic betting 
market efficiency means that 
 
𝐸(𝑠| ∅ )  ≤ 0,         (12) 
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where 𝑠 stands for the applied betting strategy. (Tryfos et al., 1984; Gandar et al., 1988) 
Similar to financial markets, different betting strategies can be broadly divided into 
two categories: fundamental and technical strategies (see, e.g., Hausch et al., 1981; Thaler and 
Ziemba, 1988). Fundamental strategies are commonly based on publicly available 
information according to which a bettor attempts to detect bets that have greater probabilities 
of winning than implied by odds quoted in the market. Technical strategies use only current 
betting data and require less information; here, a bettor attempts to find inefficiencies in the 
market and to place bets that have a positive expected value. Most of the earlier academic 
research has concentrated on technical strategies, and as a weak form examination of 
efficiency the economic tests applied in this study are also based on technical strategies. 
There are various methods to test the significance of returns obtained with different 
betting strategies (see, e.g., Tryfos et al., 1984; Gandar et al., 1988; Paton and Vaughan 
Williams, 1998; 2005; Sessford and White, 2010). For example, z-values of returns can 
simply be evaluated against the null hypotheses of randomness and/or unprofitability. 
Moreover, after calculating the actual return to a unit stake on each outcome, net returns on 
unit bets can be regressed on odds or, inversely, on implied probability. 
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4. Earlier studies on weak form betting market efficiency 
 
This chapter focuses on the literature on weak form betting market efficiency. While 
much of the earlier literature concentrates on racetrack betting, team sports have begun to 
attract attention more recently. In sports whose betting markets are centred around handicaps, 
researchers have mostly focused on potential biases in the favorite-longshot and home-away 
dimensions. On the other hand, in markets where bets are offered on different outcomes at 
odds varying according to the relative strengths of the participating teams, as is the case in 
soccer, the literature has concentrated on biases in the short odds versus long odds dimension. 
Regarding statistical tests, Pankoff (1968) performs the first ever test of betting market 
efficiency by regressing match outcomes in NFL on bookmakers’ spreads, later followed by 
Zuber et al. (1985), Gandar et al. (1988), and Dare and MacDonald (1996), all of whom 
conclude that the market seems to be efficient on aggregate, analogously to the stock market. 
The first economic tests, also in NFL, are provided by Vergin and Scriabin (1978), Tryfos et 
al. (1984), Zuber et al. (1985), and Sauer et al. (1988), all of whom are able to demonstrate 
some profitable betting strategies, though often with much less consistency when applied with 
other samples. In the following, I will present the later literature most relevant from this study 
point of view, divided in three parts: evidence of the favorite-longshot bias, results in soccer, 
and findings in sports arbitrage. 
 
4.1. The favorite-longshot bias 
 
The most prominent bias reported in the betting market literature is unquestionably the 
favorite-longshot bias (FLB), first discovered by Griffith (1949). The FLB implies that 
placing bets on favorites yields a higher return than placing bets on longshots; in other words, 
the betting public has been observed to have a systematic tendency to overbet longshots and 
underbet favorites. Asch and Quandt (1987, 290) describe it as “the most widely established 
empirical regularity” in betting. This phenomenon has been identified in a variety of sports.33 
The FLB is most extensively investigated in horse racing, in which it is detected for example 
by Dowie (1976), Ali (1977), Snyder (1978), Hausch et al. (1981), Asch et al. (1982, 1984), 
                                                 
33 Rubinstein (1985) detects a similar bias also in the equity options market as he finds that shorter maturity 
options (i.e. longshots) are overpriced. Moreover, Hodges et al. (2003) demonstrate how the FLB exists when 
investors pay more for S&P 500 and FTSE 100 put options than they are subsequently worth, while the degree 
of overpaying increases monotonically as the probability of finishing in the money decreases. 
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Vaughan Williams and Paton (1997), Jullien and Salanié (2000), and Snowberg and Wolfers 
(2010). Most often the FLB is found by comparing objective and subjective probabilities 
and/or economic returns between different odds classes or favorite positions. 
Thaler and Ziemba (1988) review the earlier literature on betting markets in horse 
racing and highlight the consistency of the favorite-longshot bias. At the same time, however, 
they propose that the betting market is surprisingly efficient in an economic sense; the FLB 
does not appear to translate into profitable betting strategies. More generally, Thaler and 
Ziemba argue that modelling betting behavior is complicated because it seems to depend on 
numerous factors that are existent also in other investment behavior. Professional portfolio 
managers, for example, might be more concerned with beating some index than with 
maximizing returns, which might lead to betting on longshots at the end of the day if behind. 
In soccer, evidence of the favorite-longshot bias is provided by Pope and Peel (1989), 
Paton and Vaughan Williams (1998), Cain et al. (2000, 2003), Deschamps and Gergaud 
(2007), Vlastakis et al. (2009), Koning (2012), Direr (2013), and Nyberg (2014). Besides 
soccer, Cain et al. (2003) depict that the FLB appears in many sports, including boxing, 
cricket, greyhound and horse racing, as well as snooker and tennis, even though it remains 
unclear whether the bias can be viewed as a monotonic relationship throughout the probability 
spectrum. In most cases, however, regardless of the sport at issue, the studies propose that it is 
not possible to exploit the bias to devise a profitable betting strategy, despite the variation in 
rates of return between different bets along the favorite-longshot continuum. 
The economics and psychology literature provides several explanations for the 
favorite-longshot bias without a clear consensus on its causes. In any case, when 
recharacterizing the FLB as a human tendency to overestimate the probability of unlikely 
events, Coleman (2004) accentuates the need for a robust explanation for the phenomenon 
because it might be pervasive throughout finance, management, and society, often causing the 
return from investment to fall as the probability of loss increases.34 The different explanations 
for the FLB can be broadly divided into two categories: demand side explanations and supply 
side explanations. In the former, the FLB is caused by irrational behavior of bettors; as they 
place more money on longer than shorter odds, they progressively reduce the return of 
longshots. In the latter, the FLB is driven by biased odds setting behavior of bookmakers. 
Next, I will shortly present the main ideas behind these explanations. 
                                                 
34 As real life examples of this tendency, Coleman (2004) mentions how the return is often lower than expected 
in investments in developing markets, mergers and acquisitions, mineral exploration, and innovative business 
models, essentially covering a wide spectrum of institutions from marriage to crime. 
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4.1.1. Demand side explanations for the FLB 
 
The demand side reasons for the favorite-longshot bias can be further classified into 
two distinct explanations: bettors either have risk loving utility functions and/or they 
misperceive probabilities associated with different outcomes. The risk loving class presumes 
that bettors give up some return in exchange for the additional risk of low probability bets. 
The view that bettors are purely risk lovers is supported by Weitzman (1965), Ali (1977), 
Quandt (1986), and Jullien and Salanié (2000), for example. In addition, some other theories 
are observationally equivalent to the risk loving explanation; these include the existence of 
bragging rights resulting from eventually winning a bet with long odds (Snyder, 1978; Thaler 
and Ziemba, 1988), bettors’ preference for skewness instead of variance (Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998), as well as utility conferred by purchasing a bet with long odds (Conlisk, 
1993). Because globally risk loving bettors should not buy insurance—even though they do it 
in most cases—it is often suggested that bettors are actually locally risk loving but globally 
risk averse (Rosett, 1965; Quandt, 1986; Golec and Tamarkin, 1995). 
In the misperceptions class it is assumed that cognitive errors and misperceptions of 
probabilities play a bigger role in the FLB than risk love. Many laboratory studies have 
shown how people overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities; 
people are systematically poor at discerning between small and tiny probabilities, while also 
having a strong preference for certainty over extremely likely outcomes (Snowberg and 
Wolfers, 2010). These findings, in turn, constitute an important foundation for the prospect 
theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Moreover, Golec and Tamarkin (1995) 
examine whether bettors’ risk preferences or overconfidence better explains the preference for 
low probability bets and find that overconfidence fits the data more closely.35 
 
4.1.2. Supply side explanations for the FLB 
 
The supply side factors behind the favorite-longshot bias rest on the fact that the 
phenomenon is more pronounced in bookmaker markets (in which firms accept bets from the 
public and might therefore carry a risk if their books are not balanced) than in pari-mutuel 
                                                 
35 In addition to the above explanations, it has been suggested that transaction and information costs might cause 
the FLB at least partly (Terrell and Farmer, 1996; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Smith et al., 2006). The 
reasoning here is that becoming an informed bettor is hindered because of these costs, which slows down the 
removal of market mispricing and maintains the bias. Here, the extent of the FLB depends on the incidence of 
these costs on informed bettors; the greater the transaction and information costs, the greater the bias. 
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markets (in which payoffs represent proportional shares of the total money bet on all 
outcomes and market makers carry no risk) (Coleman, 2004). At the same time, however, the 
supply side cannot provide a complete explanation as the FLB is slightly present also in pari-
mutuel betting markets. In his discussion on bookmakers’ strategies, Henery (1985) concludes 
that because betting on favorites is most competitive, bookmakers quote higher odds on 
favorites to attract bettors, while they compensate for the implied reduction in margin by 
providing less advantageous odds on longshots. Shin (1991), on the other hand, argues that 
due to the existence of insiders it is optimal from the bookmakers’ point of view to employ a 
square root rule where the ratio of quoted odds is equal to the square root of the ratio of 
objective probabilities. As a result, betting odds would underestimate the chances of favorites 
and overestimate the chances of longshots. 
 
4.1.3. Exceptions to the FLB 
 
Despite the wide evidence of the favorite-longshot bias, some authors have also 
provided exceptions, either in the form of no bias at all or in the form of a reverse favorite-
longshot bias (RFLB). Busche and Hall (1988), Busche (1994), and Swidler and Shaw (1995), 
for example, find no bias in racetracks, whereas Schnytzer and Weinberg (2008) observe no 
bias in Australian football. More recently, after the emergence of betting exchanges, Smith et 
al. (2006; 2009) show how the FLB is demonstrably lower in betting exchange markets than 
in traditional betting markets, most likely due to lower transaction costs. They also suggest 
that the level of the FLB is inversely related to the amount of information available to bettors. 
The reverse favorite-longshot bias means that placing bets on favorites yields a lower 
return than placing bets on longshots; as subjective probability of an outcome increases, 
objective probability increases less than implied market efficiency and vice versa. Signs of a 
RFLB have been detected in American football (Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Borghesi, 2012), 
basketball (Paul and Weinbach, 2005a), and ice hockey (Woodland and Woodland, 2001; 
Gandar et al., 2004; Paul and Weinbach, 2012), occasionally allowing also profitable betting 
strategies. Furthermore, in baseball, Woodland and Woodland (1994; 2003) find individual 
betting lines efficient but observe a RFLB when considering all lines simultaneously, whereas 
Gandar et al. (2002) find only a subtle bias after making a correction to the Woodland-
Woodland methodology. 
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4.2. Findings in soccer 
 
During the recent decades scholars have begun to examine weak form efficiency also 
in soccer, initiated by Pope and Peel (1989) who analyze odds quoted by four national high 
street bookmakers in the UK. With a linear probability model, they regress match outcomes 
on bookmakers’ subjective probabilities using weighted least squares estimation. Their 
evidence shows not only that there are differences in pricing of certain types of bets between 
the bookmakers, but also that there are systematic differences in the apparent odds setting 
processes of the firms. In this respect, Pope and Peel argue that pooling of information 
contained in odds leads to more efficient forecasts. At the same time, however, none of these 
superior forecasts results in profits after considering the bookmaker margin. The authors end 
up concluding that the betting market appears to meet the most important (economic) criterion 
for market efficiency, even though all the odds, especially those for the draw outcome, do not 
seem to meet the axioms of rational expectations. 
Paton and Vaughan Williams (1998) employ tobit regression with a small sample of 
1X2 Premier League odds and detect a favorite-longshot bias, explaining the phenomenon 
with transaction costs. Also in English soccer, Cain et al. (2000) report evidence of a FLB, 
similar to that found in horse racing, both for match results and scores when comparing the 
estimated fair odds with a bookmaker’s actual odds. Their calculations of probability for 
different categories of bets suggest that betting on strong favorites may offer limited profits. 
Also in a later study, Cain et al. (2003) find a FLB for match results, but they underline the 
need for inspecting more closely whether the FLB takes place only at the high and low 
probability ends of the odds spectrum or monotonically throughout the spectrum. Kuypers 
(2000), on the contrary, performs weak form tests of efficiency in four English divisions, 
using odds of only one bookmaker. He detects neither differences between subjective and 
objective probabilities nor strategies that would lead to positive returns. Moreover, Kuypers’ 
results give no support to the Pope and Peel (1989) assertion on biased odds for draws. 
In an essential paper, Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005) hypothesize that the 
existence of outlier odds may provide otherwise uninformed bettors with forecasting 
information that can be used to build improved betting strategies. Using data from the UK 
bookings points spread betting market, the authors define quasi-arbitrages (or quarbs) as 
situations in which the average or mid-point of all the quoted spreads lies outside the top or 
bottom end of the spread quoted by at least one bookmaker. When detecting a quarb, they 
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analyze whether it is the average market position or the outlying position which provides 
most information and whether it is possible to implement a profitable betting strategy based 
on this information. More specifically, the logic here is that in the absence of other 
information, the mid-point of all spreads should provide an obvious point estimate of the 
value of the asset; then, as long as this value is greater (lesser) than the price at which the 
bettor buys (sells), one can expect positive returns. The results clearly show that the market 
mid-point price comprises a better forecast of betting asset values than the outlier odds. Even 
more importantly, when taking advantage of the market mid-point as a predictor, Paton and 
Vaughan Williams demonstrate positive and superior returns both in-sample and out-of-
sample, even after controlling for differential risk. 
Deschamps and Gergaud (2007) analyze also weak form efficiency in English soccer, 
observing a favorite-longshot bias both in the odds for home wins and away wins, and a 
reverse bias in the draw odds. Despite this evidence, they find no betting strategy with a 
positive return. Anyway, Deschamps and Gergaud confirm that the strategy of choosing 
systematically the highest available odds between different bookmakers improves the return 
significantly. In addition, consistent with Paton and Vaughan Williams (2005), using a more 
sophisticated strategy according to which the variance of odds between bookmakers acts as a 
signal that the bookmaker with the highest odds for an outcome might underestimate the 
probability of this outcome, generates an even higher return. 
After taking into consideration the two major changes introduced by online sports 
betting, low transaction costs and the greater number of bookmakers from which to choose 
the highest odds, Malarić et al. (2008) test weak form efficiency in ten European soccer 
leagues during three seasons. Their simple strategy based on value betting yields a return of 
7.9% when placing only bets with an expected return greater than 5%. Malarić et al. perform 
their study with a limited number of leagues and with not more than fifteen bookmakers, but 
they suggest that the model could be easily expanded to include both more leagues and 
bookmakers to increase the number of profitable bets per season. 
Vlastakis et al. (2009) undertake a comprehensive empirical study in European soccer, 
which according to them constitutes one of the most liquid and important betting markets, 
focusing on the predictability of match outcomes based on information contained in odds. 
When evaluating the average returns of a series of different betting rules, the authors perceive 
a favorite-longshot bias but also evidence of overestimation of home ground advantage, 
together leading to a new reverse home-underdog bias, i.e. an away-favorite bias. Vlastakis et 
al. also employ two regression techniques, a Poisson count for forecasting scores and a 
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multinomial logit model for forecasting outcome probabilities, separately for each 
bookmaker. They then combine the predictions from individual bookmakers with two 
different encompassing techniques; their idea with this is that if bookmakers use different 
methodologies when quoting their odds, aggregating this information might lead to superior 
forecasting performance. The authors suggest that formal econometric models result in more 
accurate forecasts which can then be utilized to build profitable betting strategies, indicating 
weak form inefficiency. In particular, they highlight that encompassing goal forecasts seem to 
provide superior results; at their best, regression-based encompassing of goal forecasts in the 
away-favorite subsample yields an average return of 13.3% per bet. However, when 
employing 1X2 odds only, they cannot reject economic efficiency. 
Strumbelj and Sikonja (2010) use both Brier scores and ranked probability scores to 
evaluate bookmaker odds as probabilistic forecasts of match outcomes in six major European 
soccer leagues. They discover that odds of specific bookmakers are better forecasts than those 
of others but also that the effectiveness of odds has increased over time, even though the 
effectiveness varies between different leagues. Without investigating any betting strategies 
themselves, Strumbelj and Sikonja highlight that in the future it would be interesting to study 
whether more effective bookmaker odds and/or consensus among bookmakers would provide 
additional information to build a profitable strategy. 
More recently, Direr (2013) investigates weak form efficiency of European soccer 
betting with odds from twelve bookmakers in 21 divisions over eleven years, totally including 
79,446 matches and around 1,800,000 odds, being the largest data set thus far in the relevant 
literature. His method of systematically picking out odds inferior to a threshold—simply 
betting on favorites whose probability of winning exceeds 90%—generates a return of 4.5% 
with best odds and 2.8% with average odds available in the market, being robust to out-of-
sample tests. In other words, only with information contained in odds and without relying on 
complex econometric models, Direr observes a favorite-longshot bias similar to other betting 
markets and, consequently, provides evidence of deviations from weak form efficiency. 
Koning (2012) examines the efficiency of soccer betting odds in ten highest level 
European leagues during eight seasons, employing a binary logit model. He finds a persistent 
favorite-longshot bias, which holds across different countries and applies both to home and 
away wins. Moreover, in a related study, Nyberg (2014) employs a binary logit model to 
make a comparison to previous models but also introduces a multinomial logit model to test 
the three match outcomes simultaneously. His sample consists of the top four divisions in 
England between the years 2000 and 2013. Overall, with both models, Nyberg shows that 
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statistically there are no large deviations from efficiency, but that the Premier League betting 
market is weak form inefficient, also featuring a FLB, which leads to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of efficiency also for the whole sample. 
  
4.3. Evidence of sports arbitrage 
 
Even though the search for arbitrage opportunities would be a natural starting point to 
discover weak form efficiency in betting markets, it has received relatively little attention in 
the literature, at least partly due to the fact that betting markets were previously segmented 
across countries with neither any intensive competition between bookmakers nor proper 
possibilities to carry out arbitrage analysis (Vlastakis et al., 2009). In any case, arbitrage 
opportunities have been found in racetrack betting for example by Asch and Quandt (1987) 
among different exotic bets, by Hausch and Ziemba (1990) in cross-track betting, and by 
Edelman and O’Brian (2004) with their specific model involving several bet types. However, 
Edelman and O’Brian list also some practical obstacles (such as time lags and limited 
liquidity) which make arbitrage betting not completely risk-free and easily exploitable. 
In soccer, Pope and Peel (1989) list a small number of conceivable arbitrage bets 
between odds of four UK bookmakers, whereas Dixon and Pope (2004) find no arbitrage 
situations between three and Forrest et al. (2005) between five UK bookmakers. Using data 
on the 2002 World Cup, Gil and Levitt (2007) detect only a few arbitrage opportunities, 
which also disappear rather quickly. Vlastakis et al. (2009), in turn, study the odds quoted by 
five major online bookmakers and one regular bookmaker for soccer matches in 26 different 
countries and events during 2002–2004, when online sports betting was in its early phase. 
When considering all the bookmakers, they find 63 arbitrage situations, representing 0.5% of 
all matches, with an average return of 21.8% (that in my view represents an impossibly high 
return to be exploited in practice). However, when taking into account the online bookmakers 
only, Vlastakis et al. identify only ten arbitrage opportunities. 
More recently, even if Koning (2012) finds only a minimal number of arbitrage bets, 
Constantinou et al. (2013) identify arbitrage opportunities in not less than 70 matches out of 
the 380 matches played during the English Premier League season 2011–2012, guaranteeing 
an average profit of 0.57% per such match. Constantinou and Fenton (2013) also find a 
notable number of arbitrage bets in 14 European soccer leagues. In addition, Franck et al. 
(2013) provide the first paper analyzing inter-market arbitrage, i.e. the possibility to combine 
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bets between bookmaker and betting exchange markets. They find 102 intra-market arbitrage 
opportunities among bookmakers but a whole of 2,287 inter-market arbitrage opportunities 
(in 19.2% of matches), yielding an average return of 1.4%. The authors note that these inter-
market opportunities arise mostly from too generous bookmaker odds that a bettor can then 
sell at a higher price (i.e. at lower odds) at the betting exchange. 
 
4.4. Summary of the earlier literature 
 
Overall, the earlier findings on betting market efficiency in its different forms provide 
no waterproof evidence neither on efficiency nor inefficiency. As expected, statistical 
efficiency has been rejected more often than the decisive test of economic efficiency. The 
situation in which a betting market is found to be statistically efficient but economically 
inefficient can be explicated with Jensen’s (1978) weaker formulation on financial market 
efficiency, according to which prices reflect information to the point at which the marginal 
benefits of acting on the information do not exceed the marginal costs. Because bookmaker 
margins, which can be viewed as bookmakers’ safety buffer against biased subjective 
probabilities, have been large before the online betting era, marginal benefits (placing value 
bets that exploit biases) have not exceeded marginal costs (bookmaker margins) and the 
statistical inefficiencies have thereby often had only scant practical relevance. As highlighted 
throughout this study, this setting of large bookmaker margins does not exist anymore. 
In terms of weak form efficiency in 1X2 soccer betting, a notable part of the previous 
literature has rejected statistical inefficiency in some form or another, often in the shape of a 
favorite-longshot bias, without being able to reject economic efficiency (Pope and Peel, 1989; 
Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Cain et al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; 
Vlastakis et al., 2009). On the other hand, some more recent studies detect statistical 
inefficiency but do not investigate economic efficiency at all (Strumbelj and Sikonja, 2010; 
Koning, 2012; Nyberg, 2014). This study aims at filling these gaps in the literature. On the 
one hand, the study inspects whether the statistical inefficiencies—if there still are some—
could now lead also to economic inefficiencies, thanks to the more competitive odds in the 
present-day betting market. On the other hand, the study builds on the recently observed 
statistical inefficiencies by performing also economic tests of efficiency. 
Regarding the choice of methodology of this study, the previous results lead to four 
important conclusions. First, to obtain more powerful results, the academic evidence clearly 
43 
 
 
demonstrates that tests of statistical efficiency must be carried out by analyzing odds on a 
level-by-level basis, along with aggregate tests. Second, pooling of odds information from 
diverse bookmakers has been shown to lead to more efficient forecasts, making it an 
applicable procedure to reach a market consensus estimate. Third, when utilizing these 
consensus estimates, economic profits have been generated by various value betting strategies 
in general and quasi-arbitrage strategies in particular. Thus, when performing economic tests 
of efficiency, it is reasonable to apply a variety of betting strategies. Fourth, alongside value 
betting strategies, the research has proven the (fairly self-evident) proposition that the 
exploitation of highest odds instead of average market odds or odds of a specific bookmaker 
only yields higher returns. Even when comparing bookmakers and betting exchanges, it is 
usually the former who give rise to economic inefficiencies due to their too generous odds. 
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5. Hypotheses 
 
This chapter presents the two hypotheses of this study, founded on the efficient market 
hypothesis in general and its applications in the context of sports betting markets in particular. 
Within the EMH, the focus is on weak form efficiency, assuming that future prices cannot be 
predicted by analyzing prices from the past. As described in Section 3.3, in sports betting this 
presumption translates into a condition according to which all information concerning 
upcoming sports outcomes is already included in the record of betting odds from the past. 
As demonstrated above, weak form efficiency of betting markets can be further 
separated into statistical and economic weak form efficiency, the latter being considered as 
the decisive test of efficiency. Statistical efficiency implies that subjective probabilities 
denoted by betting odds are unbiased estimators of match outcomes. Due to bookmaker 
margins (that represent transaction costs in betting markets), conceivable statistical 
inefficiencies might not lead to economic profits and hence have only limited practical 
relevance, but the results are important from the academic viewpoint. Moreover, information 
on statistical efficiency and/or inefficiency can be used to build certain betting strategies to 
gain more insight into economic efficiency. Therefore, with connection to statistical weak 
form efficiency, we get the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis I: The European online soccer betting market is statistically weak form 
efficient, meaning that 1X2 betting odds are unbiased predictors of match outcomes. 
 
Economic weak form betting market efficiency implies that there is no betting strategy 
that generates consistent positive returns. As explained in Section 2.2, bookmaker margins 
have decreased in the online betting era, which means that smaller biases in odds might these 
days lead to economic profits. On the other hand, as odds quoted for each and every outcome 
vary between different bookmakers, it might be possible to build a profitable betting strategy 
even under unbiased market odds by exploiting the highest odds available in the market. 
Thus, the hypothesis with respect to economic weak form efficiency can be written as: 
 
Hypothesis II: The European online soccer betting market is economically weak form 
efficient, meaning that no betting strategy yields consistent positive returns. 
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6. Data 
 
The data in the study consist of full time results as well as both average and highest 
1X2 odds quoted for each outcome in the online betting market for 95,789 soccer matches in 
74 divisions in 45 European countries during the seasons 2009–2014. As there are six 
separate odds for each match (three average and three highest), the data include in total 
574,734 odds. The data are obtained from oddsportal.com, a leading sports betting odds 
comparison site that compiles odds quoted by dozens of online bookmakers. Collecting and 
processing the primary data stood for a notable part of the study’s total workload. 
Table 1 describes the match outcomes, odds, and probabilities in the data, while Table 
A.1 in Appendix A lists the number of matches per season in each country and division 
considered in the study. Table 1 shows that the proportions of home wins, draws, and away 
wins have been relatively stable during the sample period. Moreover, even though the 
frequency of the different outcomes is fairly close to their subjective probability, the table 
indicates on aggregate that home wins have occurred somewhat more often than expected, 
whereas the opposite is the case for draws and away wins. In addition, Table 1 highlights that 
the standard deviation for the subjective probability of draws is notably lower than that for 
home wins and away wins. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 2, the data include the number of 
bookmakers whose odds were available and thereby taken into account when determining the 
average and highest odds for each match. Table 2 proves that the number of available 
bookmakers has increased each year during the sample period. 
For the purposes of this study, some revisions have been made to the data obtained 
from the odds comparison site. First, matches that were either cancelled or awarded have been 
removed from the data. Second, matches for which no 1X2 odds were quoted have also been 
eliminated from the data; however, this was the case only in a few dozen matches in the less 
significant divisions during the earliest seasons considered in the study. Third, to improve 
robustness as well as practical applicability of the results, all matches with highest odds that 
could have resulted in arbitrage bets of at least 5% have been taken out from the data. Even 
though such arbitrage bets appear occasionally in the current online betting market, odds for 
these considerable arbitrage bets might also include palps, i.e. obvious errors made by 
bookmakers who reserve the right to cancel bets made at these odds. Thus, it is the norm in 
the value betting community to avoid substantial outlier odds. Overall, slightly more than 
three thousand matches have been removed from the primary data and the results of a little 
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Table 1 
Match outcomes, odds, and probabilities 
This table presents summary statistics for match outcomes, odds, and subjective probabilities for each season in 
the data. The first two columns give the number of given outcomes (n) and their frequency during each season 
(later on referred to as objective probability). The third and fourth columns list the mean and median odds, 
employing the average odds quoted in the market. The last two columns portray the mean (𝜌), as defined in  
Eq. (3), and standard deviation (𝜎𝜌) of subjective probability. 
 
 n Frequency Mean odds Median odds 𝝆 𝝈𝝆 
  
2009–10  
 Home wins 8,824 0.460 2.41 2.05 0.452 0.156 
 Draws 4,958 0.258 3.57 3.31 0.264 0.042 
 Away wins 5,401 0.282 4.24 3.41 0.284 0.138 
 Total 19,183 1 3.41 3.15 0.333 0.149 
2010–11  
 Home wins 8,945 0.462 2.42 2.07 0.451 0.156 
 Draws 4,983 0.257 3.60 3.32 0.263 0.043 
 Away wins 5,441 0.281 4.22 3.39 0.286 0.139 
 Total 19,369 1 3.41 3.14 0.333 0.149 
2011–12  
 Home wins 8,742 0.452 2.45 2.09 0.449 0.157 
 Draws 5,013 0.259 3.62 3.32 0.263 0.042 
 Away wins 5,606 0.290 4.23 3.33 0.289 0.140 
 Total 19,361 1 3.43 3.13 0.333 0.149 
2012–13  
 Home wins 8,524 0.450 2.45 2.13 0.442 0.151 
 Draws 4,913 0.259 3.59 3.33 0.264 0.040 
 Away wins 5,502 0.291 4.02 3.25 0.294 0.135 
 Total 18,939 1 3.36 3.13 0.333 0.142 
2013–14  
 Home wins 8,526 0.450 2.55 2.13 0.442 0.161 
 Draws 4,851 0.256 3.70 3.36 0.260 0.044 
 Away wins 5,560 0.294 4.14 3.26 0.299 0.146 
 Total 18,937 1 3.46 3.16 0.333 0.150 
Total  
 Home wins 43,561 0.455 2.45 2.09 0.447 0.156 
 Draws 24,718 0.258 3.62 3.33 0.263 0.042 
 Away wins 27,510 0.287 4.17 3.32 0.290 0.150 
 Total 95,789 1 3.41 3.14 0.333 0.148 
        
 
Table 2 
Availability of bookmaker odds 
Shown below are summary statistics for the number of bookmakers whose odds were available in the online 
betting market for each match in the data. In other words, these figures describe how many different bookmakers 
have been involved when determining the average and highest odds in the sample.  
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
       
Mean 33 38 43 50 56 44 
Median 36 43 47 54 59 45 
Standard deviation 10.3 10.9 10.4 11.4 11.1 13.5 
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over one hundred matches that were decided after either overtime or penalties have been 
manually altered to reflect their full time result. 
The data set in this study is very extensive. To the best of my knowledge, in 
comparison with the earlier literature on betting markets in soccer, the number of matches 
considered is larger than in any previous study. Moreover, the data set is outstanding also in 
terms of the number of bookmakers taken into consideration when determining the average 
and highest odds quoted in the market. While the absolute majority of previous studies 
employ odds quoted only by a few bookmakers, the average and highest odds employed here 
represent the view of the whole market instead of only some specific bookmakers. Table 3 
depicts the number of matches and bookmakers included in the data sets of some earlier 
investigations of betting market efficiency in soccer. 
 
Table 3 
Coverage of earlier betting market studies in soccer 
This table portrays the number of matches and bookmakers (B’s) considered in some earlier studies on betting 
market efficiency in soccer. Compared to all the studies mentioned below, the current study (95,789 matches and 
a median of 45 bookmakers per match) dominates in both standards. 
 
Study Matches B’s 
   
Direr, 2013 79,446 12 
Hvattum & Arntzen, 2010 30,524 various 
Nyberg, 2014 26,463 5–10 
Koning, 2012 25,744 up to 12 
Demir et al., 2012 12,880 various 
Vlastakis et al., 2009 12,841 6 
Malarić et al., 2008 12,128 15 
Franck et al., 2013 11,933 11* 
Graham & Stott, 2008 11,000 1 
Strumbelj & Sikonja, 2010 10,699 10 
Forrest et al., 2005 9,727 5 
Deschamps & Gergaud, 2007 8,377 6 
Dixon & Coles, 1997 6,629 1–3 
   
Study Matches B’s 
   
Dixon & Pope, 2004 6,629 1–3 
Constantinou et al., 2012 6,244 28–40 
Kuypers, 2000 3,382 1 
Goddard & Asimakopoulos, 2004 3,139 1 
Cain et al., 2000 2,855 1 
Cain et al., 2003 2,855 1 
Forrest & Simmons, 2000 1,694 3** 
Forrest & Simmons, 2008 1,510 7 
Pope & Peel, 1989 1,291 10*** 
Sessford & White, 2010 787 1 
Paton & Vaughan Williams, 2005 447 up to 5 
Constantinou et al., 2013 380 26–49 
Milliner et al., 2009 194 1 
   
 
Notes: * Includes one betting exchange. ** Represents tipsters, not bookmakers. *** Includes six tipsters. 
 
The odds applied in the study are closing odds, i.e. odds quoted in the market just 
before the start of an event. Intuitively, closing odds should be the most efficient odds 
amongst the pre-match odds at different points in time. For example, when compared to 
opening odds that are primarily based on statistical analysis of the participating teams’ 
performance and other relevant information at the time of publishing the odds for the match, 
closing odds can be assumed to best reflect all news, statistics, as well as the bettor sentiment 
regarding the match. Moreover, while bookmakers usually accept lower stakes at opening 
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odds, which can also change quickly after they have been published without a chance for the 
bettor to place her bet at the initial odds in practice, bookmakers accept much higher stakes at 
closing odds that also tend to remain stable at the end of the pre-match betting period. 
The data provide interesting insights also into bookmaker margins and arbitrage 
opportunities in the online betting market in soccer. Table 4 portrays the evolution of the 
bookmaker margin during the sample period separately for the average and highest odds. As 
foreseen earlier in the study, the margin has steadily decreased each year in both cases, 
resulting in, ceteris paribus, better chances for profitable betting. In practice, the use of 
highest odds in the current online betting market seems to imply zero transaction costs.  
Consistent with this observation, when considering the highest odds quoted in the 
market for each match, sports arbitrage opportunities have increased each year both in number 
and size, as shown in Table 5. While for the whole sample period arbitrage bets appeared in 
roughly 42% of the matches, during the season 2013–2014 there was such an opportunity 
available in more than 50% of the matches. This finding gives initial support for rejecting 
Hypothesis II and contrast with the earlier studies that find either no or a minimal number of 
arbitrage bets (Dixon and Pope, 2004; Forrest et al., 2005; Gil and Levitt, 2007; Vlastakis et 
al., 2009; Koning, 2012) and a moderate number of these bets (Pope and Peel, 1989; 
Constantinou and Fenton, 2013; Constantinou et al., 2013; Franck et al., 2013). The 
abundance of arbitrage opportunities in the sample can be explained to a large extent by the 
low margins of the current online betting market and by the outstanding number of 
bookmakers considered in the study. However, as there in practice are some challenges in 
capitalizing on arbitrage opportunities, the existence of arbitrage bets per se is not a sufficient 
condition for the overall conclusion that the market is economically weak form inefficient. 
 
Table 4 
Evolution of the bookmaker margin 
This table gives summary statistics for the bookmaker margin, as defined in Eq. (2), for both the average and 
highest odds in the data. 
  
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
Average odds       
 Mean 0.098 0.097 0.095 0.092 0.090 0.095 
 Median 0.096 0.095 0.093 0.091 0.088 0.093 
 Standard deviation 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Highest odds       
 Mean 0.014 0.011 0.007 0.002 –0.002 0.006 
 Median 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.000 –0.002 0.004 
 Standard deviation 0.032 0.028 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.026 
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Table 5 
Prevalence of arbitrage opportunities 
Listed below are summary statistics for the prevalence of sports arbitrage opportunities in the data, as defined in 
Eq. (6), employing the highest odds quoted for each match. The first two rows represent the number of such 
matches (n) and their frequency during the given period, while the remaining rows describe the scale of these 
bets, i.e. the return that could have been earned by placing bets in correct proportions on each outcome. As 
explained in this chapter, bets with an arbitrage return of over five percent have been removed from the data set. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
n 6,456 6,697 7,574 9,230 10,442 40,399 
Frequency 0.337 0.346 0.391 0.487 0.551 0.422 
Mean 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 
Median 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.012 
Standard deviation 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
       
 
Lastly, we will take a look at the descriptive measures on the prediction accuracy of 
the odds in the sample. Table 6 gives the Brier scores and the rank probability scores for the 
sample, using the average odds. Both scores clearly exhibit that the effectiveness of the odds 
has remained very stable during the sample period and has especially not improved. 
Moreover, the scores in Table 6 indicate that the prediction accuracy of home wins is 
somewhat weaker than that of draws and away wins. These observations, combined with the 
above finding that the bookmaker margin has decreased constantly at the same time, make up 
a fascinating setting for the efficiency tests carried out in the study. 
 
Table 6 
Brier scores and rank probability scores 
Employing the average odds, this table lists the Brier scores for each match outcome during the sample period, 
as defined in Eq. (10), as well as the rank probability scores (RPS) for each season, as defined in Eq. (11). For 
comparability, both scores have been scaled so that they vary between zero and one, zero indicating the best 
achievable forecast and one denoting the worst possible forecast. Coin tossing would generate a score of 0.5. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
Brier scores       
 Home wins 0.220 0.220 0.218 0.221 0.217 0.219 
 Draws 0.189 0.188 0.189 0.190 0.187 0.189 
 Away wins 0.179 0.179 0.182 0.185 0.183 0.182 
 Total 0.196 0.196 0.196 0.199 0.196 0.196 
RPS       
 Total 0.199 0.199 0.200 0.203 0.200 0.200 
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7. Methodology 
 
This chapter presents the methodology applied in the study, divided into statistical and 
economic parts. The statistical part performs two regression-based tests, employing linear and 
logit (both binary and multinomial) regression, as well as compares subjective and objective 
probabilities by grouping odds in two different ways. The economic part regresses the net 
returns of unit bets on odds applying tobit estimation, tests the rates of return of each odds 
group against the profitability threshold, and explores the profitability of both naïve and 
simulated sophisticated strategies. Altogether, this methodology toolbox is composed of the 
techniques most widely used in the betting market literature. On many occasions, I will use 
various specifications to generate robust results. 
 
7.1. Statistical tests of weak form efficiency 
 
In 1X2 betting, three outcomes are possible. Compared to those forms of betting that 
have only two conceivable outcomes, the analysis of statistical efficiency in 1X2 betting 
becomes more complicated because of dependence issues. As more than one outcome might 
have similar or almost similar odds, methods that group these bets based on the level of odds 
might place more than one outcome of an event into the same odds group, leading to within-
group correlation as only one of the outcomes can take place. To overcome these 
complications, this study performs all the statistical tests of efficiency, except the one that 
applies multinomial logit, in three parts, i.e. separately for home wins, draws, and away wins. 
This way there will be only two possible outcomes in each case, for example a home win and 
a complement of the home win, removing the potential problem of dependency. 
 
7.1.1. Linear regression: subjective vs. objective probability of odds groups 
 
I will start exploring the relation between subjective and objective probability on the 
aggregate level with linear regression using odds groups, estimating the simple model 
 
𝜋ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝜌ℎ + 𝑒ℎ,       (13) 
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where 𝜋ℎ is the objective probability of the odds group ℎ, 𝜌ℎ is the subjective probability of 
this odds group, and 𝑒ℎ is the error term. Here, weak form betting market efficiency implies 
that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1; if this holds, subjective probability is an unbiased estimator of 
objective probability (see, e.g., Zuber et al., 1985; Gandar et al., 1988; Sauer et al., 1988; 
Golec and Tamarkin, 1991; Gray and Gray, 1997). If 𝛽 > 0, the betting market predicts the 
outcome in the correct direction, while the opposite holds if 𝛽 < 0. 
To carry out the linear regression (as well as the grouping-based methods introduced 
later in this chapter), odds must be grouped according to a criterion so that nearby odds, i.e. 
all odds falling within specific intervals, are assigned into a same group. The literature 
recognizes two such criteria, originally developed by Ali (1977) and Snyder (1978). The first 
alternative is to determine the intervals so that each group would include approximately the 
same number of odds, as later done by Asch and Quandt (1987) and Busche and Hall (1988), 
for example. The second choice is to define the intervals so that each probability interval is of 
similar size, as later conducted in soccer by Kuypers (2000), for instance. 
Beyond these two alternatives there are no widely accepted guidelines for defining the 
intervals. Snyder (1978), for example, uses only his own discretion and convenience. In any 
case, grouping may introduce measurement error and the groupings should be chosen so that 
they maximize between group (and minimize within-group) variation (Busche and Hall, 1988; 
Vaughan Williams and Paton, 1998). The larger the group size, the more observations there 
are in each group, generating more reliable test statistics; on the other hand, a larger group 
size means also a fewer number of groups and therefore more aggregation, i.e. higher 
variation of odds within the groups. Thus, to obtain robust results, it is advisable to apply 
multiple intervals and check whether different choices give similar results. 
I will perform the linear regression with three different groupings, taking advantage of 
the considerable size of the data set. First, I estimate the model with one thousand equally 
sized groups. Second and third, I repeat the estimation with one hundred equally sized groups 
and fifty groups with an equal probability interval. To be exact, since we are here more 
interested in the subjective probabilities implied by the odds than in the odds themselves, I 
carry out all the groupings based on subjective probability, as defined in Eq. (3).36 
                                                 
36 I see this as an important procedural choice, considering that each match has its unique bookmaker margin. 
For example, if we have two matches in which the average odds for a home win are 1.38 and 1.42, these odds 
would most likely be (incorrectly) classified in different groups. If, however, we take into account that the 
bookmaker margins for these matches are 0.08 and 0.05, respectively, the subjective probability of a home win 
in both matches is actually 0.671 and the matches would be (correctly) classified in the same group. 
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7.1.2. Logit regressions: outcome-specific binary and all-inclusive multinomial 
 
After employing standard linear regression and getting the first impression of weak 
form betting market efficiency on the aggregate level and concerning each outcome 
separately, I will investigate the issue also with logit regression, a nonlinear regression model 
specifically designed for binary dependent variables. More specifically, I will apply both 
binary logit regression to test the efficiency of each outcome separately and multinomial logit 
regression to test the efficiency of all the three outcomes simultaneously. 
Generally, nonlinear binary response models use formulations that force the predicted 
values to be between zero and one. For a binary dependent variable 𝑌, these models estimate 
the probability that 𝑌 = 1. There are two such models: probit regression that uses the standard 
normal cumulative probability distribution function (c.d.f.) and logit regression that applies 
the logistic c.d.f. Even though the logistic c.d.f. has thinner tails than the normal c.d.f., these 
models often produce very similar results. Both probit and logit regression have been 
employed in the betting market literature. Different versions of probit regression have been 
utilized by Kuypers (2000), Boulier and Stekler (2003), Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), 
Forrest et al. (2005), Graham and Stott (2008), and Franck et al. (2010; 2013), for example. 
Logit regression has been used by Pope and Peel (1989), Forrest and Simmons (2000), 
Vlastakis et al. (2009), Hvattum and Arntzen (2010), Koning (2012), and Nyberg (2014), for 
instance. 
Following Koning (2012), the binary logit model, which tests the efficiency of each 
outcome separately, can be defined as follows. Since the outcome of a soccer match 𝑖 is either 
a home win (HW), a draw (D), or an away win (AW), these events can be indicated by 
dummy variables 𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 1, 𝑌𝑖
𝐷 = 1, and 𝑌𝑖
𝐴𝑊 = 1, while the variables are zero if the 
outcome does not occur. Thus, when the match is finished, we have three dummy variables 
that sum up to one. Given that odds reflect all information, the expected payout (including the 
stake) on a unit bet on a home win in the match 𝑖 is then 
 
𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊 × Pr(𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 1) + 0 × Pr(𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 0) = 1,     (14) 
 
where 𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊 is the scaled odds for a home win in the match, defined in Eq. (4). In other words, 
informationally efficient odds for a home win imply that Pr(𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 1) = 1/𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊. Because 
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1
𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊 =
1
1+𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊−1
=
1
1+exp(log(𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊−1))
=
1
1+exp(−0−(−1)log(𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊−1))
=
1
1+exp((−)(0−log(𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊−1)))
 , 
 
weak form betting market efficiency can be investigated by estimating the logit model 
 
Pr(𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 1) =
1
1+exp((−)(𝛼+𝛽 log(𝜗𝑖
𝐻𝑊−1)))
 ,     (15) 
 
testing the joint hypothesis that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = −1. Similar procedure naturally applies to 
draws and away wins. Besides performing this analysis for each outcome, I will estimate the 
above model also for each season separately to see if there are changes in the degree of 
efficiency during the sample period. Moreover, similar to Nyberg (2014), to combine the 
information of the independent logit models and their test statistics, I consider a simple and 
intuitively plausible procedure in which the total value of the log-likelihood function is the 
sum of the independent logit models. In that case, a joint test of the hypothesis that 𝛼 = 0 and 
𝛽 = −1 can be employed in the conventional way for all the outcomes simultaneously. 
After employing binary logit regression for each outcome separately, I will also use 
multinomial logit regression to model the three possible soccer match outcomes in tandem 
within one model. Here, efficiency testing can be based on only one test statistic instead of the 
three obtained above. In fact, multinomial logit regression is a generalization of the binary 
logit model and, following Greene (2012, 803–805) and Nyberg (2014), can be defined as 
follows. 
If we now denote the outcomes of a match 𝑖 as 𝑌𝑖 so that 𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 = 1, 𝑌𝑖
𝐷 = 0 and 
𝑌𝑖
𝐴𝑊 = −1, we can have three binary indicator variables so that 𝑌𝑖,1 = 1 and 𝑌𝑖,0 = 𝑌𝑖,−1 = 0 
if the result of the match 𝑖 was a home win. Similarly, we have 𝑌𝑖,0 = 1 and 𝑌𝑖,1 = 𝑌𝑖,−1 = 0 if 
the result was a draw, as well as 𝑌𝑖,−1 = 1 and 𝑌𝑖,1 = 𝑌𝑖,0 = 0 if the result was an away win. 
Assume also that the subjective probabilities assigned by the market for the match are 
contained in the vector 
 
𝜌𝑖 = [𝜌𝑖
𝐻𝑊 𝜌𝑖
𝐷 𝜌𝑖
𝐴𝑊].       (16) 
 
The multinomial logit model is then specified when we determine the conditional 
probabilities 𝜌𝑖,𝑗 (𝑗 = −1, 0, 1) of the match outcomes 𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗, conditional on the relevant 
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predictive information, which under weak form betting market efficiency should be 
completely included in Eq. (16). The model can be written applying the log-odds ratios so that 
 
log (
𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜋𝑖,0
) = 𝜏𝑖,𝑗,        (17) 
 
where the linear functions 𝜏𝑖,𝑗, 𝑗 = −1, 1, should be determined to complete the model. Using 
the subjective probabilities in Eq. (16), the log-odds ratios reduce to 
 
log (
𝜌𝑖,𝑗
𝜌𝑖,0
) = 𝛾𝑖,𝑗.        (18) 
 
Thus, as we want to investigate the predictive power of the subjective probabilities, the linear 
functions given in Eq. (17) can be specified as 
 
𝜏𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝛽𝑗 , 𝑗 = −1, 1,      (19) 
 
where the parameters 𝛼𝑗 and 𝛽𝑗 are outcome-specific. Similar to Vlastakis et al. (2009) and 
Nyberg (2014), for example, I will use draws as the benchmark category in Eq. (17), which 
indicates that the linear function in Eq. (19) is not determined for that outcome. For 
robustness, however, I will repeat the analysis using also home wins and away wins as the 
benchmark category, respectively. Finally, when solving the conditional probabilities 𝜋𝑖,𝑗 
from Eq. (17), we get 
 
𝜋𝑖,1 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝜌𝑖) =
exp(𝜏𝑖,1)
1+exp(𝜏𝑖,1)+exp(𝜏𝑖,−1)
     
𝜋𝑖,0 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 0|𝜌𝑖) =
1
1+exp(𝜏𝑖,1)+exp(𝜏𝑖,−1)
      (20) 
𝜋𝑖,−1 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = −1|𝜌𝑖) =
exp(𝜏𝑖,−1)
1+exp(𝜏𝑖,1)+exp(𝜏𝑖,−1)
,    
 
where ∑ 𝜋𝑖,𝑗
1
𝑗=−1 = 1. This equation shows that the linear functions in Eq. (19) completely 
determine the conditional probabilities of the different soccer match outcomes. The 
parameters of this multinomial logit model can be estimated by maximum likelihood, which 
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also facilitates the use of the conventional likelihood-based test statistics when investigating 
market efficiency. 
Statistical weak form betting market efficiency can be then tested with a restricted 
multinomial logit model in which 𝜏𝑖,1 = 𝛾𝑖,1 and 𝜏𝑖,−1 = 𝛾𝑖,−1. Therefore, we get the null 
hypothesis 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛼𝑗 = 0,  𝛽𝑗 = 1, 𝑗 = −1, 1.      (21) 
 
If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, subjective probabilities are statistically unbiased and 
informationally efficient predictors of match outcomes. If, on the other hand, the null 
hypothesis is rejected, match results deviate systematically from subjective probabilities and 
it would be possible to get more accurate probability forecasts using the unrestricted model. 
 
7.1.3. Grouping based on subjective probability 
 
As the last test of statistical efficiency, I will employ the widely used method that 
sorts odds into groups based on subjective probability and compares the groups’ subjective 
probabilities with their objective probabilities. This turns the focus from aggregate level to 
odds level, allowing us to go through the spectrum of odds on a level-by-level basis and 
clarify whether there are deviations between subjective and objective probabilities on some 
specific levels of odds. After Ali’s (1977) groundwork in developing a grouping method for 
horse racing based on the favorite rank, Snyder (1978) is the first to provide a test that groups 
the observations (odds) based on the level of odds. The method proceeds in the following 
way. 
First, similar to standard linear regression presented in Section 7.1.1, the odds are 
classified into groups so that nearby odds are assigned into a same group. Second, the groups’ 
average subjective probabilities are calculated by taking the average of the subjective 
probabilities implied by all the odds included in each group. The estimators for the objective 
probabilities are calculated as a ratio of the number of winning bets in each group to the total 
number of bets in the same group. Formally, the average subjective probability and the 
estimator for the objective probability are given as 
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𝜌
ℎ
=
∑ 𝜌ℎ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛ℎ
 and        (22) 
𝜋ℎ =
∑ 𝑌ℎ𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛ℎ
,         (23) 
 
where 𝜌
ℎ
 is the subjective probability of the group ℎ, 𝜌ℎ𝑖 is the subjective probability of the 
bet in the group ℎ and match 𝑖, 𝑛ℎ is the number of matches in the group ℎ, 𝜋ℎ is the 
estimator for the objective probability of the group ℎ, and 𝑌ℎ𝑖 is a variable for the bet in the 
group ℎ and match 𝑖 so that 𝑌ℎ𝑖 = 1 if the bet wins in the 𝑖:th match and zero otherwise. As 
the matches can be considered as independent binomial trials, 𝑌ℎ𝑖 follows a binomial 
distribution so that 𝐸(𝑌ℎ𝑖) = 𝜋ℎ and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌ℎ𝑖) =
𝜋ℎ(1−𝜋ℎ)
𝑛ℎ
. 
Finally, after determining the subjective and objective probabilities I will calculate 
whether these probabilities are equal within each group h, applying the null hypothesis 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝜌ℎ − 𝜋ℎ = 0        (24) 
 
for all ℎ = 1, 2, …, 𝐻, where 𝐻 refers to the number of groups. This analysis reveals whether 
the betting market is able to predict the winners and whether the calibration of odds varies 
between different levels of odds. Given the size of the sample, the binomial distribution can 
be approximated with the normal distribution and, due to the Central Limit Theorem, the test 
statistic for the group ℎ can be formally defined as 
 
𝑧ℎ =
𝜌ℎ−𝜋ℎ
√
𝜋ℎ(1−𝜋ℎ)
𝑛ℎ
~ 𝑁(0,1).       (25) 
 
In this study, I will conduct the grouping analysis with four different categorizations. 
First, I sort the odds into fifty equally sized groups, thereafter repeating the procedure with 
fifty groups with an equal probability interval. Third and fourth, I carry out the analysis with 
twenty equally sized groups as well as twenty groups with an equal probability interval, 
respectively. In soccer, this method has been employed with varying categorizations by Pope 
and Peel (1989), Kuypers (2000), and Koning (2012), for instance. 
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7.2. Economic tests of weak form efficiency 
 
This section presents the four economic tests of efficiency performed in the study. 
Instead of average market odds, the economic tests employ highest odds available in the 
market and explores whether historical information on odds can be utilized to make a profit. 
Similar to the tests of statistical efficiency, also the economic tests begin with an aggregate 
test, employing tobit regression that examines the whole spectrum of odds simultaneously. 
The second test makes a shift in focus to odds level, inspecting whether profits can be made 
on some specific levels of odds. The third part tests the profitability of some naïve betting 
strategies, while the fourth and final part encompasses tests of some specific sophisticated 
strategies that apply value betting and simulation. 
 
7.2.1. Tobit regression: returns of unit bets on odds 
 
As the first test of economic efficiency, I will apply tobit regression to investigate 
whether the returns of unit bets are systematically non-positive across all odds levels, 
originally proposed by Paton and Vaughan Williams (1998) and Vaughan Williams and Paton 
(1998), and later applied for example by Sessford and White (2010). Since this method 
aggregates returns and odds, we do not need to make any groupings and therefore avoid the 
potential challenges of doing (sometimes artificial) classifications. Separately for each match 
𝑖 and outcome 𝑗 in the sample (due to the correlation issues discussed earlier), I will first 
calculate the net returns of a unit bet so that 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 =  𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 − 1 if the bet won and 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = −1 if 
the bet did not win. We can then perform the regression 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,       (26) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑗 is the realized net return of a unit bet on the outcome 𝑗 in the match 𝑖, 𝛿𝑖,𝑗
𝐵  is the 
best odds for the given outcome, and 𝑒𝑖,𝑗 is the error term. Because the dependent variables 
are now left-censored at –1, OLS regression would lead to biased estimates and tobit 
estimation is more appropriate. 
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In an economically weak form efficient market, returns should be zero or negative 
throughout the spectrum of odds. Thus, given that the coefficient 𝛽 does not exceed zero, we 
get the null hypothesis 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛼 ≤ 0.         (27) 
 
On the other hand, tobit regression also reveals whether the returns vary between different 
odds levels. If 𝛽 = 0, the level of odds does not have any effect on returns. However, if 
𝛽 < 0, returns are lower at higher odds, indicating a favorite-longshot bias; if 𝛽 > 0, returns 
are higher at higher odds, which would point to a reverse favorite-longshot bias. 
 
7.2.2. Returns of odds groups 
 
After inspecting economic weak form betting market efficiency on the aggregate level, 
I will move on to exploring it on the individual odds level by sorting the odds into groups in 
the same way that in the statistical efficiency part and perform a simple test of the returns of 
unit bets in each group. In soccer, this procedure has been carried out by Pope and Peel 
(1989), Cain et al. (2000; 2003), Kuypers (2000), Dixon and Pope (2004), Deschamps and 
Gergaud (2007), Malarić et al. (2008), and Direr (2013). Similar to the statistical test of 
grouping based on subjective probability, I will use four different groupings: fifty and twenty 
equally sized groups as well as fifty and twenty groups with an equal probability interval. In 
each case, after assigning the odds into the groups, I will use the returns of unit bets as 
obtained in the previous section and employ the standard one-sided t-test to examine whether 
the return of any group is positive. Thus, for each group ℎ, we get the null hypothesis 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝑅ℎ ≤ 0,         (28) 
 
where 𝑅ℎ is the average net return of unit bets in the group ℎ. 
To examine the profitability of various betting strategies, different versions of the 
standard t-tests as well as z-tests have been the norm in the literature (see, e.g., Snyder, 1978; 
Tryfos et al., 1984; Gandar et al., 1988; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 2005; Demir et al., 
2012). However, there is no unanimous view concerning whether one should apply one-sided 
or two-sided tests. Woodland and Woodland (2003), for example, discuss that when 
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inspecting the equality of observed outcomes with conditions for efficiency, a two-sided test 
is appropriate. Meanwhile, if the objective is to test betting market returns directly, as is the 
case both in this and their own study, Woodland and Woodland recommend a one-sided test. 
 
7.2.3. Returns of naïve betting strategies 
 
The last two economic tests of efficiency compose different betting strategies and 
examine whether they result in consistent profits. These strategies are divided into two 
categories: naïve and sophisticated. In the former, I will calculate the returns obtained with 
five different naïve strategies, applying two simple staking plans. The naïve strategies consist 
of betting on every home win, draw, and away win, respectively, as well as of betting on the 
favorite (the outcome with the lowest odds in each match) and on the longshot (the outcome 
with the highest odds). In other words, these strategies place one bet on every match in the 
sample following a specific straightforward rule, without making any other distinction 
between different matches and the odds relating to them (see, e.g., Kuypers, 2000; Forrest et 
al., 2005; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009; Franck et al., 2013). 
The staking strategies applied with the naïve strategies are unit bets and unit wins, 
introduced in Section 2.4.4. After calculating the net return of each bet, I will perform the 
simple one-sided t-test to find out whether the returns are systematically zero or negative. The 
null hypothesis for all the naïve (as well as sophisticated) strategies will therefore be 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝑅𝑠 ≤ 0,         (29) 
 
where 𝑅𝑠 is the average return of the given strategy 𝑠. Moreover, to see whether there 
are systematic differences between the returns generated by the two staking strategies, I will 
test the equality of the returns of each naïve strategy, using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test37, as 
done in the context of soccer betting for example by Demir et al. (2012). 
 
  
                                                 
37 Developed by Wilcoxon (1945), the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a nonparametric statistical hypothesis test 
that can be used for example to compare two related samples. 
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7.2.4. Returns of sophisticated betting strategies 
 
The economic tests—as well as the whole study—culminate in the exploration of the 
returns earned by the sophisticated strategies. Here, I will utilize the two cornerstones of 
profitable betting presented in Section 2.4: value betting and Kelly staking. Regarding value 
betting, I will seek an edge [cases in which 𝑟𝑗 in Eq. (5) exceeds one] through two strategies 
that rest on quasi-arbitrage and the binary logit model constructed in the statistical efficiency 
part of this study, respectively. The idea with applying both quasi-arbitrage and the logit 
model is that bets with a positive expected value might stem from two distinct sources: either 
from taking advantage of outlier odds in a statistically efficient market or from exploitation of 
the observed statistical inefficiencies, in which case our logit model would be useful to 
determine the true probabilities. Overall, different variants of value betting have been 
extensively covered in the betting market literature (see, e.g., Dixon and Coles, 1997; 
Kuypers, 2000; Dixon and Pope, 2004; Vlastakis et al., 2009; Franck et al., 2010; Hvattum 
and Arntzen, 2010; Constantinou et al., 2013; Direr, 2013). 
First, introduced by Vaughan Williams (2001), quasi-arbitrage refers to a setting in 
which the highest odds quoted in the betting market lies so far outside the average market 
odds that, taking into account the bookmaker margin, the bettor can place a bet with a positive 
expected value. Therefore, in the quasi-arbitrage strategy, I will place bets only on outcomes 
and matches in which such quasi-arbitrage opportunity is available, similar to Paton and 
Vaughan Williams (2005) and Deschamps and Gergaud (2007). The numerator in Eq. (5) is 
now represented by the subjective probability of the average market odds, while the offered 
probability of the highest odds stands for the denominator. I will calculate the annual returns 
of this strategy with six different thresholds for 𝑟𝑗: 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50; the 
higher the threshold, the higher the deviation between the average and highest market odds. 
Second, I will seek an edge by utilizing the coefficients for the binary logit model 
obtained in the statistical tests of efficiency. In soccer, similar techniques have been employed 
by Pope and Peel (1989) and Vlastakis et al. (2009). Here, the procedure is otherwise similar 
to the quasi-arbitrage strategy, but the numerator in Eq. (5) is now represented by the 
probability estimate generated by the binary logit model, based on the logit coefficients 
obtained for the whole sample period. 
In theory, the returns of this logit-based strategy might be subject to in-sample bias 
because the logit coefficients applied in the strategy are founded on a sample that is similar in 
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terms of actual match results to the sample that is then used to simulate the strategies.38 In 
practice, however, the risk of bias is here considerably diminished due to two factors. On the 
one hand, the used logit coefficients represent those of the whole sample period, not of single 
seasons. On the other hand, even though the sample is similar in terms of match results, the 
strategy anyway employs a different set of odds, i.e. highest odds instead of average market 
odds that were utilized when building the logit model. In any case, for robustness, I will 
perform also out-of-sample tests, employing the seasons 2009–2012 as the in-sample period, 
according to which the logit model is determined, then operating the seasons 2012–2014 as 
the out-of-sample period. 
In connection with both the sophisticated strategies, I will follow the Kelly staking 
plan to determine the stakes. As discussed in Section 2.4.5, in betting practice it is advisable 
to apply a fractional Kelly plan that increases security at the expense of somewhat 
compromising long term growth maximization. Thus, besides employing the full Kelly plan 
[in which 𝑔 = 1, as defined in Eq. (8)], I will operate three fractional Kelly plans in which 
𝑔 = 1/2, 𝑔 = 1/4, and 𝑔 = 1/20. 
Moreover, since the size of a Kelly stake is dependent on the current size of the 
bettor’s bankroll, inherent in Kelly staking is the fact that outcomes of consecutive matches 
have their influence on forthcoming stakes. At the same time, soccer matches can be 
considered independent of each other per se. Therefore, to make statistical inferences on both 
the sophisticated strategies, I will use simulation in which I let the match order to differ 
randomly within each season in the sample, thereby obtaining a distribution of the returns 
separately on each above threshold for 𝑟𝑗 as well as on each above level of Kelly staking. For 
each season, I will generate a random match order, calculate the returns of the two 
sophisticated strategies with the above specifications and repeat the procedure one thousand 
times, eventually performing the simple t-test to find out whether the returns are not positive, 
operating the null hypothesis defined in Eq. (29). In the betting market literature, different 
forms of simulation have been employed by Constantinou et al. (2012), Demir et al. (2012), 
and Nyberg (2014), for instance. 
 
                                                 
38 Thus, in terms of a potential in-sample bias, the logit-based sophisticated strategy differs from the strategy that 
is based on quasi-arbitrage. Because in the quasi-arbitrage strategy subjective probability is based only on the 
average market odds quoted for the given match, that strategy contains definitely no risk of any in-sample bias. 
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8. Assumptions 
 
This chapter presents the key assumptions for carrying out the tests of efficiency. The 
first two assumptions interconnect with both the statistical and economic tests of efficiency. 
The third and fourth assumptions relate to the statistical tests of efficiency only, while the 
fifth, sixth, and seventh assumptions are linked merely to the economic tests of efficiency. 
 
8.1. Determination of market consensus 
 
When determining the subjective probabilities assigned by the betting market, the 
study assumes that market consensus is represented by the average odds quoted in the market. 
This is a painless and natural assumption and common in the betting market literature (see, 
e.g., Buchdal, 2003, 43–48; Levitt, 2004; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 2005; Deschamps 
and Gergaud, 2007; Hvattum and Arntzen, 2010; Koning, 2012). If the betting market 
processes all known information in the most efficient manner, one might expect that average 
odds provide the best indicator of the actual outcome.39 On the other hand, if a specific 
bookmaker possesses privileged information or at least has superior expertise in processing 
public information, outlier odds might provide a more accurate predictor of the outcome. 
 
8.2. Bettor rationality 
 
Betting strategies employed in the study assume that bettors are risk neutral and 
rational wealth maximizers with a linear utility of wealth. This assumption translates into two 
separate attributes. First, risk neutrality denotes that no bet imposes additional costs or 
benefits due to its probability of winning, i.e. depending on the riskiness of the bet. Second, as 
odds offered by different bookmakers on same outcomes vary, rational bettors always place 
their bets at the bookmaker offering the most favorable odds. By combining bets at different 
bookmakers and disregarding other factors such as habits, personal favorites, and levels of 
maximum payouts, they are able to reduce their exposure to risk and/or increase their 
expected return from betting strategies (Pope and Peel, 1989). 
                                                 
39 Also in other contexts, aggregation of information has been shown to provide valuable information in 
predicting future outcomes. Regarding future GNP growth, for instance, Clemen and Winkler (1986) and Fomby 
and Samanta (1991) observe that the consensus estimate is a better predictor than any one single estimate. 
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8.3. Bookmaker book balancing 
 
Following the convention of the literature that examines betting market efficiency 
under the traditional models of sportsbook behavior, this study assumes that bookmakers set 
market clearing prices (odds) by balancing their books (see, e.g., Pankoff, 1968; Zuber et al., 
1985; Sauer et al., 1988; Dare and MacDonald, 1996; Gray and Gray, 1997; Gandar et al., 
2002). In other words, bookmakers are assumed to play the role of market makers who match 
buyers and sellers without taking positions by themselves. If odds are set this way, betting 
action will be split between the different outcomes, bookmakers earning risk-free returns as 
soon as a balance is achieved. When odds are determined as a result of bettor actions, sports 
betting markets become a natural place to test the efficient market hypothesis with its 
different variations (Paul and Weinbach, 2012). 
This view on bookmaker behavior has been dominant in the literature, but it does not 
necessarily hold. The traditional model has been challenged by assuming that bookmakers set 
odds to maximize profits rather than to balance their books and might therefore take positions 
with respect to match outcomes, quoting inefficient odds to exploit bettor biases (see, e.g., 
Treynor, 1987; Avery and Chevalier, 1999; Millman, 2001; Levitt, 2004; Surowiecki, 2004). 
If this would be the case, odds would not represent bettors’ views on outcome probabilities, 
questioning the methodology applied in this study. 
Even though studies that have recently tested this contradictory view do not discard it, 
they demonstrate that the strategic odds setting by bookmakers is substantially more 
uncommon and less profitable than proposed earlier (Paul and Weinbach, 2009; 2012; Krieger 
et al., 2013). Instead, it has been suggested that bookmakers might set their odds as a forecast 
of actual match outcomes, which would be a profit maximizing strategy in the long run even 
in the presence of imbalanced betting volumes (Paul and Weinbach, 2012; Franck et al., 
2013).40 If this would be the case, odds would not represent bettors’ views on outcome 
probabilities but would instead reflect bookmakers’ views on these probabilities. In any case, 
from this study point of view, the methodology for determining subjective probabilities is 
justifiable as long as bookmakers set their odds either as forecasts or to balance their books, 
the only difference then relating to the actual source of these probabilities. 
                                                 
40 Paul and Weinbach (2012) also add that by setting odds as a forecast of actual game outcomes bookmakers 
would still earn their commission on losing bets in the long run, without the transaction costs that are necessary 
to attempt to balance the book or to price to exploit bettor biases on an event-by-event basis. Furthermore, the 
authors note that this strategy lessens the incentive for informed bettors to enter the market, eventually 
preventing these bettors to take away additional profits from bookmakers in the long run. 
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8.4. Distribution of the bookmaker margin 
 
In addition to assuming that bookmakers balance their books, this study assumes that 
the bookmaker margin is spread proportionally across each possible outcome of any event. 
Together with the above assumption about bookmakers balancing their books, this is a 
necessary condition for calculating subjective probabilities using Eq. (3), i.e. determining 
these probabilities by dividing odds quoted in the market by the margin, and is widely used in 
the literature.41 If the books of a bookmaker are not in balance and/or if its margin is spread 
unproportionally, questions of market efficiency would become more difficult to address 
because the subjective probabilities could not be exposed (Woodland and Woodland, 1994). 
 
8.5. Search and transaction costs 
 
The thesis also assumes that search and transaction costs, naturally excluding the 
built-in costs in bookmaker margins, are zero. This is a relatively undemanding condition and 
widely applied in the literature. Direr (2013) notes that there are nowadays several websites 
offering odds comparisons between bookmakers for free and argues that shopping around for 
highest possible odds does not entail significant search costs. When it comes to transaction 
costs, depositing and withdrawing funds to and from accounts at different bookmakers, which 
constitutes an unavoidable task when using multiple bookmakers, comprises another potential 
source of transaction costs besides bookmaker margins. In this respect, there are nowadays 
money transfer sites that offer zero costs for transferring money to and from bookmakers. 
Moreover, as bettors almost always receive a welcome bonus when joining a new bookmaker, 
overall transaction costs may well turn out to be even negative in practice. 
 
  
                                                 
41 Studies in which bookmaker margins are assumed to spread this way include, among others, Kuypers (2000), 
Dixon and Pope (2004), Goddard and Asimakopoulos (2004), Forrest et al. (2005), Deschamps and Gergaud 
(2007), Graham and Stott (2008), Malarić et al. (2008), Milliner et al. (2009), Vlastakis et al. (2009), Demir et 
al. (2012), Koning (2012), and Nyberg (2014). 
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8.6. Stakes and bookmaker limits 
 
When carrying out the economic tests of efficiency, the thesis assumes that one might 
bet any given sum of money at any given odds in the data. It is therefore assumed that 
bookmaker stake limits are absent. This condition might be restrictive in some occasions, 
possibly harming the implementation of certain betting strategies. This is because 
bookmakers currently have the technical means to identify skilled bettors and arbitrageurs and 
always reserve the right to limit the stakes of individual customers or to close the accounts of 
these customers completely (Franck et al., 2013). As the strategies necessitate placing bets on 
the highest odds quoted in the market as well as using exact stakes, for example betting 2,147 
euros instead of betting exactly two thousand euros, such bets might raise the attention of 
bookmakers who counteract their sharpest clients and lead to stake limits. 
 
8.7. Bettor taxation 
 
When testing economic efficiency, the study assumes that online bettors do not have 
to pay any taxes on their betting activities in general and winnings in particular. This 
assumption is due to two facts that together in practice lay the foundation for tax-free betting 
in a significant part of Europe, for instance. First, winnings from online betting are currently 
not taxed at all in many European countries or taxed only for winnings received from 
bookmakers that are based outside the EU; overall, the current outlook of bettor taxation is 
manifold and subject to constant change. Second, even if living in a country in which non-EU 
online betting winnings are taxed, a bettor can always reduce or completely eliminate her tax 
burden by transferring funds into some of her EU-bookmaker accounts using matched betting 
introduced in Section 2.4.3. In this case, if necessary, she would withdraw funds only from 
her EU-bookmakers and never withdraw any net winnings from non-EU bookmakers.42 
 
  
                                                 
42 As such, the intuition behind this procedure is the same than in tax planning activities of multinational 
corporations who aim at earning accounting profits in countries with lower taxation. 
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9. Results 
 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical and economic tests of weak form 
betting market efficiency performed in the study, as introduced in Chapter 7. A discussion on 
the results follows then in Chapter 10. 
 
9.1. Statistical tests of weak form efficiency 
 
In the following, I will display the results of the three statistical tests of efficiency as 
described in Section 7.1, applying average market odds. The first two tests reveal whether the 
1X2 betting market in European soccer is statistically weak form efficient on the aggregate 
level, whereas the third test exposes the degree of efficiency on the individual odds level. 
 
9.1.1. Linear regression: subjective vs. objective probability of odds groups 
 
The comparison between the subjective and objective probability of odds groups casts 
doubt on statistical weak form betting market efficiency on the aggregate level. As shown in 
Table 7, standard linear regression using one thousand equally sized groups rejects market 
efficiency for all outcomes with high values of the F-statistic. Moreover, the coefficient 𝛽 is 
significantly larger than one, which means that when subjective probability increases, 
objective probability increases more than implied by market efficiency and vice versa. In 
other words, average market odds seem to be too high for favorites and too low for longshots. 
This indicates a favorite-longshot bias, the most common departure from market efficiency in 
the earlier literature highlighted in Section 4.1. These results contrast sharply with Kuypers 
(2000) who neither is able to reject weak form efficiency nor detects any systematic bias, 
though with a sample roughly thirty times smaller than that of this study, thereby providing 
much less power. 
Another interesting aspect of the linear regression results in Table 7 is the notably 
different results for draws when compared to those for home wins and away wins. The 
estimated coefficients and the value for R-squared reveal that odds for draws appear to be 
considerably more biased than those for the other outcomes and the linear regression model 
fits the data for draws much worse. This feature has been noticed earlier by Pope and Peel 
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Table 7 
OLS estimates and efficiency testing results of 1,000 equally sized groups  
This table presents the OLS estimates and the efficiency testing results of the standard linear regression model, 
as defined in Eq. (13), for 1,000 equally sized odds groups. The regressions have been run separately for home 
wins, draws, and away wins. The groups are sorted by subjective probability, as defined in Eq. (3), so that the 
group size is 95 for 211 groups and 96 for 789 groups. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficient 𝛽, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽 = 1. The sixth and seventh 
rows give the F-statistics for the joint test that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1, which denotes the test of weak form betting 
market efficiency. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Home wins Draws Away wins 
    
𝛼 –0.0338*** –0.0724*** –0.0302*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0075) (0.0028) 
𝛽 1.0930*** 1.2582*** 1.0934*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0292) (0.0097) 
R2 0.929 0.572 0.923 
F 68.61*** 51.60*** 57.74*** 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 1,000 1,000 1,000 
    
 
(1989), Dixon and Pope (2004), as well as Koning (2012), all of whom highlight bookmakers’ 
potential inability to predict draws and propose that bookmakers might systematically 
underestimate the variance of the probabilities associated with this outcome. 
The repetition of the procedure with one hundred equally sized groups and fifty 
groups with an equal probability interval produces similar results. The only major differences 
are that in the former the model fits the data better also for draws and that in the latter market 
efficiency for draws cannot be rejected, even though the coefficients are still parallel to those 
in the other groupings. For convenience, the results of these two additional estimations are 
given in Tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. As all the three groupings generate similar 
outcomes, the results can be considered robust and there is no need for repeating the analysis 
with other groupings. 
 
9.1.2. Logit regressions: outcome-specific binary and all-inclusive multinomial 
 
The results of the binary logit regression give further support to the rejection of 
statistical weak form betting market efficiency. As illustrated in Table 8, the joint hypothesis 
of market efficiency is rejected for each outcome and season, as well as for the whole sample 
period and all the outcomes simultaneously. Thus, also here subjective probabilities of soccer 
matches seem to deviate systematically from their objective probabilities. Moreover, when 
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Table 8 
ML estimates and efficiency testing results of the binary logit model 
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and the efficiency testing results of the binary logit model, 
as defined in Eq. (15). Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. In the 
case of the coefficient 𝛽, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽 = −1. Wald’s 𝜒2 refers to the Wald’s chi-square test 
statistic for the estimated model, while 𝜒1
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) stands for the test statistic for the Wald’s test of 
coefficient restrictions, the null hypothesis of weak form efficiency being that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = −1. Pseudo-R2 
refers to McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. 𝜒6
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) stands for the joint test that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = −1 for 
home wins, draws, and away wins simultaneously. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
Home wins       
 𝛼 0.0595*** 0.0712*** 0.0385** 0.0569*** 0.0642*** 0.0583*** 
  (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0164) (0.0164) (0.0072) 
 𝛽 –1.1257*** –1.1213*** –1.1382*** –1.0953*** –1.1201*** –1.1204*** 
  (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0260) (0.0251) (0.0113) 
 Wald’s 𝜒2 2,020.85*** 2,012.32*** 2,061.05*** 1,778.26*** 1,983.57*** 9,856.36*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒1
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) 31.12*** 33.73*** 31.18*** 19.18*** 29.55*** 140.25*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0912 0.0907 0.0949 0.0824 0.0971 0.0913 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
Draws  
 𝛼 0.2688*** 0.2680*** 0.2540*** 0.3874*** 0.4446*** 0.3212*** 
  (0.0830) (0.0818) (0.0825) (0.0924) (0.0870) (0.0380) 
 𝛽 –1.2968*** –1.2953*** –1.2697*** –1.4055*** –1.4522*** –1.3409*** 
  (0.0810) (0.0795) (0.0800) (0.0905) (0.0839) (0.0369) 
 Wald’s 𝜒2 256.17*** 265.74*** 252.02*** 241.27*** 299.80*** 1,320.11*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒1
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) 16.48*** 17.01*** 12.63*** 21.52*** 29.94*** 94.66*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0130 0.0139 0.0128 0.0136 0.0176 0.0141 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
Away wins  
 𝛼 0.0950*** 0.0828*** 0.1174*** 0.0711*** 0.0560** 0.0840*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0258) (0.0120) 
 𝛽 –1.1312*** –1.1345*** –1.1384*** –1.1158*** –1.1075*** –1.1251*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0254) (0.0117) 
 Wald’s 𝜒2 1,859.21*** 1,846.37*** 1,920.90*** 1,687.19*** 1,908.39*** 9,2221.54*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒1
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) 25.51*** 28.24*** 28.50*** 19.51*** 20.36*** 118.35*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0976 0.0978 0.0990 0.0882 0.0994 0.0965 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
All outcomes       
 𝜒6
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = −1) 73.11*** 78.98*** 72.31*** 60.21*** 79.85*** 353.26*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
 
inspecting the results of each season separately, we see no clear changes in the degree of 
inefficiency in the course of the sample period (excluding odds for draws that appear to have 
become even more inefficient during the two last seasons), which indicates that the betting 
market has not become more efficient during the more recent years. These results are 
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strikingly consistent both with Koning (2012) who rejects weak form betting market 
efficiency while not observing any differences in the degree of efficiency between countries 
or seasons and with Nyberg (2014) who rejects efficiency for his whole sample as well as for 
the English Premier League separately. At the same time, however, the results contrast with 
Pope and Peel (1989) who find that odds are set in a weak form efficient manner for home 
wins and away wins but are anyway similar in the sense that odds are more devoid of 
information content for draws. 
 We also see that the coefficient 𝛽 is significantly smaller than minus one in all cases. 
Within the binary logit model, this means that when subjective probability decreases, 
objective probability falls more than implied by market efficiency and vice versa. Therefore, 
well in line with Koning (2012) and Nyberg (2014), a favorite-longshot bias is found also 
with the binary logit regression; favorites win more often and longshots less frequently than 
indicated by the average betting market odds. Altogether, these results are identical to those of 
the linear regression presented above. 
Portrayed in Table 9, statistical weak form betting market efficiency is rejected also 
when employing multinomial logit regression, both for the whole sample and for each season 
separately. In fact, as highlighted by the test statistics for the joint hypothesis of market 
efficiency, the multinomial logit model suggests that the betting market has become more 
inefficient during the latter part of the sample period. Based on the above results of binary 
logit regression, this change in the overall degree of inefficiency is most likely due to the even 
more biased draw odds during the seasons 2012–2014. In line with the rejection of weak form 
efficiency, the estimated coefficients show deviations from efficiency, consistent with Nyberg 
(2014). The coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽−1 are significantly greater than one, which here denotes that 
as subjective probability of a home win or an away win rises, objective probability of the 
given outcome climbs more than implied by efficiency and vice versa. Thus, this finding is 
explicitly in line with the FLB found in the previous tests of statistical efficiency. 
For robustness, instead of draws, I repeated the analysis using home wins and away 
wins as the benchmark category, respectively. The results of these alternative specifications, 
depicted in Tables B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B, are intuitively the same as those above in the 
sense that the market seems to be weak form inefficient when modeling all the outcomes in 
tandem, while the change in the degree of efficiency is induced by the draw odds.43 
                                                 
43 In addition, to further test the validity of the results, I also performed a similar test applying the multinomial 
probit model that assumes the standard normal c.d.f. The results of this method are, as expected, uniform with 
those of the multinomial logit model and available upon request. 
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Table 9 
ML estimates and efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit model 
with draws as the benchmark category 
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and the efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit 
model, as defined in Eq. (20). Draws are used as the benchmark category. Robust standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽−1, the null hypothesis 
is that 𝛽1 = 𝛽−1 = 1. Wald’s 𝜒4
2 refers to the Wald’s chi-square test statistic for the estimated model, while 
𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) stands for the test statistic for the Wald’s test of coefficient restrictions, the null hypothesis of 
weak form efficiency being that 𝛼𝑗 = 0 and 𝛽𝑗 = 1 for 𝑗 = −1, 1. Pseudo-R
2 refers to McFadden’s pseudo  
R-squared. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
 𝛼1 –0.0510 –0.0499 –0.1175** –0.1596*** –0.1841*** –0.1019*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0472) (0.0542) (0.0524) (0.0204) 
 𝛽1 1.1780** 1.1924** 1.2765*** 1.4171*** 1.4490*** 1.2832*** 
  (0.0852) (0.0838) (0.0998) (0.1137) (0.1057) (0.0425) 
 𝛼−1 –0.0569 –0.0805 –0.0557 –0.2057*** –0.1705*** –0.1032*** 
  (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0545) (0.0591) (0.0551) (0.0239) 
 𝛽−1 1.2471** 1.2838*** 1.2580** 1.5600*** 1.4008*** 1.3262*** 
  (0.1153) (0.1099) (0.1229) (0.1307) (0.1138) (0.0523) 
 Wald’s 𝜒4
2 2,498.37*** 2,498.38*** 2,574.00*** 2,263.92*** 2,538.24*** 12,360.37*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) 9.10* 11.70** 12.77** 23.16*** 21.86*** 66.87*** 
 (p-value) (0.059) (0.020) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0745 0.0747 0.0765 0.0681 0.0786 0.0745 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
        
 
9.1.3. Grouping based on subjective probability 
 
Thus far we have found powerful evidence of statistical weak form betting market 
inefficiency on the aggregate level, considering the whole spectrum of odds simultaneously. 
Consequently, when later conducting different betting strategies, it might be possible to 
obtain more accurate probability forecasts by utilizing the above regression results, especially 
those generated by logit regression that is a binary response model. The third and final part of 
the statistical tests of efficiency shifts from aggregate level to odds level, investigating 
whether the above evidence of a favorite-longshot bias translates into systematic deviations 
between subjective and objective probabilities on some individual odds levels. 
Table 10 presents the results of the grouping analysis based on odds level for fifty 
groups with equal size, performed separately for each possible outcome. The results reveal 
statistically significant deviations from efficiency at both ends of the odds spectrum. At the 
one end with highest probability, i.e. for groups with lowest group number, objective 
probability tends to be systematically higher than subjective probability especially for home 
and away wins, as indicated by the negative z-values. In other words, average betting odds 
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Table 10 
Subjective vs. objective probability: z-tests of 50 equally sized groups 
This table presents the results of the z-tests that compare subjective probabilities (𝜌
ℎ
) of 50 odds groups with their 
objective probabilities (𝜋ℎ), as defined in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23). The groups are sorted by subjective probability so that 
the group size is 1,915 for 49 groups and 1,954 for the remaining group. The lower the group number, the higher the 
subjective probability and vice versa. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Home wins   Draws   Away wins 
𝒉 𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
 𝝆
𝒉
 𝝅𝒉 z-value  𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
            
1 0.824 0.897 –10.4***  0.334 0.349 –1.4  0.733 0.789 –5.9*** 
2 0.763 0.807 –4.8***  0.312 0.331 –1.8*  0.622 0.655 –3.1*** 
3 0.726 0.762 –3.7***  0.307 0.341 –3.2***  0.564 0.579 –1.4 
4 0.695 0.723 –2.7***  0.303 0.304 –0.1  0.521 0.536 –1.3 
5 0.671 0.696 –2.4**  0.301 0.305 –0.4  0.487 0.508 –1.8* 
6 0.649 0.671 –2.0**  0.298 0.335 –3.4***  0.461 0.486 –2.2** 
7 0.630 0.651 –1.9*  0.296 0.285 1.1  0.440 0.462 –2.0** 
8 0.612 0.617 –0.4  0.294 0.283 1.1  0.421 0.422 –0.2 
9 0.597 0.622 –2.3**  0.293 0.304 –1.1  0.405 0.409 –0.3 
10 0.583 0.608 –2.2**  0.291 0.304 –1.2  0.392 0.399 –0.6 
11 0.570 0.570 0.0  0.290 0.288 0.1  0.381 0.377 0.4 
12 0.558 0.579 –1.9*  0.289 0.315 –2.5**  0.370 0.373 –0.3 
13 0.546 0.554 –0.6  0.287 0.292 –0.4  0.360 0.351 0.8 
14 0.536 0.551 –1.4  0.286 0.269 1.7*  0.351 0.360 –0.8 
15 0.525 0.554 –2.5**  0.285 0.297 –1.1  0.343 0.359 –1.5 
16 0.515 0.532 –1.5  0.284 0.290 –0.6  0.335 0.340 –0.5 
17 0.505 0.512 –0.6  0.284 0.263 2.1**  0.328 0.339 –1.0 
18 0.496 0.496 0.0  0.283 0.286 –0.3  0.322 0.304 1.7* 
19 0.487 0.502 –1.3  0.282 0.285 –0.3  0.315 0.312 0.3 
20 0.478 0.470 0.7  0.281 0.285 –0.4  0.309 0.297 1.2 
21 0.471 0.477 –0.6  0.280 0.281 –0.1  0.303 0.289 1.4 
22 0.463 0.465 –0.1  0.279 0.273 0.6  0.297 0.288 0.8 
23 0.456 0.473 –1.5  0.278 0.261 1.7*  0.291 0.268 2.2** 
24 0.448 0.460 –1.0  0.277 0.291 –1.4  0.285 0.281 0.4 
25 0.441 0.447 –0.5  0.276 0.278 –0.3  0.278 0.255 2.3** 
26 0.434 0.430 0.3  0.274 0.280 –0.6  0.272 0.267 0.5 
27 0.426 0.449 –2.0**  0.273 0.274 –0.1  0.266 0.251 1.5 
28 0.419 0.440 –1.8*  0.272 0.265 0.6  0.260 0.257 0.3 
29 0.412 0.419 –0.6  0.270 0.254 1.7*  0.254 0.239 1.6 
30 0.406 0.425 –1.7*  0.269 0.264 0.4  0.248 0.227 2.2** 
31 0.400 0.389 1.0  0.267 0.264 0.3  0.242 0.237 0.5 
32 0.394 0.419 –2.2**  0.265 0.232 3.4***  0.235 0.213 2.4** 
33 0.387 0.373 1.3  0.263 0.245 1.9*  0.229 0.223 0.6 
34 0.380 0.375 0.4  0.261 0.241 2.0**  0.222 0.197 2.7*** 
35 0.373 0.385 –1.0  0.259 0.248 1.1  0.214 0.192 2.5** 
36 0.365 0.358 0.7  0.256 0.242 1.5  0.207 0.210 –0.3 
37 0.357 0.354 0.3  0.253 0.257 –0.4  0.200 0.207 –0.8 
38 0.348 0.353 –0.4  0.250 0.240 1.1  0.192 0.194 –0.2 
39 0.339 0.348 –0.8  0.246 0.228 1.9*  0.185 0.173 1.3 
40 0.329 0.305 2.3**  0.242 0.223 2.0**  0.176 0.151 3.1*** 
41 0.319 0.314 0.4  0.237 0.225 1.3  0.168 0.169 –0.1 
42 0.307 0.280 2.6***  0.232 0.226 0.6  0.159 0.152 0.9 
43 0.294 0.292 0.1  0.225 0.216 1.0  0.150 0.142 1.0 
44 0.278 0.260 1.9*  0.218 0.212 0.6  0.141 0.137 0.5 
45 0.260 0.260 0.1  0.209 0.185 2.7***  0.130 0.124 0.8 
46 0.240 0.221 2.1**  0.199 0.183 1.8*  0.119 0.106 1.9* 
47 0.215 0.209 0.6  0.187 0.153 4.1***  0.108 0.094 2.1** 
48 0.185 0.178 0.8  0.171 0.146 3.1***  0.095 0.079 2.5** 
49 0.148 0.143 0.7  0.151 0.133 2.4**  0.079 0.057 4.2*** 
50 0.094 0.073 3.6***  0.116 0.074 7.0***  0.056 0.027 7.8*** 
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quoted in the market for strong favorites seem to be higher than what weak form market 
efficiency would imply. This anomaly is most extensive for home favorites. Therefore, from a 
betting strategy point of view, this result suggests that a (weak form) sharp bettor should 
exploit especially the excessively generous odds offered for favorites. At the same time, the 
opposite takes place at the other end of the odds spectrum. For groups with lowest probability, 
i.e. with highest group number, subjective probability appears to be systematically higher than 
objective probability, particularly for draws and away wins. 
Due to the statistically significant and positive z-values, average market odds for the 
more obvious longshots seem to be lower than suggested by efficiency. Altogether, while the 
market shows to be efficient in between, the deviations found at both perimeters reflect a 
favorite-longshot bias observed already in the first two tests of statistical efficiency, but also 
provide insights on the shape of this bias. Most importantly, the relation between subjective 
and objective probability turns out not to be linear throughout the odds spectrum; instead, the 
deviations are borne particularly when the probabilities in question are high respective low. In 
other words, when comparing subjective probabilities with objective probabilities on a level-
by-level basis, the results show that the betting market is statistically efficient in the middle 
part of the odds spectrum, whereas it is inefficient near the both ends of the spectrum. 
 Shown in Table 11, the results of fifty groups with an equal probability interval are on 
the whole similar to those of fifty groups with equal group size, still demonstrating a FLB as 
well as aggregate efficiency in the middle part of the odds spectrum. However, we can 
distinguish three differences. First, the deviations in probabilities assigned by the market for 
home and away favorites are now even more extensive, objective probability being higher 
than subjective probability for several groups. To be exact, we see that the average market 
odds seem to be biased in a statistically significant sense approximately down to the 
probability of 0.60. Thus, the betting market for home and away wins appears to be inefficient 
roughly up to the odds of 1.60. Second, an opposite deviation is in this case visible also for 
home longshots, in addition to the deviations for draw and away longshots found previously. 
Third, due to the very limited number of matches with high probabilities of a draw, the 
specification does not provide information on the equality of subjective and objective 
probability for this end of the draw odds spectrum. 
Put together, the differences between the results of the two classifications point out 
that the average odds are upward (downward) biased up to (down to) a certain level, but that 
the number of matches in which this low (high) odds are available is somewhat limited. In 
European top soccer, namely, subjective probabilities of the majority of matches are relatively  
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Table 11 
Subjective vs. objective probability: z-tests of 50 groups with equal interval 
This table presents the results of the z-tests that compare subjective probabilities (𝜌
ℎ
) of 50 odds groups with their 
objective probabilities (𝜋ℎ), as defined in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23). The groups have been formed so that they have an 
equal probability interval. The lower the group number, the higher the subjective probability and vice versa.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Home wins   Draws   Away wins 
𝒉 𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
 𝝆
𝒉
 𝝅𝒉 z-value  𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
            
1 0.908 0.923 –0.2  0.74 1.00 n/a  0.90 0.86 0.3 
2 0.892 0.973 –4.2***  0.73 1.00 n/a  0.88 1.00 n/a 
3 0.874 0.969 –6.2***  0.71 1.00 n/a  0.86 0.96 –2.6*** 
4 0.857 0.915 –3.0***  n/a n/a n/a  0.85 0.96 –3.6*** 
5 0.839 0.935 –5.9***  n/a n/a n/a  0.83 0.94 –3.4*** 
6 0.821 0.906 –5.8***  0.67 1.00 n/a  0.81 0.87 –1.9* 
7 0.803 0.869 –4.6***  n/a n/a n/a  0.79 0.85 –1.4 
8 0.785 0.838 –3.7***  0.64 0.50 0.4  0.78 0.82 –1.3 
9 0.768 0.817 –3.5***  0.63 0.00 n/a  0.76 0.80 –1.4 
10 0.750 0.783 –2.5**  0.61 1.00 n/a  0.74 0.77 –1.0 
11 0.732 0.761 –2.1**  0.60 0.33 1.0  0.72 0.80 –2.7*** 
12 0.714 0.754 –3.1***  0.59 0.00 n/a  0.70 0.78 –2.7*** 
13 0.696 0.725 –2.3**  0.58 0.00 n/a  0.69 0.74 –2.0** 
14 0.678 0.702 –2.0**  0.56 0.50 0.2  0.67 0.71 –1.8* 
15 0.660 0.688 –2.4**  0.54 1.00 n/a  0.65 0.72 –2.8*** 
16 0.642 0.667 –2.2**  0.53 0.33 0.7  0.63 0.66 –1.4 
17 0.625 0.629 –0.4  0.52 0.67 –1.0  0.62 0.68 –3.2*** 
18 0.606 0.628 –2.1**  0.51 1.00 n/a  0.60 0.59 0.4 
19 0.589 0.607 –1.9*  0.49 0.75 –1.2  0.58 0.57 0.3 
20 0.571 0.577 –0.6  0.48 0.13 3.0***  0.56 0.58 –1.2 
21 0.553 0.570 –1.9*  0.46 0.50 –0.2  0.55 0.58 –1.7* 
22 0.535 0.553 –2.1**  0.45 0.63 –1.0  0.53 0.53 –0.4 
23 0.517 0.535 –2.1**  0.43 0.25 1.2  0.51 0.53 –1.6 
24 0.499 0.505 –0.7  0.42 0.63 –1.2  0.49 0.51 –1.5 
25 0.481 0.484 –0.4  0.41 0.38 0.2  0.47 0.49 –1.0 
26 0.463 0.472 –1.2  0.39 0.29 0.6  0.46 0.48 –1.9* 
27 0.446 0.453 –1.1  0.38 0.33 0.4  0.44 0.46 –1.9* 
28 0.428 0.443 –2.1**  0.37 0.42 –0.7  0.42 0.42 –0.2 
29 0.410 0.420 –1.5  0.35 0.33 0.3  0.40 0.41 –0.3 
30 0.392 0.393 –0.1  0.34 0.43 –1.5  0.38 0.38 0.0 
31 0.374 0.378 –0.5  0.32 0.33 –0.4  0.37 0.37 –0.2 
32 0.356 0.354 0.2  0.31 0.33 –1.9*  0.35 0.36 –1.1 
33 0.338 0.336 0.3  0.30 0.31 –2.5**  0.33 0.34 –0.8 
34 0.321 0.308 1.5  0.29 0.29 –1.0  0.31 0.30 1.9* 
35 0.303 0.282 2.3**  0.27 0.27 1.3  0.30 0.28 2.3** 
36 0.285 0.277 0.8  0.26 0.25 3.4***  0.28 0.27 1.6 
37 0.267 0.255 1.2  0.25 0.23 2.9***  0.26 0.25 2.1** 
38 0.249 0.247 0.2  0.23 0.22 1.9*  0.24 0.23 2.6*** 
39 0.231 0.203 2.6**  0.22 0.21 0.5  0.22 0.21 3.2*** 
40 0.213 0.206 0.7  0.20 0.18 3.4***  0.21 0.21 0.2 
41 0.195 0.203 –0.6  0.19 0.15 4.5***  0.19 0.19 0.7 
42 0.177 0.163 1.2  0.18 0.16 1.7*  0.17 0.16 2.4** 
43 0.159 0.162 –0.2  0.16 0.14 2.0**  0.15 0.15 0.8 
44 0.141 0.126 1.3  0.15 0.13 2.1**  0.14 0.13 1.1 
45 0.124 0.102 1.9*  0.14 0.10 3.5***  0.12 0.11 1.9* 
46 0.106 0.107 –0.1  0.12 0.08 3.6***  0.10 0.08 3.0*** 
47 0.088 0.066 2.0**  0.11 0.05 4.4***  0.08 0.06 3.5*** 
48 0.071 0.036 3.2***  0.09 0.05 3.2***  0.07 0.04 5.4*** 
49 0.053 0.014 4.0***  0.08 0.03 3.7***  0.05 0.01 9.5*** 
50 0.038 0.026 0.5  0.07 0.04 0.9  0.03 0.01 2.0** 
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even, hence not including any clear favorite and/or longshot. These findings both align and 
contradict with earlier results in soccer. Pope and Peel (1989) observe some evidence of a 
FLB in the tails of odds distributions for draws and away wins at the same time that Koning 
(2012) shows that more likely events tend to happen slightly more frequently than implied by 
odds in the case of home wins and away wins, holding across different countries. According 
to Kuypers (2000), in contrast, subjective probability appears to be a good estimator of 
objective probability except around the probability of 0.5 in his small sample. 
The FLB is illustrated also in Fig. 1, which provides nonparametric lowess regressions 
of objective probability on subjective probability for home wins and away wins using one 
thousand odds groups with equal size. As explicated above, the results for draws are more 
erratic and therefore not presented in the figure. If subjective probability would be an 
unbiased estimator of objective probability, the regressions should lie on the grey 45-degree 
lines that in Fig. 1 symbolize statistical weak form betting market efficiency. However, we 
clearly see that events whose subjective probability is high tend to occur more frequently than 
suggested by efficiency, the deviation getting larger as subjective probability increases. The 
opposite holds for events with very low probability, even though the magnitude of the bias is 
smaller at this extreme of the odds spectrum. Otherwise the regressions for the two outcomes 
behave very similarly and there appears to be no bias in the middle of the odds spectrum. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Lowess regressions of objective probability on subjective probability. The regressions (black line) have 
been run separately for home wins and away wins using 1,000 odds groups with equal size. Statistical weak form 
betting market efficiency (grey line) implies that subjective probability equals objective probability throughout 
the odds spectrum. 
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For robustness, in addition to the two grouping specifications presented above, I 
performed a similar comparison also for twenty groups with equal size as well as for twenty 
groups with equal probability interval. The results of these specifications, which imply more 
within-group variation, provide no additional information to those portrayed above and are 
given in Tables B.5 and B.6 in Appendix B. 
In summary, all the three tests of statistical efficiency give unanimous evidence of 
statistical weak form betting market inefficiency and therefore strong support to the rejection 
of Hypothesis I. In European soccer, 1X2 betting odds appear not to be unbiased estimators of 
match outcomes. Moreover, since all the tests detect a favorite-longshot bias, we also have 
stark evidence of a FLB consistent with the literature presented in Section 4.1. Next, I will 
turn the focus from probabilities assigned by average market odds to highest odds quoted in 
the market and go through the results of the economic tests of efficiency too see whether the 
betting market is economically weak form efficient, albeit not being statistically efficient. 
 
9.2. Economic tests of weak form efficiency 
 
This section displays the results of the four economic tests of efficiency introduced in 
Section 7.2, employing highest odds quoted in the market. Similar to the statistical tests, the 
economic tests begin with an aggregate test that exposes whether the betting market is 
economically weak form efficient on the aggregate level. The latter tests reveal the degree of 
efficiency on the individual odds level as well as explore the profitability of both naïve and 
sophisticated betting strategies. 
 
9.2.1. Tobit regression: returns of unit bets on odds 
 
Tobit regression does not reveal any signs of economic inefficiency and hence of any 
profitable betting strategies but, as a by-product, provides extra support to the existence of a 
favorite-longshot bias. The result is therefore consistent with Paton and Vaughan Williams 
(1998). The coefficients 𝛼 in Table 12 are systematically below zero, which means that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of economic efficiency. In other words, returns of unit bets 
are negative throughout the odds spectrum, even when using the highest available odds, and 
the betting market seems to be economically weak form efficient on this aggregate level. 
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Table 12 
ML estimates and efficiency testing results of the tobit model 
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the tobit model, as defined in Eq. (26). Robust standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficient 𝛼, the null 
hypothesis is that 𝛼 ≤ 0. Pseudo-R2 refers to McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. *** indicates significance  
at the 1% level. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
Home wins       
 𝛼 –0.3624 –0.3576 –0.4269 –0.6139 –1.1599 –0.6597 
  (0.0707) (0.0720) (0.0679) (0.0815) (0.3529) (0.1419) 
 𝛽 –0.2767*** –0.2719*** –0.2713*** –0.2057*** –0.0554 –0.1855*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0239) (0.0274) (0.0896) (0.0451) 
 F 116.91*** 111.10*** 128.41*** 56.41*** 0.38 16.88*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.537) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0083 0.0084 0.0087 0.0049 0.0006 0.0046 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
Draws  
 𝛼 –1.9686 –2.0352 –2.2376 –2.2318 –2.4486 –2.2112 
  (0.2421) (0.2390) (0.2463) (0.2840) (0.2937) (0.1220) 
 𝛽 –0.5271*** –0.5179*** –0.4600*** –0.4593*** –0.4316*** –0.4719*** 
  (0.0586) (0.0569) (0.0578) (0.0677) (0.0660) (0.0288) 
 F 80.80*** 82.82*** 63.35*** 45.96*** 42.71*** 268.62*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0029 0.0032 0.0029 0.0025 0.0032 0.0029 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
Away wins  
 𝛼 –2.2908 –2.4177 –2.1887 –2.0721 –2.0922 –2.2124 
  (0.1688) (0.1913) (0.1741) (0.1356) (0.1532) (0.0747) 
 𝛽 –0.3754*** –0.3524*** –0.3547*** –0.3656*** –0.3490*** –0.3591*** 
  (0.0269) (0.0304) (0.0276) (0.0231) (0.0250) (0.0121) 
 F 194.70*** 134.24*** 164.93*** 251.07*** 195.36*** 881.90*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0120 0.0111 0.0129 0.0120 0.0134 0.0123 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
        
 
However, while all negative, the differences in the degree of negative value for the coefficient 
𝛼 are worth noting; Table 12 shows that the returns are least negative for home wins and most 
negative for away wins. Thus, betting on home wins appears to be more favorable, although 
still unprofitable, than betting on draws or away wins. 
At the same time, the coefficients 𝛽 are statistically significantly negative for all 
outcomes during every season separately as well as during the whole sample period, except 
for home wins during the season 2013–2014. This gives an additional indication on the FLB 
earlier discovered in each statistical test of efficiency. An increase in odds (here represented 
by highest instead of average odds) decreases the expected return of unit bets and vice versa. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the relatively stable values of the coefficient 𝛽 for each 
outcome, there is no change in the degree of the bias over the course of the sample period. 
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9.2.2. Returns of odds groups 
 
The analysis on the individual odds level does not expose considerable signs of 
economic weak form inefficiency. Tables 13 and 14 depict the returns of unit bets for fifty 
equally sized groups and fifty groups with an equal probability interval, respectively. Overall, 
home wins and away wins generate a marginally negative return, while placing unit bets on 
draws performs much worse. For all outcomes, the odds groups with highest subjective 
probability generate positive returns, whereas the groups with lowest probability perform 
worst, especially in the case of draws and away wins. Otherwise, along the odds spectrum 
outside the perimeters, the returns show no clear pattern and give no hints on potentially 
profitable betting strategies. 
 
Table 13 
Returns of unit bets of 50 equally sized groups 
This table presents the returns of unit bets of 50 equally sized odds groups based on subjective probability, 
employing the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (28). The lower the group number, the higher the subjective 
probability and vice versa. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Home wins  Draws  Away wins 
𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉  𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
              
1 0.030*** 26 –0.024  1 0.009 26 0.014  1 0.026** 26 0.014 
2 0.006 27 0.039*  2 0.030 27 –0.001  2 0.015 27 –0.026 
3 0.002 28 0.036*  3 0.082*** 28 –0.030  3 –0.002 28 0.024 
4 –0.003 29 0.004  4 –0.024 29 –0.065  4 0.003 29 –0.027 
5 –0.005 30 0.029  5 –0.013 30 –0.021  5 0.022 30 –0.050 
6 –0.006 31 –0.039  6 0.092*** 31 –0.016  6 0.038* 31 0.023 
7 –0.004 32 0.050**  7 –0.062 32 –0.125  7 0.037* 32 –0.050 
8 –0.028 33 –0.048  8 –0.064 33 –0.071  8 –0.008 33 0.019 
9 0.007 34 –0.024  9 0.012 34 –0.077  9 –0.001 34 –0.064 
10 0.010 35 0.023  10 0.017 35 –0.040  10 0.007 35 –0.057 
11 –0.031 36 –0.028  11 –0.030 36 –0.049  11 –0.020 36 0.071* 
12 0.007 37 –0.011  12 0.068** 37 0.022  12 0.002 37 0.102** 
13 –0.015 38 0.018  13 –0.008 38 –0.033  13 –0.030 38 0.075* 
14 –0.000 39 0.034  14 –0.081 39 –0.058  14 0.025 39 0.003 
15 0.025 40 –0.065  15 0.016 40 –0.060  15 0.049* 40 –0.081 
16 0.006 41 0.005  16 –0.001 41 –0.029  16 0.022 41 0.084* 
17 –0.011 42 –0.068  17 –0.092 42 –0.001  17 0.043* 42 0.035 
18 –0.021 43 0.021  18 –0.006 43 –0.008  18 –0.043 43 0.029 
19 0.009 44 –0.039  19 –0.005 44 0.004  19 0.005 44 0.066 
20 –0.038 45 0.034  20 –0.003 45 –0.084  20 –0.023 45 0.048 
21 –0.006 46 –0.044  21 –0.011 46 –0.045  21 –0.027 46 –0.008 
22 –0.014 47 0.029  22 –0.036 47 –0.143  22 –0.006 47 –0.012 
23 0.020 48 0.030  23 –0.071 48 –0.094  23 –0.052 48 –0.012 
24 0.008 49 0.046  24 0.042 49 –0.052  24 0.015 49 –0.133 
25 –0.002 50 –0.101  25 –0.002 50 –0.27  25 –0.052 50 –0.402 
  Total –0.003    Total –0.030    Total –0.006 
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Compared to the returns of equally sized groups, the returns of groups with an equal 
probability interval shown in Table 14 indicate more clearly that unit bets with higher 
subjective probability yield higher and often statistically significant positive returns, while 
those with lower subjective probability generate much worse returns. Thus, also this 
observation indicates a favorite-longshot bias, the phenomenon found in many sections of this 
study. What is interesting about the FLB here is that while it was discovered in the statistical 
tests of efficiency using average market odds, it is now discerned also using highest odds on 
the individual odds level. 
 The results of twenty groups with equal size and twenty groups with an equal 
probability interval are, by and large, similar to their respective counterparts with fifty groups. 
For convenience, the results of these specifications are given in Tables C.1 and C.2 in 
 
Table 14 
Returns of unit bets of 50 groups with equal interval 
This table presents the returns of unit bets of 50 odds groups with an equal probability interval, employing the 
one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (28). The lower the group number, the higher the subjective probability and vice 
versa. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Home wins  Draws  Away wins 
𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉  𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
              
1 –0.035 26 0.000  1 0.220** 26 –0.314  1 –0.121 26 0.040* 
2 0.030* 27 0.001  2 0.285** 27 –0.117  2 0.059*** 27 0.040* 
3 0.047*** 28 0.021  3 0.300 28 0.122  3 0.037 28 –0.007 
4 0.008 29 0.010  4 n/a 29 –0.090  4 0.056* 29 –0.003 
5 0.054*** 30 –0.011  5 n/a 30 0.232*  5 0.065** 30 –0.010 
6 0.042*** 31 0.001  6 0.437*** 31 –0.022  6 0.013 31 –0.003 
7 0.025* 32 –0.005  7 n/a 32 0.014  7 0.014 32 0.024 
8 0.012 33 0.000  8 –0.300 33 0.009  8 0.001 33 0.023 
9 0.012 34 –0.022  9 –1.000 34 –0.011  9 0.006 34 –0.023 
10 –0.003 35 –0.046  10 0.600 35 –0.023  10 –0.004 35 –0.024 
11 –0.008 36 –0.002  11 –0.477 36 –0.052  11 0.051* 36 –0.003 
12 0.011 37 –0.011  12 –1.000 37 –0.046  12 0.058* 37 –0.013 
13 –0.001 38 0.030  13 –1.000 38 –0.027  13 0.038 38 –0.021 
14 –0.008 39 –0.085  14 –0.160 39 0.016  14 0.023 39 –0.039 
15 0.000 40 0.016  15 0.690** 40 –0.089  15 0.058** 40 0.054** 
16 0.000 41 0.113**  16 –0.427 41 –0.158  16 0.009 41 0.043* 
17 –0.030 42 –0.013  17 0.220 42 –0.034  17 0.070** 42 –0.010 
18 0.001 43 0.104  18 0.922*** 43 –0.053  18 –0.046 43 0.053* 
19 –0.003 44 –0.024  19 0.488 44 –0.058  19 –0.041 44 0.047 
20 –0.021 45 –0.092  20 –0.731 45 –0.189  20 0.007 45 0.016 
21 0.001 46 0.147  21 –0.008 46 –0.238  21 0.027 46 –0.026 
22 0.005 47 –0.070  22 0.381 47 –0.398  22 –0.010 47 –0.065 
23 0.006 48 –0.369  23 –0.450 48 –0.335  23 0.024 48 –0.255 
24 –0.011 49 –0.729  24 0.421 49 –0.564  24 0.027 49 –0.702 
25 –0.015 50 1.374  25 –0.081 50 –0.149  25 0.007 50 –0.473 
  Total –0.003    Total –0.030    Total –0.006 
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Appendix C. Less surprisingly, the most notable difference is that the average returns of the 
specifications with 20 groups have less variation, due to the considerably larger group size. 
Moreover, the number of groups whose returns are statistically significantly positive is 
smaller. In any case, when considering the signs of the returns of these groupings displayed in 
Table 15, the occurrence of positive (negative) returns of the groups with highest (lowest) 
subjective probability is clearly visible. The difference in the number of pluses and minuses 
between the two methods in Table 15 also demonstrates that unit bets with highest subjective 
probability are more profitable but that there is only a limited number of them. 
 
Table 15 
Signs of unit bet returns of groupings with 20 groups 
This table shows the combined signs of unit bet returns of the two odds grouping methods: equal group size and 
equal probability interval, for 20 groups. A given sign for a given group denotes that at least two (out of three) of 
the returns of the different outcomes (home wins, draws, and away wins) had that sign in that group. The lower 
the group number, the higher the subjective probability of a given outcome and vice versa. 
 
 Group 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Equal size + + + – – + – – – – + – – – – – – + – – 
Equal interval + + + + – + + – + – – + + – – – + – – – 
 
In terms of the favorite-longshot bias, these results are parallel to the majority of 
earlier relevant studies. The phenomenon in which bets on favorites generate higher returns 
than those on longshots has been observed at least to a certain extent by Cain et al. (2000; 
2003), Malarić et al. (2008), and Direr (2013). Moreover, the above results shed light on the 
Cain et al. (2003) question whether the FLB occurs only at the high- and low-probability ends 
of the odds spectrum or whether we might expect to see a continuous decrease in returns 
when progressing towards longshots; based on Tables 13 and 14, the answer appears to be the 
former. On the other hand, the results contradict with two studies performed in English 
soccer. Deschamps and Gergaud (2007) find mixed evidence regarding the FLB, showing that 
there is a FLB for away wins, a reverse FLB for draws, and no bias at all for home wins, 
whereas Dixon and Pope (2004) detect a reverse FLB for all the outcomes. 
In terms of economic efficiency, the results differ more from those of the earlier 
studies. Regardless of some biases, the absence of positive returns is discovered by Cain et al. 
(2000; 2003), Kuypers (2000), Dixon and Pope (2004), Deschamps and Gergaud (2007), and 
Malarić et al. (2008), while only Direr (2013) is able to demonstrate statistically significant 
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positive returns when betting on clear favorites with odds less than 1.21, consistent with the 
results in Tables 13 and 14. Thus, when exploring the returns of unit bets of odds groups, this 
study indicates more signs of economic inefficiency than the earlier literature, which can be 
explained by the considerably higher odds available in the current online betting market. 
 
9.2.3. Returns of naïve betting strategies 
 
None of the naïve betting strategies yield statistically significant positive returns, 
though with a couple of mild exceptions. Nevertheless, the returns in Table 16 bring out some 
other interesting aspects. First, as suggested earlier, betting on favorites performs better than 
betting on longshots, consistent with Vlastakis et al. (2009) whose returns are anyway more 
negative than those in this study. In fact, when considering both the staking strategies, out of 
the five betting strategies betting on favorites performs best and betting on longshots worst. 
Second, betting on home wins produces higher returns than betting on the other outcomes 
(away wins with the unit wins staking strategy being the exception). These results are in line 
with Vlastakis et al. (2009) but conflict with Kuypers (2000) and Deschamps and Gergaud 
(2007) who find that betting on draws yields highest returns; however, also the highest returns 
in all these studies are negative and worse than those presented in Table 16. In addition, as 
indicated already by Tables 13 and 14, unit betting on all outcomes generates a slightly 
negative return, beating the return of –7% by Forrest et al. (2005) and the return of –18% by 
Kuypers (2000) but losing to the minimally positive return of 0.4% by Franck et al. (2013). In 
any case, in comparison with the earlier studies, the returns of the naïve betting strategies 
presented here are higher but do obviously not point to economic inefficiency. 
Third, as demonstrated by the negative values of the Wilcoxon test statistic in all cases 
in Table 16, the staking strategy of unit wins yields consistently higher returns than that of 
unit bets, which suggests that it pays off to modify the stake according to the odds separately 
for each match. This feature is completely in line with Hvattum and Arntzen (2010) who also 
underline it as an additional evidence of a favorite-longshot bias, due to the fact that the 
staking strategy of unit wins places smaller bets when subjective probability is low. 
Altogether, thus far all the results of the economic tests of efficiency indicate the 
absence of profitable betting strategies if employing only simple staking plans and not making 
any distinction between different matches and the odds relating to them. Thus, in search for 
economic inefficiencies, we need to apply more sophisticated strategies that involve diligent  
81 
 
 
Table 16 
Returns of naïve betting strategies 
This table presents the returns obtained with five different naïve betting strategies and two simple staking plans, 
employing the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (29). Unit bets means betting a stake of one on every match, while 
Unit wins stands for determining the stake so that the potential winnings are equal to one. Home wins, Draws, 
and Away wins refer to placing a bet on the given outcome in every match in the sample, while Favorite and 
Longshot denote betting on the outcome with the lowest and highest odds, respectively, in every match. Besides 
reporting the returns, the table shows the z-values for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test that tests the equality of a 
given naïve strategy between the two staking plans, the null hypothesis being that both distributions are the 
same. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
Unit bets       
 Home wins –0.013 –0.006 –0.021 0.007 0.018* –0.003 
 Draws –0.040 –0.038 –0.025 –0.025 –0.020 –0.030 
 Away wins –0.010 –0.016 0.004 –0.001 –0.006 –0.006 
 Favorite 0.001 –0.001 –0.007 0.008 0.000 0.000 
 Longshot –0.023 –0.041 –0.006 –0.015 0.003 –0.016 
Unit wins  
 Home wins –0.003 0.000 –0.006 0.002 0.004 –0.001 
 Draws –0.009 –0.008 –0.005 –0.005 –0.003 –0.006 
 Away wins –0.001 –0.002 0.005* 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 Favorite 0.000 0.000 –0.002 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 Longshot –0.004 –0.009 0.003 –0.004 0.001 –0.003 
Wilcoxon: unit bets vs. unit wins 
 Home wins –19.468*** –18.860*** –21.337*** –17.238*** –19.742*** –43.297*** 
 Draws –12.243*** –12.734*** –11.907*** –11.685*** –12.769*** –27.427*** 
 Away wins –31.978*** –31.553*** –29.055*** –27.695*** –29.452*** –66.979*** 
 Favorite –3.649*** –4.319*** –5.284*** –2.170** –4.194*** –8.820*** 
 Longshot –28.745*** –30.638*** –26.563*** –26.997*** –26.997*** –62.578*** 
        
 
criteria to choose the matches and outcomes to bet, besides also using a more advanced 
staking technique—this is exactly what will be done in the remaining economic tests. 
 
9.2.4. Returns of sophisticated betting strategies 
 
The results of the sophisticated strategies are delivered in three parts. First, we go 
through the application that is based on quasi-arbitrage. Table 17 lists the number of quasi-
arbitrage bets traced from the sample with different thresholds of the value betting edge. As 
expected, the larger the edge (i.e. the deviation between the highest and average market odds) 
the smaller the number of available quasi-arbitrage bets. Furthermore, on each threshold, the 
number of these bets increases season by season, reflecting the intensified competition and 
price war characteristic of the online betting market during the recent decade. 
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Table 17 
Occurrence of quasi-arbitrage bets 
This table displays the number of quasi-arbitrage bets available in the sample with six different thresholds of the 
value betting edge (𝑟𝑗): 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. In other words, on a given threshold, it reveals the 
number of bets that were placed when following the quasi-arbitrage strategy introduced in Section 7.2.4. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 16,026 16,524 17,119 17,345 17,660 84,674 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 8,760 8,674 9,368 9,446 10,218 46,466 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 3,789 3,730 4,373 4,445 4,921 21,258 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 912 985 1,310 1,322 1,638 6,167 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 313 389 619 600 791 2,712 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 47 115 240 190 282 874 
        
 
The annual returns of the quasi-arbitrage strategy support economic weak form 
efficiency. Available in Table 18, the majority of these returns converge to minus one and do 
certainly not generate positive returns. This is in a stark contrast to Paton and Vaughan 
Williams (2005) who are able to devise a consistently profitable strategy based on exploiting 
the outlier odds. To be exact, however, the context of Paton and Vaughan Williams is 
bookings spreads, not 1X2 odds, while their sample size is also tiny in relation to this study. 
The few exceptions in which the strategy yields profits include some higher thresholds during 
the season 2009–2010 and the most recent season with lower values of fractional Kelly. 
Moreover, considering the whole five-year period, the only statistically significant positive 
returns are made with the most conservative staking (when 𝑔 = 0.05) and on the lowest edge 
thresholds (1.00, 1.05, and 1.10) that, as shown in Table 17, involve placing a greater number 
of bets. Overall, apart from these rare cases, the results imply that by following the quasi-
arbitrage strategy the bettor would ultimately lose her wealth. The more aggressive the 
staking and/or the lower the edge threshold, the more negative the return. Conversely, the 
higher the threshold, the higher are the returns of the strategy, even though they are still 
negative; in this regard, the results align with Deschamps and Gergaud (2007). 
As explained earlier, given that the probabilities implied by the average market odds 
are unbiased estimators of true probabilities, the quasi-arbitrage strategy should generate 
positive returns since it places only bets with a positive expected value. Thus, the obvious 
lack of profits perceived here implies that the average market odds are not such unbiased 
estimators, which is fully consistent with the findings of statistical efficiency presented in 
Section 9.1. More precisely, the absolute majority of the conceivable value bets that the 
strategy detects from the sample are either moderate or strong longshots, not favorites. 
Keeping in mind that we have earlier found a FLB, the quasi-arbitrage strategy assigns too 
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Table 18 
Annual returns of the quasi-arbitrage strategy 
This table presents the annual returns obtained with simulating the quasi-arbitrage strategy, as explained in 
Section 7.2.4, employing the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (29). For each period, the simulation has been 
repeated 1,000 times, letting the sequence of matches during the given period to vary randomly. The simulations 
have been performed separately for each period, level of fractional Kelly staking (𝑔), and threshold of the value 
betting edge (𝑟𝑗). In terms of the fractional Kelly staking, four different values for 𝑔 have been applied: 1.00, 
0.50, 0.25, and 0.05. With respect to the threshold of the betting edge, six different levels have been employed: 
1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. *** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
𝑔 = 1.00       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –1.000 –1.000 –1.000 –1.000 –0.999 –1.000 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –1.000 –1.000 –1.000 –1.000 –0.996 –1.000 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.995 –0.999 –1.000 –1.000 –0.999 –1.000 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 0.217*** –0.994 –1.000 –1.000 –0.995 –0.995 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 0.222*** –0.775 –0.999 –0.999 –0.986 –0.978 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.196 –0.873 –0.968 –0.956 –0.690 –0.866 
𝑔 = 0.50  
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.966 –0.969 –0.942 –0.998 0.732*** –0.954 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.950 –0.937 –0.934 –0.990 1.776*** –0.910 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.615 –0.878 –0.895 –0.980 –0.522 –0.863 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 1.012*** –0.857 –0.957 –0.956 –0.699 –0.825 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 0.443*** –0.335 –0.949 –0.944 –0.711 –0.761 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.053 –0.616 –0.782 –0.762 –0.094 –0.557 
𝑔 = 0.25       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.602 –0.625 –0.411 –0.893 3.092*** –0.478 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.552 –0.504 –0.420 –0.763 3.798*** –0.319 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.024 –0.454 –0.420 –0.740 0.537*** –0.342 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 0.680*** –0.549 –0.733 –0.727 –0.143 –0.457 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 0.298*** –0.097 –0.743 –0.731 –0.284 –0.434 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.010 –0.365 –0.503 –0.493 0.134*** –0.291 
𝑔 = 0.05       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.055 –0.068 0.044*** –0.254 0.615*** 0.021*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.044 –0.026 0.028*** –0.136 0.647*** 0.064*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 0.074*** –0.044 –0.011 –0.154 0.258*** 0.016*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 0.142*** –0.120 –0.198 –0.192 0.056*** –0.072 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 0.068*** –0.002 –0.220 –0.213 –0.009 –0.083 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 0.001* –0.082 –0.120 –0.121 0.065*** –0.054 
        
 
high probabilities for the longshots. Consequently, due to the FLB, the strategy is not able to 
trace value bets correctly, which explains the considerably negative returns in Table 18, in 
line with the discussion in Section 2.4.5 about the challenges of value betting if the 
estimations of true probabilities are somehow wrong. 
Nevertheless, the results of the quasi-arbitrage strategy underline two important 
aspects. First, to increase the suitability and attractiveness of sports betting as an investment 
alternative and to decrease the risk of losing a significant part of one’s wealth if experiencing 
a longer sequence of losses and/or if for some reason obtaining inaccurate probability 
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estimations, the results strongly recommend the use of conservative staking. Only the lowest 
level of fractional Kelly seem to provide any sensible balance between security and long term 
capital growth. Second, in search for profits with value betting, we should evidently find an 
alternative method to determine the true probabilities; luckily, this is precisely the idea that 
has been employed in the final economic tests of efficiency that utilize our logit model. 
Similar to Table 17 for quasi-arbitrage bets, Table 19 provides the number of value 
bets when determining the true probabilities with the coefficients of our binary logit model 
presented in Section 9.1.2. Compared to those of quasi-arbitrage, the logit model discovers a 
somewhat smaller number of value bets, especially on the higher thresholds. In this respect, to 
obtain a sufficient number of bets and thereby reduce the impact of random variation, in 
practice it would not be advisable to employ the highest thresholds with the strategy. 
 
Table 19 
Occurrence of value bets discovered by the logit model 
This table displays the number of value bets detected in the sample when determining the objective probabilities 
with the binary logit model. Similar to the above case of quasi-arbitrage, six thresholds of the value betting edge 
(𝑟𝑗) have been used: 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. In other words, on a given threshold, it reveals the 
number of bets that were placed when following the value betting strategy based on the binary logit model. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 14,143 14,411 14,979 15,899 16,324 75,756 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 3,630 3,213 3,772 4,100 4,398 19,113 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 395 521 841 925 1,054 3,736 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 45 99 230 221 282 877 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 21 52 121 103 152 449 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 9 18 40 36 64 167 
        
 
As the result of the second sophisticated strategy, the logit-based strategy performs 
notably better than the quasi-arbitrage strategy, but since all the specifications do not yield 
consistent positive returns, we cannot still fully reject economic weak form betting market 
efficiency. Portrayed in Table 20, for the whole five-year period as well as for the majority of 
the single seasons, the strategy generates statistically significant positive returns on all levels 
of fractional Kelly staking, except on the most aggressive one, and on the three lowest 
thresholds of the betting edge. For the thresholds higher than 1.10, the number of available 
value bets is already low, therefore involving more random variation. The substantial 
variation in the returns of the more aggressive staking plans is also worth noting, further 
accentuating the need for applying very conservative staking if using the strategy in real life. 
The sky-high returns of the season 2013–2014 stand out as an outlier but with an obvious 
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Table 20 
Annual returns of the logit-based strategy 
This table presents the annual returns obtained with simulating the value betting strategy based on the binary 
logit model, as explained in Section 7.2.4, employing the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (29). For each period, 
the simulation has been repeated 1,000 times, letting the sequence of matches during the given period to vary 
randomly. The simulations have been performed separately for each period, level of fractional Kelly staking (𝑔), 
and threshold of the value betting edge (𝑟𝑗). In terms of the fractional Kelly staking, four different values for 𝑔 
have been applied: 1.00, 0.50, 0.25, and 0.05. With respect to the threshold of the betting edge, six different 
levels have been employed: 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. *** and * indicate significance  
at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
𝑔 = 1.00       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.994 –0.997 3.225*** –1.000 210.189*** –0.959 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.966 –0.987 2.145*** –0.998 8.207*** –0.880 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 0.018*** 1.348*** 0.014*** –0.956 –0.695 –0.497 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.256 0.139*** –0.829 –0.734 0.731*** –0.418 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.256 –0.146 –0.755 –0.650 –0.088 –0.451 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.133 0.290*** –0.497 –0.461 0.710*** –0.123 
𝑔 = 0.50  
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.447 –0.692 12.262*** –0.976 176.352*** 0.579*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.287 –0.657 4.762*** –0.826 14.434*** 0.305*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 0.379*** 1.108*** 0.423*** –0.687 –0.045 0.043*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.119 0.125*** –0.560 –0.439 0.662*** –0.164 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.137 –0.046 –0.497 –0.392 0.122*** –0.223 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.069 0.172*** –0.290 –0.265 0.500*** –0.031 
𝑔 = 0.25       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 0.225*** –0.128 4.834*** –0.733 24.391*** 1.115*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 0.187*** –0.223 2.242*** –0.411 5.025*** 0.604*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 0.271*** 0.579*** 0.307*** –0.378 0.144*** 0.133*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.056 0.078*** –0.325 –0.233 0.392*** –0.060 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.071 –0.013 –0.287 –0.214 0.121*** –0.104 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.035 0.093*** –0.157 –0.142 0.288*** –0.004 
𝑔 = 0.05       
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 0.128*** 0.046*** 0.535*** –0.163 1.124*** 0.264*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 0.093*** –0.005 0.328*** –0.049 0.539*** 0.162*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 0.063*** 0.111*** 0.071*** –0.075 0.057*** 0.043*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.011 0.018*** –0.073 –0.048 0.085*** –0.007 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.015 –0.001 –0.065 –0.046 0.035*** –0.019 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.007 0.020*** –0.034 –0.030 0.063*** 0.002* 
        
 
explanation. When using the logit-based strategy, the season in question embodies 
substantially many winning bets that, together with aggressive staking and a very large 
number of bets to be placed (16,324 on the lowest edge threshold, for example), produces an 
extremely high return. On the other hand, during the season 2013–2014 even the specification 
according to which 𝑔 = 1.00 and 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 implies a return of only 0.03% per bet. At the same 
time, conversely, the notably large number of losing bets accounts for the returns that are 
negative with all the specifications during the season 2012–2013. 
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 Another aspect that catches our attention in the results portrayed in Table 20 (as well 
as in the results displayed below) concerns the fact that the absolute majority of the positive 
returns are also statistically significant at the 1% level. This can be justified by the way in 
which the simulations have been performed for each period, staking, and threshold. Even 
though the simulations have allowed the match order to vary randomly in each case, as 
explained in Section 7.2.4, the distribution of these returns was often narrow, denoting that 
the match order does eventually not play any key role in the formation of the returns. Thus, 
although the size of a Kelly stake is dependent on the size of the bankroll at a given moment, 
actual match outcomes (that naturally remained the same throughout the simulations) drive 
the returns to a very large extent when the total number of bets to be placed is large. 
As the third and final sophisticated strategy, I replicated the logit-based strategy by 
utilizing the favorite-longshot bias and the apparent underpricing of favorite bets found in this 
study even more directly by placing bets only on favorites. I did this by scanning value bets 
with the logit model as above but only with the betting edge threshold of 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00, thereafter 
excluding bets whose odds exceeded a given odds threshold and then performing the 
simulations. Table 21 lists the number of value bets detected by this advanced model. As 
expected, the number of bets that meet the criteria is much smaller than in the above 
specifications visible in Tables 17 and 19 for 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00. In any case, according to Table 21, the 
odds thresholds of 1.30 and above are applicable for implementing this strategy. 
When including only favorites, the sophisticated strategy founded on the logit model 
provides unanimous evidence of economic weak form betting market inefficiency. As 
portrayed in Table 22 (page 88), all the simulations that consider the whole sample period 
generate returns that reject the null hypothesis of unprofitability. The same holds for the 
absolute majority of the individual seasons as well. For example, when involving only clear 
favorites whose odds are not higher than 1.50, combined with the most conservative staking, 
the strategy yields an annual return of 7.6% during the five-year period, while being negative 
during none of the single seasons. 
Moreover, similar to the earlier sophisticated strategies, the volatility of the returns is 
higher among the higher levels of fractional Kelly. At the same time, however, there is no 
clear trend with regard to the magnitude of the returns on different odds thresholds on each 
level of fractional Kelly. Based on the results, in practice it would be advisable to apply a 
specification of the strategy with an odds threshold not lower than 1.40 (to find an adequate 
number of value bets) and with a level of fractional Kelly not larger than 0.25 (to reduce the  
87 
 
 
Table 21 
Occurrence of value bets discovered by the logit model with favorites only 
This table displays the number of value bets detected in the sample when determining the objective probabilities 
with the binary logit model and including only bets for favorites whose odds (𝛿) are below a specific threshold. 
The table lists the figures for seven different odds thresholds: 1.70, 1.60, 1.50, 1.40, 1.30, 1.20, and 1.10. In 
other words, on a given threshold, it reveals the number of bets that were placed when following the value 
betting strategy that is based on the logit model and includes only favorites. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
𝛿 < 1.70 1,556 1,840 1,921 1,801 2,050 9,168 
𝛿 < 1.60 1,125 1,294 1,372 1,257 1,441 6,489 
𝛿 < 1.50 670 769 837 738 912 3,926 
𝛿 < 1.40 314 385 421 371 462 1,953 
𝛿 < 1.30 93 122 148 119 154 636 
𝛿 < 1.20 5 6 19 21 22 73 
𝛿 < 1.10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
 
volatility of the returns). However, as this study aims only at exploring whether the betting 
market is economically weak form efficient when employing various strategies, specification 
of the optimal choice of staking and bets is out of scope here and left as a future exercise.  
As explained in Section 7.2.4, there is a theoretical possibility that the returns of the 
logit-based sophisticated strategies in Tables 20 and 22 are subject to in-sample bias, even 
though the risk is not considerable in practice. The presumption of no bias is further 
supported by the results in Section 9.1.2 that show how the coefficients produced by the 
binary logit model for each season remain relatively stable throughout the sample period, 
indicating a permanent favorite-longshot bias. In any case, for robustness, I performed the 
corresponding out-of-sample simulations, using the seasons 2009–2012 as the in-sample 
period and then operating the seasons 2012–2014 as the out-of-sample period. As expected, 
the out-of-sample returns behave similarly to those above; in fact, these returns are even 
slightly higher than the equivalent in-sample returns portrayed in Tables 20 and 22. 
Therefore, the results of the more advanced logit-based strategy appear to hold very 
well also out-of-sample. The strategy that employs value betting, Kelly staking, and a logit 
model that captures the statistical bias found in the betting market generates consistent 
positive returns, which allows us to reject Hypothesis II. For convenience, the out-of-sample 
results are exhibited in Appendix C, in Tables C.3 and C.4 for the basic logit-based strategy 
(corresponding to Tables 19 and 20 above), and in Tables C.5 and C.6 (being comparable to 
Tables 21 and 22 above) for the advanced logit-based strategy that includes only favorites. 
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Table 22 
Annual returns of the logit-based strategy with favorites only 
This table presents the annual returns obtained with simulating the value betting strategy based on the binary 
logit model including only bets for favorites whose odds are below a specific threshold, employing the one-sided 
t-test defined in Eq. (29). For each period, the simulation has been repeated 1,000 times, letting the sequence of 
matches during the given period to vary randomly. The simulations have been performed separately for each 
period, level of fractional Kelly staking (𝑔), and odds threshold. In terms of the fractional Kelly staking, four 
different values for 𝑔 have been applied: 1.00, 0.50, 0.25, and 0.05. With respect to the odds threshold, five 
different levels have been employed: 1.70, 1.60, 1.50, 1.40, and 1.30. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
        
𝑔 = 1.00       
 𝛿 < 1.70 –0.859 –0.336 0.846*** –0.755 46.539*** 0.150*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 –0.785 0.407*** 0.586*** 0.621*** 97.812*** 1.383*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.310*** –0.338 0.203*** 3.257*** 19.025*** 1.454*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 1.844*** 0.644*** 0.642*** 7.970*** 3.773*** 2.187*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.986*** –0.105 –0.220 1.380*** 2.792*** 0.658*** 
𝑔 = 0.50  
 𝛿 < 1.70 –0.496 0.111*** 0.894*** –0.247 10.722*** 0.564*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 –0.434 0.471*** 0.615*** 0.692*** 13.624*** 1.016*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.274*** –0.078 0.266*** 1.400*** 4.709*** 0.828*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 0.769*** 0.370*** 0.397*** 2.292*** 1.566*** 0.956*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.421*** –0.031 –0.086 0.587*** 1.030*** 0.323*** 
𝑔 = 0.25       
 𝛿 < 1.70 –0.238 0.137*** 0.493*** –0.039 2.896*** 0.371*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 –0.210 0.278*** 0.350*** 0.394*** 3.199*** 0.515*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.158*** –0.010 0.165*** 0.607*** 1.534*** 0.403*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 0.346*** 0.190*** 0.207*** 0.856*** 0.665*** 0.429*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.195*** –0.010 –0.036 0.268*** 0.440*** 0.158*** 
𝑔 = 0.05       
 𝛿 < 1.70 –0.042 0.038*** 0.097*** 0.008** 0.340*** 0.081*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 –0.039 0.059*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.352*** 0.098*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.034*** 0.003* 0.037*** 0.106*** 0.216*** 0.076*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 0.063*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.136*** 0.114*** 0.078*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.037*** –0.001 –0.006 0.050*** 0.077*** 0.031*** 
        
 
When comparing the results of the sophisticated strategies based on the logit model 
with the earlier literature we must be careful because, to the best of my knowledge, there are 
no previous studies in soccer that would be directly comparable. In particular, Koning (2012) 
and Nyberg (2014), both of whom reject statistical weak form betting market efficiency with 
logit models similar to this study, do not utilize their models to explore economic efficiency 
at all. When considering the variety of sophisticated strategies more loosely and allowing also 
for semi-strong form studies, the results in the earlier literature mostly align to those in this 
study in the sense that substantial improvement in returns can be achieved compared to less 
sophisticated strategies, as demonstrated by Pope and Peel (1989), Dixon and Pope (2004), 
Vlastakis et al. (2009), and Franck et al. (2010). 
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At the same time, however, the previous studies show less consistency in terms of 
positive returns, i.e. in the rejection of economic efficiency. The strategies of Pope and Peel 
(1989) are not translatable into profitable post-tax profits (bettor taxes were the norm at that 
time). Vlastakis et al. (2009) suggest that econometric models, such as the multinomial logit 
model, can be employed to form profitable betting strategies, but in the context of 1X2 odds 
they cannot show positive returns. Nevertheless, Dixon and Pope (2004) and Franck et al. 
(2010) are able to generate marginal statistically significant profits with their advanced 
models for betting edge thresholds above 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, somewhat in line with the 
results presented in this chapter. 
In summary, the four tests of economic efficiency give a more ambiguous view on 
efficiency than those of statistical efficiency. On the aggregate level, tobit regression shows 
no profit opportunities but proves that all bets do not yield the same expected return, implying 
a FLB. Neither the naïve betting strategies nor the quasi-arbitrage strategy demonstrate 
chances for profitable betting, whereas some of the odds groups involving clear favorites 
appear to generate moderate profits. In any case, the sophisticated strategy that takes into 
account the earlier observed favorite-longshot bias yields consistent profits, which means that 
we ultimately found a profitable strategy in European 1X2 soccer betting. 
Altogether, since we have now rejected both of our hypotheses introduced in Chapter 
5, finally including also the stricter hypothesis of economic efficiency, we may rather safely 
conclude that the online betting market in European soccer is weak form inefficient. The next 
chapter provides a discussion on these results. 
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10. Discussion 
 
 The results above clearly indicate that the online sports betting market in European 
soccer is weak form inefficient both statistically through an explicit favorite-longshot bias and 
economically when applying a sophisticated betting strategy that takes into account that bias. 
In the light of this study, the observed betting market inefficiency appears to be robust and 
resilient. Regardless of the developments in the current online betting market, the FLB has 
not vanished, which appears to give rise to profitable betting opportunities. Consequently, it is 
important to contemplate why the FLB still can persist, without sharp bettors completely 
exploiting the irrationality similarly to what sharp investors and arbitrageurs would do in 
financial markets to eliminate mispricing. I find two streams of intertwining explanations: 
institutional arrangements and market immaturity. 
 Regarding institutional arrangements, it might be that bookmakers’ option to 
unilaterally limit the stakes of specific customers or to close their accounts entirely can at 
least hinder sharp bettors from exploiting the bias. As reminded by Franck et al. (2013), 
unlike betting exchanges, bookmakers are not trading against anonymous submitters of 
market orders; they are capable of and allowed to follow the trading history of each client and 
discriminate against skilled bettors, thereafter skewing the odds to optimize profits from the 
remaining, less skilled customer base. This is naturally in a stark contrast to financial 
marketplaces, but its real life significance is difficult to estimate. Franck et al. (2013, 321) 
also mention that this practice of “hidden price discrimination” has not been investigated thus 
far, but that it might have important consequences in the way that bookmakers’ odds setting 
decisions should be modelled and potential market anomalies interpreted. 
 On the other hand, the importance of the explanation around institutional 
arrangements could be reduced in the future due to two reasons. First, if assuming that the 
population of bettors would become sharper, the size of the less sophisticated customer base 
would decrease, forcing bookmakers to alter their strategies to maintain and enhance revenues 
at the expense of profitability. In other words, to remain in the business, it might be that 
bookmakers’ only option is to accept even sharp bettors. In this respect, the evolution of the 
bettor population along the continuum between sophistication and unsophistication plays a 
pivotal role. Second, even if this population would not become sharper, sophisticated bettors 
could anyway apply some specific methodologies to avoid becoming limited by bookmakers, 
or compromise their returns slightly by taking advantage of bookmakers that are less keen on 
91 
 
 
limiting successful customers. Similar to the question around price discrimination, there is 
thus far no academic evidence of the degree of economic efficiency when employing betting 
strategies that dodge limitations or a subset of bookmakers that do not enforce stake limits. 
 The second stream of explanations for the persistence of market inefficiency not 
discerned in financial markets relates to the immaturity of betting markets. Compared to 
financial markets, present-day betting markets include more participants whose motives are 
less financial and whose stakes are relatively small. As emphasized by Paton and Vaughan 
Williams (2005), sports betting encompasses entertainment value that is significant for a large 
proportion of bettors, while the utility functions of financial traders are more dominated by 
wealth and risk considerations. Moreover, for the majority of bettors, a typical bet involves 
only a small proportion of wealth, whereas many financial decisions necessitate risking a 
much larger proportion. Taken together, these factors might lead to betting decisions that are 
not profit maximizing. Consequently, as formalized by Levitt (2004) and later discussed for 
example by Vlastakis et al. (2009) and Franck et al. (2010), bookmakers would set prices 
strategically (statistically less efficiently) to exploit bettor biases, as long as the institutional 
arrangements introduced above restrain sharp bettors from utilizing the biases too much. 
 At this point, it is challenging to give accurate estimations on how the population of 
bettors will evolve along the sophistication or maturity continuums. As sports betting markets 
are constantly expanding, most likely attracting mainly amateur players, it might well be that 
the proportion of the volume generated by these less sophisticated bettors will remain at least 
on the same level, if not increasing. Even if and when the pace of this expansion becomes 
slower, it might be that a significant proportion of the population of bettors will always have 
different utility functions than those of sophisticated bettors, meaning that betting markets 
would never reach maturity in the wealth maximizing sense. If this would be the case, the 
markets would remain inefficient and, in terms of exploiting the biases, bypassing the 
potential institutional arrangements becomes the key. If, on the other hand, betting markets 
would become more mature, signified by a situation in which supply matches demand by 
market forces with more efficient equilibrium prices (odds), performing even more subtle 
tests of efficiency and capitalizing on them—or completely switching over to other forms of 
making money in sports betting—would become the key. 
 Taken together, the focal implication of this study for finance is to show that even a 
competitive market that resembles any financial market, characterized by an ocean of market 
participants, considerable volumes, and low transaction costs, can be weak form inefficient 
under some specific conditions. By these conditions I refer to arrangements that prevent 
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sophisticated investors from exploiting the biases and, at least partly due to these 
arrangements, to a situation in which a significant proportion of the total volume is brought 
about by less sophisticated investors. As such, these conditions differ from those under which 
rational arbitrageurs do not always eliminate sentimental mispricing in financial markets (see, 
e.g., DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Avery and Chevalier, 1999). 
 The results of this study contribute to the literature on weak form betting market 
efficiency in three dimensions. First, with a more comprehensive data set than in any previous 
soccer betting study in terms of the number of both matches and bookmakers considered, it is 
able to carry out more accurate odds level tests and explore the profitability of different 
betting strategies with a greater number of value bets, enabling more precise specifications as 
well as smaller random variation and more consistency in returns. In this respect, the study 
confirms the earlier findings around statistical weak form inefficiency that manifests itself in 
the favorite-longshot bias, but amplifies the literature regarding the location of the FLB on the 
odds spectrum. Moreover, compared to the existing literature, the study demonstrates more 
consistent economic weak form inefficiency by the existence of profitable betting strategies 
that utilize the FLB with a statistical model. 
 As the second empirical contribution, the study performs various tests of efficiency in 
the online betting era, which, in comparison to the betting market contexts in the majority of 
earlier studies, is characterized by an increased number of bookmakers, thinner bookmaker 
margins, and intensive competition. While the statistical biases found in the previous 
literature have often not resulted in economic inefficiency due to the higher bookmaker 
margins, the current study shows that similar biases in the more competitive online betting era 
lead also to economic inefficiency and consistent profits. Third and finally, while some of the 
otherwise noteworthy papers focus purely either on statistical or economic efficiency, this 
study covers both the forms of efficiency, which enables the detection of value bets—the 
ingredients of profitable betting strategies—both from statistical biases and quasi-arbitrage 
opportunities. In this respect, the study shows how the statistical inefficiencies can be 
profitably exploited, while the usefulness of quasi-arbitrage is minimal. 
The study contains two main limitations that might influence the validity of the 
results: the assumption of the proportional spread of the bookmaker margin across 1X2 
outcomes and the presumption of the absence of bookmaker stake limits. I see the former 
limitation as less serious, whereas I evaluate the seriousness of the latter limitation as 
moderate. First, wholly consistent with the practice of the discipline, it has been assumed that 
the bookmaker margin is spread proportionally across each possible outcome. This is 
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necessary to be able to calculate the subjective probabilities assigned by the market, but if the 
margin would not be dispersed in the supposed way, the statistical tests of efficiency would 
be invalid due to inaccurate determination of the subjective probabilities. As long as 
bookmakers do not announce their policy and/or share the relating data, it is strictly speaking 
impossible to know for sure how the margin is distributed in reality. In this study, however, 
the significance of this limitation is diminished by two factors. First, the margins in the 
current online betting market are smaller than ever, which reduces the overall effect of the 
margin in probability calculations. Second, also the economic tests of efficiency, which do 
not need to convert odds to probabilities, indicate the existence of a bias similar to that found 
by the statistical tests, which supports the presumption that the subjective probabilities 
determined in the study are correct. 
 As the second (and somewhat more serious) limitation, the study assumes that the 
bettor is able to bet any given sum at the highest closing odds quoted in the market. However, 
because some bookmakers are known (and always allowed) to limit the stakes of their 
customers, it might be that the strategies performed in the study could have not been 
consistently implemented in reality. Once again, to be sure, either bookmakers should come 
out with their policies or we should check whether the bets suggested by the strategies could 
be placed in practice. Although this limitation might distort our results, it is probably reduced 
due to three factors. First, the current online betting market includes various bookmakers who 
publically accept sharp bettors. Second, sharp bettors can also use some specific techniques to 
minimize the possibility of being identified by bookmakers as such, without compromising 
the returns of the suggested strategies too much. Third, as the study rests on value betting 
rather than on arbitrage betting, the risk of becoming limited is less significant.  
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11. Conclusion 
 
 Online sports betting markets have expanded considerably during the recent decade. 
Meanwhile, due to their similarities with financial markets, the academic literature has viewed 
sports betting markets as an appropriate empirical setting for various tests of efficiency. 
Employing a more extensive data set than in any previous relevant study, this thesis has 
investigated weak form efficiency of online sports betting in European soccer from two 
perspectives: statistical and economic. Using three different methodologies, the statistical 
tests have inspected whether subjective probability implied by average market odds is an 
unbiased estimator of objective outcome probability. Economic tests, which represent the 
stricter tests of efficiency, have examined whether any betting strategy yields positive returns 
when utilizing highest odds quoted in the market. While the majority of the pertinent 
literature explore betting markets with more limited data sets in the pre-online era, this study 
contributes to the literature by carrying out an extensive analysis of both statistical and 
economic weak form efficiency in the online betting era with lower transaction costs. 
 The statistical tests find unanimous evidence of a favorite-longshot bias and therefore 
of statistical weak form betting market inefficiency. Both the linear and logit regression 
models, which investigate efficiency on the aggregate level, discover that as subjective 
probability increases, objective probability increases more than implied by efficiency. On the 
individual odds level, the method of sorting odds into groups based on subjective probability 
reveals that the departures between subjective and objective probability occur on both 
perimeters of the odds spectrum but not in the middle of it. In this respect, the betting market 
seems to be weak form inefficient at high respective low probabilities, whereas it appears to 
be efficient in between. In terms of statistical (in)efficiency, the results mostly align with 
those in earlier studies in soccer (Pope and Peel, 1989; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; 
Cain et al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and Gergaud, 2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009; Strumbelj and 
Sikonja, 2010; Koning, 2012; Direr, 2013; Nyberg, 2014) but also in other sports (see, e.g., 
Griffith, 1949; Dowie, 1976; Ali, 1977; Snyder, 1978; Asch et al., 1982, 1984; Vaughan 
Williams and Paton, 1997; Cain et al., 2003; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010). 
 The economic tests give a more ambiguous picture of economic weak form betting 
market efficiency. When involving all the matches in the sample, neither the tobit regression 
model nor any of the naïve strategies show chances for profitable betting, whereas some of 
the odds groups with highest subjective probability display moderately positive returns. When 
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only involving matches with a positive expected value and simulating the returns associated 
with them, the sophisticated strategy based on quasi-arbitrage is unprofitable, but the other 
sophisticated strategy that takes into account the favorite-longshot bias with a logit model 
generates consistent profits. For the whole sample period, a strategy specification that 
employs conservative staking and places bets only on clear favorites yields an annual return 
of 8%. Thus, ultimately, the betting market appears to be inefficient also in an economic 
sense. In terms of economic (in)efficiency, the results contradict with the majority of previous 
1X2 soccer betting studies that find statistical but not economic weak form efficiency (Pope 
and Peel, 1989; Paton and Vaughan Williams, 1998; Cain et al., 2000, 2003; Deschamps and 
Gergaud, 2007; Vlastakis et al., 2009). Moreover, with connection to the more recent soccer 
studies that discover statistical inefficiency but do not investigate economic efficiency at all 
(Strumbelj and Sikonja, 2010; Koning, 2012; Nyberg, 2014), the results of this study show 
how these biases lead also to economic inefficiency. 
 Altogether, the study concludes that the European online sports betting market in 
soccer is weak form inefficient. From the statistical efficiency point of view, the results 
confirm the existence of a favorite-longshot bias commonly observed in the earlier literature, 
as well as shed more light on the location of this bias at both ends of the odds spectrum, 
instead of occurring monotonically throughout the spectrum. From the economic efficiency 
point of view, contrary to the previous literature, the study demonstrates how sophisticated 
strategies that exploit the FLB can now generate consistent profits, due to the considerably 
lower transaction costs in the online betting era. 
The results therefore imply that the betting market has not become less inefficient 
during the five-year period of study, regardless of the intensified competition in terms of an 
increasing number of bookmakers and decreasing bookmaker margins. The study provides 
two intertwined explanations for the persistence of the observed inefficiencies. On the one 
hand, institutional arrangements might hinder sharp bettors from exploiting the biases. On the 
other hand, market immaturity refers to the effects that the less financial motives and smaller 
stakes of the significant part of the bettor population might have. More generally, the 
implication of this study is for finance is to portray how even a competitive market, featured 
by a wealth of market participants, considerable volumes, and low transaction costs, can be 
weak form inefficient under some distinctive circumstances. In any case, because sports 
betting markets are not yet as sophisticated as many financial markets, they provide attractive 
investment opportunities for sharp bettors. 
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12. Ideas on future research 
 
Online sports betting constitutes an emerging, alluring, and dynamic field of study and 
plenty of interesting research topics stem also from this thesis. In this final chapter, I will use 
the opportunity to shortly propose three ideas on future research. 
 First, as online sports betting markets encompass various market structures, types of 
bets, sports, as well as time horizons, this study could be replicated in other contexts with 
other data sets by simply changing the focus in any of the dimensions presented in Section 
2.2.2. While this study has focused on 1X2 pre-match bookmaker betting in European soccer, 
many other noteworthy betting markets are still to be investigated. We could hypothesize that 
the more immature a specific betting market is, the less statistically efficient it might be; on 
the other hand, the more mature the market is, the thinner the margins would most likely be, 
therefore providing higher odds and perhaps more signs of economic inefficiency. 
 Second, the context of this study could be employed with a slightly modified 
methodology. As the other of the two main limitations of the study relates to conceivable 
stake limits imposed by bookmakers, we could include only those bookmakers who publicly 
welcome winners and always allow large volumes, perhaps incorporating also betting 
exchanges. If we could then demonstrate similar deviations from efficiency, we would have 
even more waterproof evidence of weak form betting market inefficiency. At the same time, 
we could also investigate whether the opposite deviation at the other end of the odds spectrum 
could be profitably exploited utilizing betting exchanges. Since odds on low levels of 
subjective probability appear to be lower than implied by efficiency, these bets are overvalued 
and strategies based on selling these bets (i.e. betting against a given outcome to occur, which 
is available in betting exchanges) might well turn out to be profitable. 
Third and lastly, as this thesis proposes that present-day sports betting markets provide 
attractive investment opportunities for sharp bettors, the idea of really considering these 
markets as an investment alternative among the more traditional alternatives deserves much 
more attention. While this study has merely inspected whether or not a single betting market 
in European soccer is weak form efficient, assuming risk neutrality, future research should put 
effort on determining the optimal betting strategies when bettors’ individual risk appetite is 
taken into account. Since the degree of risk in the context of betting can be controlled by the 
choice of both staking and bets, both of these variables should be involved in the search for 
optimal strategies. 
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13. Appendices 
13.1. Appendix A: Additional descriptive statistics 
23Table A.123 
Countries and divisions in the sample 
This table shows the number of soccer matches per season in each country and division considered in the study. The name of each division stands for its current name; due to name 
changes in some divisions, the name mentioned in the table might not correspond to the name during the sample period. All promotion and/or relegation matches in which teams 
from two adjacent divisions have taken part have been counted in to the number of matches in the higher of these two divisions. 
Country and division 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
Armenia       
 Premier League 108 104 106 160 108 586 
Austria       
 Tipico Bundesliga 174 174 176 174 168 866 
 Erste Liga 187 177 178 176 170 888 
Azerbaijan       
 Premier League 137 188 187 177 162 851 
Belarus       
 Vysshaya Liga 198 200 166 191 191 946 
Belgium       
 Jupiler League 278 310 307 309 306 1,510 
 Proximus League 337 299 300 303 295 1,534 
Bosnia and Herzegovina       
 Premier League 231 238 237 237 232 1,175 
Bulgaria       
 A PFG 212 239 231 218 238 1,138 
Croatia       
 1. HNL 238 238 231 197 178 1,082 
Cyprus       
 First Division 202 211 209 208 225 1,055 
Czech Republic       
 Synot Liga 236 239 229 232 239 1,175 
 Division 2 239 239 235 237 236 1,186 
Denmark       
 Superliga 197 198 191 191 190 967 
 Bet25 Liga 238 237 178 178 196 1,027 
        
Country and division 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
England       
 Premier League 373 371 374 362 348 1,828 
 Championship 554 548 552 553 547 2,754 
 League One 554 554 553 550 549 2,760 
 League Two 552 551 553 551 543 2,750 
Estonia       
 Meistriliiga 181 173 177 179 176 886 
Faroe Islands       
 Premier League 105 134 135 135 135 644 
Finland       
 Veikkausliiga 183 194 193 195 188 953 
 Ykkönen 176 148 131 125 135 715 
France       
 Ligue 1 368 374 369 366 361 1,838 
 Ligue 2 373 372 375 373 369 1,862 
 National 377 385 362 369 296 1,789 
FYR of Macedonia       
 First League 103 195 185 191 191 865 
Germany       
 Bundesliga 301 304 296 296 290 1,487 
 2. Bundesliga 301 303 301 304 305 1,514 
 3. Liga 375 379 371 371 366 1,862 
Greece       
 Super League 242 244 241 244 300 1,271 
Hungary       
 OTP Bank Liga 236 236 237 233 231 1,173 
        
(Continued) 
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Table A.1 – Continued
Country and division 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
Iceland       
 Pepsideild 128 128 123 126 129 634 
Ireland       
 Premier League 178 177 174 199 194 922 
 Division 1 196 165 110 110 106 687 
Italy       
 Serie A 366 360 366 368 360 1,820 
 Serie B 456 456 459 459 459 2,289 
 Lega Pro C1/A 305 294 307 279 244 1,429 
 Lega Pro C1/B 307 295 312 246 261 1,421 
Kazakhstan       
 Premier League 140 188 178 179 168 853 
Latvia       
 Virslīga 134 142 172 131 159 738 
Lithuania       
 A Lyga 134 186 160 119 151 750 
Moldova       
 Divizia Nationala 178 263 188 178 134 941 
Montenegro       
 Prva Crnogorska Liga 184 195 194 189 197 959 
Netherlands       
 Eredivisie 325 321 321 321 320 1,608 
 Eerste Divisie 331 300 298 277 371 1,577 
Northern Ireland       
 NIFL Premiership 221 226 228 224 222 1,121 
Norway       
 Tippeligaen 242 235 241 238 234 1,190 
 OBOS-ligaen 207 231 233 238 240 1,149 
Poland       
 Ekstraklasa 235 206 233 233 284 1,191 
 Division 1 303 296 305 291 299 1,494 
Portugal       
 Primeira Liga 235 235 236 236 236 1,178 
 Segunda Liga 238 236 237 454 450 1,615 
        
Country and division 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 Total 
       
Romania       
 Liga I 301 298 294 294 292 1,479 
Russia       
 Premier League 232 230 339 230 232 1,263 
 Division 1 356 377 469 267 310 1,779 
Scotland       
 Premiership 225 227 224 225 230 1,131 
 Championship 184 183 185 184 182 918 
 League One 184 186 185 184 184 923 
Serbia       
 Super Liga 240 239 234 230 228 1,171 
Slovakia       
 Fortuna liga 196 192 197 195 193 973 
Slovenia       
 Prva liga 171 178 177 178 178 882 
Spain       
 Primera Division 370 371 371 366 339 1,817 
 Segunda Division 457 455 454 451 459 2,276 
Sweden       
 Allsvenskan 240 238 240 231 225 1,174 
 Superettan 241 239 240 232 237 1,189 
Switzerland       
 Super League 178 178 163 174 172 865 
 Challenge League 228 226 231 176 176 1,037 
Turkey       
 Super Lig 270 298 321 297 294 1,480 
 PTT 1. Lig 307 273 307 297 315 1,499 
Ukraina       
 Pari-Match League 240 236 233 233 216 1,158 
Wales       
 Premier League 303 196 194 192 187 1,072 
Europe       
 Champions League 203 204 204 199 182 992 
 Europa League 448 454 458 424 424 2,208 
Total 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
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13.2. Appendix B: Results of statistical tests with alternative specifications 
 
24Table B.124 
OLS estimates and efficiency testing results of 100 equally sized groups 
This table presents the OLS estimates and the efficiency testing results of the standard linear regression model, as 
defined in Eq. (13), of 100 equally sized odds groups. The regressions have been run separately for home wins, draws, 
and away wins. The groups are sorted by subjective probability, as defined in Eq. (3), so that the group size is 956 for 
99 groups and 1,145 for the remaining group. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. In the case of the coefficient 𝛽, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽 = 1. The sixth and seventh rows give the  
F-statistics for the joint test that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1, which denotes the test of weak form betting market efficiency. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Home wins Draws Away wins 
    
𝛼 –0.0337*** –0.0740*** –0.0301*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0085) (0.0033) 
𝛽 1.0928*** 1.2644*** 1.0929*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0339) (0.0102) 
R2 0.991 0.901 0.991 
F 49.44*** 46.03*** 43.38*** 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
n 100 100 100 
    
 
25Table B.225 
OLS estimates and efficiency testing results of 50 groups with equal interval 
This table presents the OLS estimates and the efficiency testing results of the standard linear regression model, as 
defined in Eq. (13), of 50 odds groups with variable size. The groups are sorted by subjective probability, as defined in 
Eq. (3), so that the interval of each group is of the same size in terms of subjective probability. The regressions have 
been run separately for home wins, draws, and away wins. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficient 𝛽, the null hypothesis is that 𝛽 = 1. The sixth and seventh rows 
give the F-statistics for the joint test that 𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽 = 1, which denotes the test of weak form betting market 
efficiency. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Home wins Draws Away wins 
    
𝛼 –0.0355*** –0.0463 –0.0355*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0447) (0.0065) 
𝛽 1.1055*** 1.1127 1.1174*** 
 (0.0118) (0.1952) (0.0201) 
R2 0.997 0.460 0.993 
F 41.67*** 1.74 17.27*** 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.188) (0.000) 
n 50 50 50 
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26Table B.326 
ML estimates and efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit model 
with home wins as the benchmark category 
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and the efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit model, 
as defined by Eq. (20). Home wins are used as the benchmark category. Robust standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficients 𝛽0 and 𝛽−1, the null hypothesis is that 
𝛽0 = 𝛽−1 = 1. Wald’s 𝜒4
2 refers to the Wald’s chi-square test statistic for the estimated model, while 𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) 
stands for the test statistic for the Wald’s test of coefficient restrictions, the null hypothesis of weak form efficiency 
being that 𝛼𝑗 = 0 and 𝛽𝑗 = 1 for 𝑗 = −1, 0. Pseudo-R
2 refers to McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total 
        
 𝛼0 0.0510 0.0499 0.1175** 0.1596*** 0.1841*** 0.1019*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0407) (0.0472) (0.0542) (0.0524) (0.0204) 
 𝛽0 1.2371 1.2784 1.4372** 1.7948*** 1.7976*** 1.4658*** 
  (0.1755) (0.1742) (0.2110) (0.2397) (0.2220) (0.0889) 
 𝛼−1 –0.0060 –0.0306 0.0618 –0.0461 0.0136 –0.0013 
  (0.0473) (0.0467) (0.0509) (0.0536) (0.0511) (0.0222) 
 𝛽−1 1.1881* 1.1978* 1.0973 1.1823 1.0522 1.1436*** 
  (0.1092) (0.1049) (0.1178) (0.1239) (0.1129) (0.0505) 
 Wald’s 𝜒4
2 2,498.37*** 2,498.38*** 2,574.00*** 2,263.92*** 2,538.24*** 12,360.37*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) 15.76*** 15.61*** 24.31*** 25.07*** 22.65*** 90.11*** 
 (p-value) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0745 0.0747 0.0765 0.0681 0.0786 0.0745 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
        
 
27Table B.427 
ML estimates and efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit model 
with away wins as the benchmark category 
This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates and the efficiency testing results of the multinomial logit model, 
as defined by Eq. (20). Away wins are used as the benchmark category. Robust standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are reported in parentheses. In the case of the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽0, the null hypothesis is that 
𝛽1 = 𝛽0 = 1. Wald’s 𝜒4
2 refers to the Wald’s chi-square test statistic for the estimated model, while  
𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) stands for the test statistic for the Wald’s test of coefficient restrictions, the null hypothesis of weak form 
efficiency being that 𝛼𝑗 = 0 and 𝛽𝑗 = 1 for 𝑗 = 0, 1. Pseudo-R
2 refers to McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total 
        
 𝛼1 0.0060 0.0306 –0.0618 0.0461 –0.0136 0.0013 
  (0.0473) (0.0467) (0.0509) (0.0536) (0.0511) (0.0222) 
 𝛽1 1.0645 1.0527 1.1640 0.9998 1.1361 1.0855* 
  (0.1032) (0.0993) (0.1094) (0.1118) (0.1024) (0.0469) 
 𝛼0 0.0569 0.0805 0.0557 0.2057*** 0.1705*** 0.1032*** 
  (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0545) (0.0591) (0.0551) (0.0239) 
 𝛽0 1.3606 1.4235** 1.3705 1.9773*** 1.7136*** 1.5239*** 
  (0.2242) (0.2133) (0.2377) (0.2521) (0.2226) (0.1017) 
 Wald’s 𝜒4
2 2,498.37*** 2,498.38*** 2,574.00*** 2,263.92*** 2,538.24*** 12,360.37*** 
 (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 𝜒4
2(𝛼 = 0; 𝛽 = 1) 13.30*** 20.07*** 13.23** 28.62*** 29.06*** 93.98*** 
 (p-value) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 pseudo-R2 0.0745 0.0747 0.0765 0.0681 0.0786 0.0745 
 n 19,183 19,369 19,361 18,939 18,937 95,789 
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28Table B.528 
Subjective vs. objective probability: z-tests of 20 equally sized groups 
This table presents the results of the z-tests that compare subjective probabilities (𝜌
ℎ
) of 20 odds groups with their 
objective probabilities (𝜋ℎ), as defined in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23). The groups are sorted by subjective probability so that 
the group size is 4,789 for 19 groups and 4,798 for the remaining group. The lower the group number, the higher the 
subjective probability and vice versa. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Home wins   Draws   Away wins 
Group 𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
 𝝆
𝒉
 𝝅𝒉 z-value  𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
            
1 0.78 0.83 –9.3***  0.32 0.33 –2.0**  0.66 0.70 –5.7*** 
2 0.69 0.72 –4.9***  0.30 0.32 –2.3**  0.51 0.53 –2.4** 
3 0.64 0.65 –2.4**  0.30 0.31 –1.8*  0.45 0.47 –2.8*** 
4 0.59 0.62 –3.2***  0.29 0.30 –0.5  0.40 0.41 –0.5 
5 0.56 0.57 –1.3  0.29 0.30 –2.0**  0.37 0.37 0.1 
6 0.53 0.55 –2.7***  0.29 0.28 0.6  0.35 0.36 –0.9 
7 0.51 0.52 –1.7*  0.28 0.28 0.8  0.33 0.33 –0.3 
8 0.48 0.48 0.0  0.28 0.29 –0.6  0.31 0.30 1.3 
9 0.46 0.47 –0.8  0.28 0.27 0.7  0.30 0.29 1.7* 
10 0.45 0.46 –1.6  0.28 0.28 –0.4  0.28 0.27 2.7*** 
11 0.43 0.44 –1.7*  0.27 0.27 0.1  0.27 0.26 1.3 
12 0.41 0.42 –1.8*  0.27 0.26 1.1  0.25 0.24 2.6*** 
13 0.39 0.40 –0.6  0.27 0.25 2.4**  0.24 0.23 1.4 
14 0.38 0.38 0.1  0.26 0.24 3.1***  0.22 0.20 3.9*** 
15 0.36 0.36 0.5  0.25 0.25 0.8  0.20 0.21 –0.9 
16 0.34 0.33 1.0  0.25 0.23 3.0***  0.18 0.17 2.9*** 
17 0.31 0.30 2.0**  0.23 0.22 1.8*  0.16 0.16 0.6 
18 0.27 0.27 1.2  0.22 0.20 2.1**  0.14 0.13 1.4 
19 0.22 0.21 1.7*  0.19 0.16 4.6***  0.11 0.10 3.1*** 
20 0.13 0.12 2.9***  0.14 0.11 6.7***  0.07 0.05 7.8*** 
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29Table B.629 
Subjective vs. objective probability: z-tests of 20 groups with equal interval 
This table presents the results of the z-tests that compare subjective probabilities (𝜌
ℎ
) of 20 odds groups with their 
objective probabilities (𝜋ℎ), as defined in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23). The groups have been formed so that they have an 
equal probability interval. The lower the group number, the higher the subjective probability and vice versa. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Home wins   Draws   Away wins 
Group 𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
 𝝆
𝒉
 𝝅𝒉 z-value  𝝆𝒉 𝝅𝒉 z-value 
            
1 0.89 0.96 –4.8***  0.73 1.00 n/a  0.88 0.97 –2.6** 
2 0.85 0.93 –7.4***  n/a n/a n/a  0.84 0.95 –5.1*** 
3 0.81 0.87 –7.3***  0.67 1.00 n/a  0.80 0.84 –2.1** 
4 0.76 0.80 –4.9***  0.63 0.40 1.1  0.75 0.79 –2.1** 
5 0.72 0.75 –3.9***  0.59 0.14 3.4***  0.71 0.77 –3.4*** 
6 0.67 0.70 –3.6***  0.56 0.60 –0.2  0.66 0.72 –3.9*** 
7 0.63 0.64 –2.1**  0.52 0.69 –1.5  0.62 0.66 –2.7*** 
8 0.58 0.60 –2.4**  0.48 0.38 0.7  0.58 0.58 –0.5 
9 0.54 0.56 –3.5***  0.46 0.60 –1.1  0.53 0.55 –1.8* 
10 0.49 0.50 –1.0  0.42 0.39 0.3  0.49 0.51 –2.1** 
11 0.45 0.46 –1.3  0.38 0.37 0.1  0.44 0.46 –2.6** 
12 0.40 0.42 –2.3**  0.35 0.39 –1.0  0.40 0.40 –0.1 
13 0.36 0.36 –0.5  0.31 0.33 –3.4***  0.35 0.36 –1.1 
14 0.32 0.30 2.9***  0.28 0.28 –0.2  0.31 0.30 2.5** 
15 0.27 0.26 1.2  0.25 0.24 4.5***  0.26 0.25 3.1*** 
16 0.23 0.21 2.3**  0.22 0.20 3.1***  0.22 0.21 3.1*** 
17 0.18 0.18 0.1  0.18 0.15 4.9***  0.18 0.17 2.0** 
18 0.14 0.12 1.9*  0.15 0.12 3.6***  0.13 0.12 2.3** 
19 0.09 0.08 1.9*  0.11 0.07 6.0***  0.09 0.07 5.3*** 
20 0.06 0.03 3.5***  0.08 0.04 3.6***  0.05 0.02 9.0*** 
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13.3. Appendix C: Results of economic tests with alternative specifications 
 
30Table C.130 
Returns of unit bets of 20 equally sized groups 
This table presents the returns of unit bets of 20 equally sized odds groups based on subjective probability, employing 
the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (28). The lower the group number, the higher the subjective probability and vice 
versa. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Home wins  Draws  Away wins 
𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉  𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉  𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
              
1 0.010* 11 0.015  1 0.011 11 –0.009  1 0.015* 11 0.003 
2 0.002 12 0.017  2 0.022 12 –0.030  2 0.010 12 –0.030 
3 –0.012 13 –0.003  3 0.013 13 –0.059  3 0.030** 13 0.008 
4 0.003 14 –0.011  4 –0.015 14 –0.075  4 –0.001 14 –0.056 
5 –0.013 15 –0.011  5 0.021 15 –0.012  5 –0.008 15 0.087*** 
6 0.008 16 –0.013  6 –0.035 16 –0.058  6 0.018 16 –0.022 
7 –0.001 17 –0.021  7 –0.039 17 –0.020  7 0.015 17 0.061** 
8 –0.021 18 0.004  8 –0.005 18 –0.024  8 –0.014 18 0.043 
9 –0.006 19 0.009  9 –0.029 19 –0.090  9 –0.015 19 –0.002 
10 0.009 20 –0.026  10 –0.001 20 –0.156  10 –0.033 20 –0.225 
  Total –0.003    Total –0.030    Total –0.006 
              
 
31Table C.231 
Returns of unit bets of 20 groups with equal interval 
This table presents the returns of unit bets of 20 odds groups with an equal probability interval, employing the one-sided 
t-test defined in Eq. (28). The lower the group number, the higher the subjective probability and vice versa.  
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Home wins  Draws  Away wins 
𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉  𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 𝒉 𝑹𝒉 
              
1 0.025* 11 –0.004  1 0.262*** 11 –0.032  1 0.019 11 0.031** 
2 0.036*** 12 0.011  2 n/a 12 0.086  2 0.055** 12 –0.008 
3 0.027*** 13 0.003  3 0.437*** 13 0.024*  3 0.001 13 0.015 
4 0.005 14 –0.032  4 –0.400 14 –0.016  4 0.007 14 –0.016 
5 –0.001 15 0.005  5 –0.776 15 –0.045  5 0.038* 15 –0.010 
6 –0.002 16 –0.027  6 0.012 16 –0.034  6 0.049** 16 0.000 
7 –0.014 17 0.067*  7 0.276 17 –0.103  7 0.021 17 0.030* 
8 –0.008 18 –0.026  8 –0.231 18 –0.083  8 –0.021 18 0.030 
9 0.006 19 –0.027  9 0.277 19 –0.306  9 0.009 19 –0.061 
10 –0.012 20 –0.278  10 –0.087 20 –0.398  10 0.019 20 –0.528 
  Total –0.003    Total –0.030    Total –0.006 
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32Table C.332  
Occurrence of out-of-sample value bets discovered by the logit model 
This table displays the number of out-of-sample value bets detected in the sample when determining the objective 
probabilities with the binary logit model. The in-sample period consists of seasons 2009–2012, followed by the out-of-
sample seasons 2012–2014. Similar to the above case of quasi-arbitrage, six thresholds of the value betting edge (𝑟𝑗) 
have been used: 1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. In other words, on a given threshold, it reveals the number of out-
of-sample bets that were placed when following the value betting strategy based on the binary logit model. 
 
 2012–13 2013–14 2012–14 
    
𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 15,941 16,397 32,338 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 4,230 4,600 8,830 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 909 1,034 1,943 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 202 259 461 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 94 142 236 
𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 34 57 91 
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33Table C.433 
Annual out-of-sample returns of the logit-based strategy 
This table presents the annual out-of-sample returns obtained with simulating the value betting strategy based on the 
binary logit model, as explained in Section 7.2.4, employing the one-sided t-test defined in Eq. (29). The in-sample 
period consists of seasons 2009–2012, followed by the out-of-sample seasons 2012–2014. For each period, the 
simulation has been repeated 1,000 times, letting the sequence of matches during the given period to vary randomly. 
The simulations have been performed separately for each period, level of fractional Kelly staking (𝑔), and threshold of 
the value betting edge (𝑟𝑗). In terms of the fractional Kelly staking, four different values for 𝑔 have been applied: 1.00, 
0.50, 0.25, and 0.05. With respect to the threshold of the betting edge, six different levels have been employed: 
1.00, 1.05, 1.10, 1.20, 1.30, and 1.50. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 2012–13 2013–14 2012–14 
    
𝑔 = 1.00    
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –1.000 497.851*** –0.897 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.999 56.837*** –0.728 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.977 0.417*** –0.821 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.699 0.608*** –0.304 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.593 0.077*** –0.338 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.430 0.841*** 0.025*** 
𝑔 = 0.50    
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.954 347.735*** 2.991*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.844 46.072*** 1.711*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.773 1.122*** –0.306 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.410 0.576*** –0.036 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.345 0.214*** –0.109 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.244 0.547*** 0.081*** 
𝑔 = 0.25    
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.619 36.774*** 2.792*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.426 10.029*** 1.516*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.470 0.717*** –0.046 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.217 0.348*** 0.028*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.185 0.163*** –0.026 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.130 0.303*** 0.065*** 
𝑔 = 0.05    
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.00 –0.095 1.321*** 0.449*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.05 –0.050 0.749*** 0.289*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.10 –0.104 0.147*** 0.014*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.20 –0.044 0.077*** 0.014*** 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.30 –0.039 0.042*** 0.001 
 𝑟𝑗 > 1.50 –0.027 0.065*** 0.018*** 
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34Table C.534 
Occurrence of out-of-sample value bets discovered by the logit model with favorites only 
This table displays the number of out-of-sample value bets detected in the sample when determining the objective 
probabilities with the binary logit model and including only bets for favorites whose odds (𝛿) are below a specific 
threshold. The in-sample period consists of seasons 2009–2012, followed by the out-of-sample seasons 2012–2014. The 
table lists the figures for seven different odds thresholds: 1.70, 1.60, 1.50, 1.40, 1.30, 1.20, and 1.10. In other words, on 
a given threshold, it reveals the number of out-of-sample bets that were placed when following the value betting 
strategy that is based on the logit model and includes only favorites. 
 
 2012–13 2013–14 2012–14 
    
𝛿 < 1.70 1,917 2,198 4,115 
𝛿 < 1.60 1,353 1,559 2,912 
𝛿 < 1.50 808 1,005 1,813 
𝛿 < 1.40 426 536 962 
𝛿 < 1.30 149 199 348 
𝛿 < 1.20 26 29 55 
𝛿 < 1.10 0 0 0 
    
 
35Table C.635 
Annual out-of-sample returns of the logit-based strategy with favorites only 
This table presents the annual out-of-sample returns obtained with simulating the value betting strategy based on the 
binary logit model including only bets for favorites whose odds are below a specific threshold, employing the one-sided 
t-test defined in Eq. (29). The in-sample period consists of seasons 2009–2012, followed by the out-of-sample seasons 
2012–2014. For each period, the simulation has been repeated 1,000 times, letting the sequence of matches during the 
given period to vary randomly. The simulations have been performed separately for each period, level of fractional 
Kelly staking (𝑔), and odds threshold. In terms of the fractional Kelly staking, four different values for 𝑔 have been 
applied: 1.00, 0.50, 0.25, and 0.05. With respect to the odds threshold, five different levels have been employed: 
1.70, 1.60, 1.50, 1.40, and 1.30. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 2012–13 2013–14 2012–14 
    
𝑔 = 1.00    
 𝛿 < 1.70 –0.596 33.406*** 2.730*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 1.811*** 85.053*** 14.553*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 5.576*** 16.25*** 9.651*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 11.360*** 3.242*** 6.241*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 2.266*** 2.694*** 2.473*** 
𝑔 = 0.50    
 𝛿 < 1.70 0.039*** 10.208*** 2.412*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 1.342*** 13.937*** 4.914*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 2.079*** 4.653*** 3.172*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 2.952*** 1.537*** 2.166*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.872*** 1.045*** 0.957*** 
𝑔 = 0.25    
 𝛿 < 1.70 0.148*** 2.918*** 1.121*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 0.659*** 3.336*** 1.682*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.834*** 1.560*** 1.167*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 1.045*** 0.674*** 0.850*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.380*** 0.452*** 0.415*** 
𝑔 = 0.05    
 𝛿 < 1.70 0.048*** 0.347*** 0.188*** 
 𝛿 < 1.60 0.121*** 0.365*** 0.237*** 
 𝛿 < 1.50 0.137*** 0.221*** 0.178*** 
 𝛿 < 1.40 0.159*** 0.117*** 0.138*** 
 𝛿 < 1.30 0.068*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 
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